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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Because of the historically important responsibilities 
of diplomats, historians and former emissaries have attempted 
to ascertain what;qualifications were requisite for the 
"ideal" envoy. Many of their accounts stressed abilities 
which were necessary during a particular period of history, 
while others emphasized those.characteristics that are time­
less. The noted English historian and diplomat, Harold 
Nicolson, capably discussed both the particular and general 
qualities. His emphasis upon the universal characteristics 
essential for any diplomat-was worthy of attention,* Nicol­
son asserted that' the function of diplomacy is.the management 
of the relations between independent states through the 
process of negotiation. The ideal diplomat, he added, should 
possess "moral influence" or strict honor, which is the basis 
of good negotiation. This."moral influence" is derived from 
special virtues which the envoy must have or acquire. First 
among these virtues is truthfulness, which Nicolson-defined 
as "scrupulous care to avoid the suggestion of the false or 
the suppression of the true." Truthfulness will increase the 
credibility of the diplomat, and fortify future confidence 
in him. Precision compliments truthfulness and is imperative, 
because diplomacy is a written rather than a verbal act.
2
Nicolson suggested "...the great high-roads of history are 
strewn with little shrines of peace which have either been 
left unfinished, or have collapsed when completed, for the 
sole reason that their foundations were built on the sands 
of some verbal misconception." Calm is also important. He 
explained, "Not only must the negotiator avoid displaying 
irritation when confronted by the stupidity, dishonesty, 
brutality or conceit of those with whom it'is his unpleasant 
duty to negotiate; but he must eschew all personal animos­
ities, all personal predilections,, all enthusiasms, pre­
judices, vanities, exaggerations, dramatizations, and moral 
indignations." However, a diplomat is not ideal unless he 
is modest, since the dangers of vanity are great., And 
finally, the envoy should be loyal to several different and, 
at times, conflicting sources, such as his own government, 
his staff, and his diplomatic colleagues. Nicolson con­
cluded: '"But1, the reader may object, 'you have forgotten
intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, 
charm, industry, courage and even.tact.1 I have not forgotten 
them. I have taken them for granted."
Graham H. Stuart outlined the basic duties of the diplo­
mat. He asserted that the first and most important of these
^Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963; First edition, 19 39"), 80, 110-13, 116-17,
119-20, 122-24, 126. See also Nicolson, The Evolution of 
Diplomatic Method (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1954.), 57-65.
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is the maintenance of friendly relations with the country 
to which the envoy is accredited. Of course, he must not 
lose sight of the policies of his own government, and he 
must make every effort'to justify them, even if they are 
not,pleasing to the host country. Among the diplomat's 
other major functions should be: 1) the protection of,
nationals; 2) a degree of assistance to "legitimate'' 
commercial interest; and 3) the perpetuation,of cordial 
relations with his diplomatic colleagues, the foreign:office, 
and all government officials. However, Stuart warned, the 
envoy should avoid interfering in,the internal affairs of 
the foreign country or making public expressions against 
its government; In terms of reporting, Stuart continued, a 
diplomat must observe "with an intelligent and unprejudiced 
viewpoint" everything that takes place about'him, and despatch 
whatever information he thinks might interest his government, 
in order that policy can,be shaped and proper instructions 
furnished to the diplomatic officers. Stuart further insisted 
that social functions are also a very important aspect of 
diplomatic life, and an envoy's success or failure can some­
times depend upon his ability to utilize his social contacts
2effectively and astutely.
2Graham H. Stuart, American, Diplomatic and_Consular 
Practice (New York: D. Appleton-Century do. ,. 1936), 240.-69,
27 2. [Hereinafter referred to as Stuart, Diplomatic 
Practice.) See also Hugh Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1944), 
42-43,
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Charles W. Thayer, a former- United States Foreign 
Service officer, brought the.discussion of the role of the 
diplomat.,a step further. Like Stuart, he believed political 
sense is necessary for an,effective diplomatist. In addition 
to natural qualifications and an understanding of his duties, 
the would-be diplomat, Thayer argued, needs a long and 
arduous training before he can.qualify for a mission. He 
stated, "Most authorities insist that no government should 
employ a diplomat until he has served an adequate apprentice-, 
ship.
Thayer's last observation alluded to a major problem 
of the diplomatic practice of the United States--the-use, of 
the amateur- to represent his government's interests in a 
foreign country. Overwhelmingly, historians, former diplo­
mats , and journalists have criticized this practice. Clare 
Boothe Luce queried: "...who should represent America abroad:
the professional, the amateur, or the 'best qualified man who 
can be found?' Obviously the latter. And just as obviously,
the reasonable presumption must be that the professional is
4most likely to be the man." And E. Wilder Spaulding said,
Charles W. Thayer,, Diplomat (New York: Harper, and 
Brothers Publishers,1959), 243-44, 284.
4Clare Boothe Luce, "The Ambassadorial Issue: Profes.- 
sionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs * Vol. XXXVI (October, 
1957), 114. See also T O T  : !
5
"Diplomacy is, and seems destined to remain* the only vital 
profession in the world where key members without experience 
or special aptitude are thought.to be. a d e q u a t e H e  specu­
lated that the non-professional diplomat might bring some, 
advantages to his position, such as infusing the service 
with "fresh blood" from,many walks of life, having compatible 
political views with the current administration, representing 
varying geographic areas, and contributing private: incomes. 
However, the amateur often has serious limitations^-inexper­
ience, inability to work as a member of a team, unfamiliar­
ity with foreigners and their country, and the likelihood of 
being overtly partisan for or against the country to which 
he is accredited.^
Hugh,Gibson, a widely experienced career diplomat, was 
even more critical than Spaulding, and emphasized the many 
problems inherent in amateur diplomacy. He stated:
But as regards what should be the most highly 
specialized profession in the world we do a right . 
about-face. In fact, we deny that a specialized 
need exists. We as a people are convinced we 
should be better served if the career diplomats 
were turned out'and their places taken by plain 
Americans from private.life. They alone will
E. Wilder Spaulding, Ambassadors. Ordinary and Extra­
ordinary (Washington D„C»: Public Affairs Press, 1961),..JL3, 
(Hereinafter referred to as ..Spaulding, Ambassadors .) See 
also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 162; Ray Stannard Baker, 
President 1913--I914, Vol. IV of Woodrow Wilson Life and 
Letters ..(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co. , 
Inc., 1931), 32. (Hereinafter referred-to as Baker, 
Wilson, IV.)
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stand for no nonsbnse from foreigners and know 
how to talk to them.6
He further claimed that?discussion about the failure of 
diplomacy was hardly credible, since diplomacy has not been 
given a chance to fail;. The "politicians, amateurs, and 
adventurers" usurped the diplomatic functions of the United 
States, and were sent abroad with new, untried methods and' 
"publicity stunts," resulting in, "„.a world wide mess of 
unprecedented proportions." Besides, the man appointed 
solely because he was an active party worker could not"be 
held accountable no matter how outrageously he.behaved, 
and must be handled "with gloves." Gibson also discounted 
certain criticisms which had been leveled against the pro­
fessional envoy, For instance, he argued that the belief 
that .the career diplomat succumbed to flattery and social 
attention was unwarranted. In reality, it was. the political 
appointee who, most, often submitted to, this, leading him to 
become an active propagandist for the country to which he 
was, accredited. Gibson summarized: "It is impossible to
escape the conviction that:we have the worst system that 
could be devised for appointment to high office,"
The "amateurism" which Luce, Spaulding, Thayer,,Gibson, 
and many others have criticized was an obstacle, to the de­
velopment of a capable American Foreign Service, especially
^Gibson, The Road to Foreign Policy, 33,
7lbid., 49-50, 63, 156, 167, 169-70,
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from the rise of the United States as a world power in the
a 91890's until the beginning of World War II. With the
election of William McKinley a substantial turn toward a 
professional Foreign Service seemed imminent. The Presi­
dent was not opposed to continuing, on good behavior, 
diplomatic secretaries from the previous administration, 
and about sixty percent retained their positions- However, 
this is not to argue that McKinley was above partisan 
appointments.^ Francis Mairs Huntington Wilson clearly 
exemplified the mood of the day:
March 4, 189 7, found me in Washington, stand­
ing on the curb, near the.Treasury Department 
watching the parade.in honor of President McKinley's 
inauguration. I was one.of the countless office- 
seekers that- turned the place into a mad-house, 
making the hotel lobbies swarm with people, hum 
with excited:talk, and stink with the odor of bad 
cigars. Uncouth men, with Foreign Service Lists in 
their hands, would run down the salary column, stop 
at. an attractive figure, and ask me "where the hell"
See Ernest R. May, Imperial. Democracy The Emergence 
of America as, a Great Power (New York.: Harcourt, Brace and 
World, Inc.. , 19 61), 269-70;.. Samuel Flagg.. Bemis , The United 
States as a. World..Power A Diplomatic. His tory 1900^1950 
(New York: . Henry. Holt, and Co., 1950), 1-8; William Barnes 
and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United 
States Origins, Development, and Functions (Washington D.C.: 
Historical. Bureau, of.Public Affairs, Department of State, 
1961), 154, 188.-89. (Hereinafter referred to as Barnes 
and Morgan, Foreign Service.)
9See Thayer, Diplomat, 64, 255; Stuart, Diplomatic 
Practice, 45, 238; Nicolson, Diplomacy, 128-237^
1 AiUWarren. Frederick. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy. In 
the United States 1779-1939 A Study in. Administrative 
History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 81. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy.)
the place was. It was the Spoils System working 
with a vengeance. One.heard nothing of Civil.
Service or paltry questions of qualification.. The. 
thing to do seemed to be to get as many letters of 
recommendation as possible from one's state delega­
tion in Congress and from.powerful politicians of 
the Republican party. So I set about doing this 
quite shamelessly.
About his own appointment, he added:
After a little talk at the State Department 
with Mr. Alvey A. Adee, the Second Assistant 
Secretary of State, Sidney Y. Smith, Chief of the 
Diplomatic Bureau, and others, I was given a copy 
of the Diplomatic Regulations and speeded on my 
way, a diplomat de jure, if hardly cle facto,
Knowing nothing of international law, diplomatic 
procedure, or commerce, and little of history, I 
had as qualifications only a fair command of 
French and whatever natural ability my inheritance 
may have given me.... There were no examinations; 
no attempt to determine qualifications. Appoint­
ments were made simply under pressure of political 
influence or favoritism. I was thrown into 
diplomacy, indeed thrown into life,.without due 
preparation.or advice, just as I had earlier been 
thrown into the water to learn to swim.
Especially because of the effects of the commercial,
political, and missionary expansion after the Spanish
American War, subtle changes began to occur in the size,
existing hierarchy, and standards of compensation for the
Foreign Service. McKinley's successor, Theodore Roosevelt,
had gone on record as early as 1894 as favoring a career
Foreign Service. In December, 1901, he recommended the
reorganization of the consular service, but gave it little
^F. M. Huntington Wilson, Memoirs of an Ex-Diplomat 
(Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1945), 46, 48.
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practical support at that time. By 1905, he was being 
pressured for tangible reform of the Foreign Service, es­
pecially in the consular branch, by businessmen involved in 
international commerce, imperialists, missionary groups, 
and the National Civil Service Reform League. Many members 
of the Department of State approved of the career principle, 
and both Roosevelt and Secretary of State Elihu Root, like 
most of their predecessors after 1888, approved and supported
its application. However, most congressmen and a large seg-
1 ̂ment of public opinion were unenthusiastic. Nevertheless,
Roosevelt.acted. He issued two executive orders in November, 
1905, to make lower diplomatic and consular positions more'
professional through an examination process and increased
14compensation. But these orders fell short of what the
President had advocated earlier, possibly because he believed
the service had too much "bad timber" in it, and did not
15want to perpetuate them in office. In 1906, a statute was. 
enacted reorganizing the consular service, followed closely 
by another executive order, The diplomatic corps was not
^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177- 78. See also 
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 81-82.
13Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 83-84,
■^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 177-78.
I CIlchman, Professional Diplomacy, 87,
^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 179-80.
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included in the provisions of that particular statute but, 
in terms of practical advances, there were substantial 
gains. Twentyr-five percent of the ministers and diplomatic 
secretaries under the Roosevelt administration had entered 
the service between.1888 and 1895; the remainder, entered 
prior to 1904i Another 61.4 percent had succeeded in serv­
ing under,two parties, and forty percent had received 
appointments to,two* or more posts'or,promotions within their 
own post. The number of secretaries reaching ministerial
rank also increased to 31.9 percent in 1906, although the
17rates of promotion were very uneven. Notwithstanding the
increased: attention to "professionalizing" the diplomatic
and consular services, the ministerial and ambassadorial
positions overwhelmingly remained in the hands of political
appointees and amateurs.
During the administration of William Howard Taft, some
further steps were taken to continue the merit system for
the lower, offices in the Foreign Service. By an, executive
order in 1909, all diplomatic officers below the rank of
18minister .were granted civil service status. Also, of 
the twelve career ministers Taft had retained from the 
previous’administration, eight remained in 1912; of the eight
17Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 79.
■^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 179-80; Ilchman, Pro­
fessional Diplomacy, 111.
11
original appointments made from the service under Taft, six
remained in 1912. However, 85.7 percent of the career
19ministers were;posted in Latin America.
The election of 1912 gave control of the Executive 
and; Congress to the Democratic party, which had been in 
the■"patronage wilderness" for sixteen years. Members: of 
the Foreign Service were naturally apprehensive of their 
fate, since the merit system rested on executive orders, 
which were not binding on succeeding presidents. And, 
unlike the consular service, the diplomatic corps had yet
20to establish a nonpartisan reputation in the public mind. 
Nonetheless, security of tenure and promotion by merit, on 
the.secretarial level, were fully accepted by the new admin­
istration. But its blatant use of the spoils system.all 
but eliminated the prospect of promotions to ministerial 
positions
The First World War, however, had a positive influence 
on the diplomatic service. There was. a 38.5 percent increase 
in the number of secretaries, compared to 45.6 percent in-
? 9the whole previous decade. Furthermore,, pressure was, com­
ing from a,number of organizations for increased reform of 
the diplomatic service, and in 1915 a.law was1 passed essen-
^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 111.
20Ibid., 118-19.
^ Ibid., 118-19, 130-31, See also Stuart, Diplomatic 
Practice, 181-83; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183-84. 
? ?Ilchman,,Professional Diplomacy,.132r33. See also 
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 155.
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tially ,affirming the executive order of ■■1909. This placed
all diplomatic officers, below the rank of minister, on
23the merit system.
When the war ended, one of the necessities was reorga­
nizing the machinery for the conduct of foreign relations 
to meet the fundamental changes in the world's system of
states and the,new position of power and wealth of the 
24United States, With preparation for the peace conference, 
recognition of new states and governments, and the re-estab­
lishment of missions to the Central Powers, the existing 
burdens of the Department of State increased. All this made 
a reexamination of the Foreign Service imperative, and immed­
iately twenty-five new secretaries were added to the diplo­
matic corps. Further legislative activity ensued. Repre­
sentative John Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts introduced a 
bill providing for a system of promotion of efficient 
secretaries, to ministerial vacancies, which was heartily 
approved by the career officers of the Department, Although
the bill received favorable reaction in,Congress,.the session
7 ̂closed without,action on it, About the same time, there 
was considerable talk of combining the consular and diplomatic
2 3^Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 183.
24Ibid., 184. See also Thayer, Diplomat, 68-69.
7 ̂ Ilchman,, Professional Diplomacy, 142-44.
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services; although members of the diplomatic corps were 
initially opposed. Some changes were soon to take place, 
however.
In the election of 1920, the victorious Republican 
party.committed itself to government aid in the expansion 
of trade, and the diplomatic service would be an important- 
tool in;fulfilling this promise. Moreover, the Republicans 
had traditionally favored a career Foreign Service. The 
time seemed at hand for a major step toward a further pro- 
fessiohalization.of the diplomatic corps. Warren G. Harding, 
who had won the presidency by a margin.large enough to free 
him:from many political debts, went on record early - in. 1921 
in support of such a venture. By 1922-, thirty-five percent 
of the upper positions in:the diplomatic corps were held by 
career men--the highest percentage since the Taft adminis­
tration. ̂
A major reform of the Foreign Service came in 1924 with 
the Rogers Act, which combined the diplomatic and consular 
branches into one group. It allowed for entrance by examina­
tion for all who could qualify, and secured tenure and promo­
tion ,by merit. Furthermore, the principle of interchange­
ability from one branch of the service to. the other increased 
the possibility that a candidate would get the correct type
26Ibid., 157.
14
2 7of assignment. Implementing the Rogers Act was more
difficult than.drafting it, since many inequities occurred.
Eventually, under practical conditions, the most critical
2 8issues were worked out.
With all its practical benefits, the Rogers Act.did not 
cope with the persistent problem of the political appointment 
of ministers and ambassadors. However, there were some prac­
tical advances during the 1930’s. In 1932, Herbert Hoover’s 
administration had fifty-one;percent of its upper diplomatic 
posts, including half of the ambassadorships, filled with 
career officers.. This percentage did not change radically 
under the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, even,though 
the new president has been frequently accuse,d of a deep dis­
trust of the Foreign Service, Early in his administration, 
Roosevelt and his advisers decided on a rough balance between 
career and non-career appointments. By 1937, fifty-two per­
cent of the ministers and ambassadors were.professionals, 
and, by 1939, more than sixty percent of the ambassadors were 
career men, including holders of some of the most important
posts, such:as Tokyo, Rome, and Berlin, Yet, Paris, London,
29and Moscow remained in the hands of amateurs,
^Ibid., 177. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 
185-86.
28Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 190-91.
2QIlchman, Professional Diplomacy, 211-17. See also 
Thayer, Diplomat'] 73- 75 „
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The diplomatic service made encouraging, if uneven 
progress toward professionalism from the 1890's to World 
War II. However, the upper posts--ministers and ambassadors-- 
were the last to be, involved in this process,, Of the whole 
period, the most1 pointed example of the use of amateurs as 
chiefs-ofrmission occurred during the administrations of 
Woodrow Wilson, It is the purpose of this thesis to:
1) examine the appointments to all the major ambassadorial; 
and ministerial posts during this period; and 2) evaluate 
the diplomatic performance of thirteen non-professional 
ambassadors and ministers through their published memoirs 
and letters and through the analyses of; historians .• Hope-^ 
fully, this case study will demonstrate the nature of 
"amateurism" in the American diplomatic corps.
CHAPTER II
APPOINTMENTS OF CHIEFS-OF-MISSION
It has been said that Wilson and Secretary of State 
William Jennings. Bryan, were, like most of their predecessors, 
relatively ignorant of and indifferent to foreign affairs0 
They also shared, to a remarkable degree, certain assumptions 
and ideals, which provided the impetus for their foreign 
policy,. They were both moralists, who thought in terms.of 
"eternal.verities;" they were both dedicated, at least theo­
retically, to the democratic ideal, and obsessed with the 
concept of America's mission in the world; they were both, 
fundamentally missionaries and evangelists, confident that 
they understood what was best for other countries more clearly 
than the leaders of those countries. And even,though this 
"missionary diplomacy" did not explain the politics of Wilson 
and Bryan in full,•it demonstrated their desire to act justly, 
advance the cause of international peace, and give the peoples 
of the world "the blessings of democracy and Christianity."
l.See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive 
Era 1910-19.17 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1954), 
81-82» (Hereinafter referred to as Link, Progressive Era.)
See also Harley Notter, The Origins - of- the Foreign. Policy of 
Woodrow Wilson (Baltimore! The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931.),
221-314. (Hereinafter referred to as Notter, Wilson*,.)'.;
Paolo E. Colette, Progressive Politician and Moral, Statesman 
1909-1915, Vol. II of William Jennings Bryan (Lincoln:
Uni vers ity of Nebraska Press, 1969), 1.47- 259 . (Hereinafter 
referred to as Coletta, Bryan, II).
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However, the idealism that the President and his Secretary 
of State brought to the new Democratic administration was. 
not always expressed in. their actions* The pervasive use; 
of the spoils system to fill diplomatic posts was a prime 
example*
The accession to power of the Democrats after sixteen,
years of Republican domination has been cited frequently as
the justification for the blatant use of spoils politics by
2the Wilson administration, Stuart added, that since nomi­
nations to diplomatic posts had regularly been,of a political
nature, the Wilson administration was merely following
3Republican precedents. But Warren F, Ilchman, believed that
the increasing professionalization of the Foreign Service
under, Roosevelt and Taft.was threatened by the unfettered
4use of patronage during the Wilson administration. However, 
neither Stuart nor Ilchman - clearly demonstrated why the new 
Democratic administration resorted to spoils politics„
Virtually all students of Wilson would agree that upon 
his election, he tried to,place.the best possible men in the
^See Stuart, The Department of. State A History of Its 
Organization,  ̂Procedure, and,Personnel (Hew~York: - Mac Millan 
CoT, 1949) , 22$; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign , Service, 183
^Stuart, Dip.loma.tie Practice, 182- 83, See also 
Victor S. Mamatey, The United States and: East■Central.:Europe 
1914-19.18 A Study in-Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda, 
(Princeton: Princeton University;,:Press, 1957), (Herein-
after referred to as Mamatey, Central Europe,)*
^Ilchman, Professional - Diplomacy, 118-19
18
ambassadorial and ministerial posts.  ̂ The possibility that 
the President would appoint merely personal and political 
favorites seemed highly unlikely, given his idealism and 
former position as vice-president of the National Civil 
Service,Reform League. As Ilchman stated, Wilson was an 
educator who "appreciated the need for career specializa­
tion."^ However, Link noted that the President distrusted 
the professionals in the Department of State and thought 
many of them were "...either aristocrats, the products of
exclusive schools and a snobbish society, or else syco-
7phantic imitators of the wealthy classes."
However, within thefirst few months of his presidency, 
Wilson, encountered some serious setbacks in seeking new 
chiefs-af .-mission.. Prospective appointees for the embassies 
in London, Berlin, Paris, and the legation in Peking, declined 
his offers. In general, the excuses given were.lack of funds, 
personal matters, and corporate interests. It is widely
^See Ray Stannard Baker, President 1913-1914 Vol. IV of 
Woodrow Wilson Life and.Letters (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1931), 25-26. (Hereinafter 
referred . to . as Baker , Wilson, IV, 25-26; Link, Wilson the Diplo­
matist A, Look at His Major . Foreign Policies- (Baltimore :
Tfte John Hopkins Press, 195-7.) , 25 26; Arthur Walworth, 
American Prophet, ,.Vol.. I of Woodrow Wilson (New York.: 
Longmans , Green and Co. , 19 5 8) , 3.47-4.8 . ("Hereinafter 
referred to as Walworth, Wilson, I.)'
^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 118-19,
^Link, Wilson The.Diplomatist, 24. For example, see 
Wilson to C . W., Eliot, September, 17, . 1913 , Wilson Papers, 
Library of Congress, cited in above,. See also Link, The 
New;Freedom Vol. II of Wilson (Princeton: Princeton Univer-
19
Qaccepted that inadequate finances was the foremost problem,,
The government provided'the chiefs-of-mission with minimal
salaries and only limited expense budgets with which to
maintain the embassies and legations, especially in Europe,
Hence, they would often need to utilize personal savings or
money provided by a benefactor or by a political group. The
question of wealth complicated the selection of the "best
9men," and obviously frustrated Wilson,
The inability of the President to persuade his initial 
candidates to accept the most important diplomatic posts was., 
in part, responsible for his selection of many Democratic 
party favorites. According to Charles Seymour, Wilson was 
acutely aware: of the dangers, that menaced American interests 
abroad when'a change in administrations occurred. Thus, 
Seymour continued, the President fought against the "threat­
ened intrusion of the spoils system," However, the problem 
was not simple, in view of the difficulty in finding Ameri­
cans with a combination of intellectual backgrounds and 
material resources, and also in view of the purely partisan 
influences which regarded the Foreign Service as primarily
sity Press , ,195.6) , 98, (Hereinafter referred to as Link, 
Wilson, II,)
8Walworth, Wilson, 1, 247- 4 8 Baker,, Wilson,. IV, 32; 
Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Link, Wilson, II, 101.
9Link, Wjlson, II, 101.
20
10designed to furnish jobs for political supporters,, Al­
though Link and Paolo Coletta believed that the difficulty 
in acquiring the "best men" compelled Wilson to yield to 
party pressure in naming ministers and ambassadors, they 
also declared that Wilson always considered diplomatic 
appointments on the upper level to be political in 
nature,^ Acknowledging a- certain degree of inevitability, 
Jatnes Kerney, a journalist * and Wilsonian from NeW Jersey, 
said, "In the first two years of the Presidency, Wilson, 
played considerably at organization politics. It was not
to his liking. But every President finds he must be a>
12politician in one sense.or another,"
Since Wilson.quite universally made patronage appoints 
ments, it seems probable that he was never ideologically 
opposed to selecting friends and party favorites. Also, 
when he declined to nominate many professional diplomats 
to the highest posts in favor of "best men" outside of the
•^Charles Seymour, Behind the Political. Curtain 1.912- 
1915,Vol.1 of The Intimate Papers of Colonel.House, 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press., 1926) , 177-78, (Hereinafter 
referred to as Seymour, House, I.)
■^Link, Wilson, II, 101, 103; Link, Wilson The. 
Diplomatist, 25-26; Coletta, "Secretary of State William 
Jennings Bryan and 'Deserving Democrats,'" Mid-America, 
XLV1II (April, 1966), 83, See also Ilchman7 Professional 
Diplomacy, 48-49,
James Kerney, The Political. Education of Woodrow 
Wilson (New York: The Century Co , , 19.26) , 308, (Nereinaf ter 
referred to as Kerney, Political,Education,)
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profession, he left himself susceptible to party influences. 
Certainly, Wilson’s use of spoils, system was hardly a 
transition from his original intentions. Nevertheless it 
should be noted, that Wilson, with the advice of Colonel 
Edward M. House, his confidant and personal adviser, kept 
the consular service and most subordinate officials in the 
diplomatic corps on the merit system.
Bryan's attitude concerning diplomatic appointments 
increased the likelihood that the Wilson administration 
would employ the spoils system profusely. In fact, spoils 
politics during the Wilson administration have often been 
equated with the "Great Commoner." He was even,more of a 
novice in foreign affairs than the President, and certainly 
unfamiliar with the functions of the Department of State. 
Although the Secretary came to office with an idealistic 
notion of the foreign affairs,of the United States, he was 
equally dedicated to the value of. party politics.14 He 
simplistically assumed that by "turning the rascals out" 
and replacing them with loyal Democrats, the new adminis­
tration would be strengthened. Also, Bryan's opinion of
-*-̂ Barnes and Morgan, Foreign. Service, 183; Spaulding, 
Ambassadors, 9; Seymour,.. House, 1, 178; Tlchman, Profes- 
sional Diplomacy, 120-21.
-t-̂ Link, Progressive Era, 26, 27.
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15professional diplomats paralleled the,President's. Thus, 
because of his strong convictions in favor of the spoils 
system, the inordinate number of demands on. him for political 
appointments, and his powerful position in the. Democratic 
party, Bryan-was continually seeking sinecures for "deserv­
ing Democrats . Coletta described one, of Bryan's most 
nefarious practices--making a series of temporary appoint­
ments for the sake of the honor attached- to them. For 
instance, he had reserved El Salvador "for Nebraskans only,"
He wrote to his brother Charles: "I think it would be well
to give one year to four of our friends and would suggest 
Doc Brown for the first year. Can make the appointment at 
once. Suppose you. talk to Doc and see if he would like it.
It is $1.0,000 a year." But. ex-mayor F„ tf. "Doc" Brown 
feared that accepting the post, would jeopardize his chances 
for postmaster of Lincoln. Charles Bryan became so angry 
with Brown that‘he suggested that the Secretary of State 
have, the prospective minister's resignation written out, 
dated a year in advance, and signed before the commission
■̂ •̂ Link, Wilson, II, 103. See also Coletta, Mid^-Aner.ica 
XLVIII, 8.5-.86; Baker, Wilson, IV, 38-39; Ilchman, Professional 
Diplomacy,. 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 183,; 
Spaulding.,. Ambassadors, 9; Kerney, Political Education, 316-17.
^Katherine Crane,- Mr.*, Carr, of State Forty-Seven, Years 
in .the Department of State- (NewrYerk: St. Martin's, Press.,
I960), 146-49 „ (Hereinafter referred to as Crane, Carr...)
See also Coletta, Mid-America., XLVIII, 85; Link, Wilson, II, 
103; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 119;
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was given. However, Doc Brown never accepted this type of 
offer, but other candidates did. Fortunately, Bryan's 
patronage activities were primarily,limited to ministers.-^
The nature of the use of spoils politics by the Wilson 
administration can■graphically be seen in viewing the various 
appointments themselves. Therefore, the remainder of this 
chapter will be devoted to a mission-by-mission analysis of 
the selections and the qualifications of the chiefs-of- 
mission for these positions. Hopefully, this will provide 
evidence of the character of the diplomatic corps during 
World War I.
WESTERN EUROPE
Since many of the more!important and prestigious 
embassies and legations were located in Western Europe,
Wilson made a majority of these appointments himself. The 
prominent Eondon post went to Walter Hines Page. Born into 
a substantial family in North Carolina, he attended Randolph- 
Macon College and Johns Hopkins University, and eventually 
sought his fortune in the North as a journalist.. He became, 
successful in this field, editing such periodicals as The 
Forum, The Atlantic Monthly, and World's Work. He helped 
establish the latter with Frank,Doubleday, who became his 
partner, in 1889, in the Doubleday, Page and Company pub-
l?Link, Progressive Era, 27; Ilchman, Professional 
Diplomacy, 120, 126; Seymour, House, I, 177-78; Barnes 
and Morgan, Foreign Service, l'S’3'J
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lishing house.
On an assignment from the New York World to cover the
Atlanta, Exposition of 1882 , Page had met a young lawyer,
Woodrow Wilson, with whom he established an immediate 
19rapport. Ross Gregory dramatically summarized the rela­
tionship between the two men: "If Page and Wilson had not
met in 1882 it would have been-another time, for circum­
stances destined that their paths frequently would cross. 
Both were southerners; both,went to Johns Hopkins, attained
success in,the North, and looked back on,the old area with
20hopeful objectivity." Their paths did cross repeatedly
after the first meeting. By 1885, Page had a New York,
editorial position, and in searching for good manuscripts
oftentimes relied upon Wilson, who was then a college pro- 
21fessor. It was not surprising that Page became an early
^A, Howard Meneely, "Walter Hines Page," in Vol. XIV 
of Dictionary of American Biography, ed. by Dumas Malone 
(New York; Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 142-44. (Here­
inafter referred, to. as D.A .Bo) See also,Alex Mathew Arnett, 
Claude Kitchin and the Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Co., 1937), 121-22. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Arnett, Kitchin.)
■^Ross Gregory, Walter Hines Page. Ambassador to. the 
Court of St. James's (Lexington: University of Kentucky 
Press , 19 70) , 7Z (Hereinafter referred to as Gregory, Page.)
20 Ibid., 17.
7 1Ibid. Gregory also asserted that Page’s position as 
a New York editor laid the foundation for a stronger rela­
tionship between the two men.
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■ 2 2supporter of Wilson for the presidency in 1912,
After Wilson had been elected, it could be assumed that 
he would seriously consider his long-time friend for a place 
in his administration. Many of Page's associates urged his 
appointment to the Cabinet. House felt that Page should be 
considered, but only after "a few qualified men" could be 
placed, and the political spoils had been dispensed. It 
was no secret that Page had wanted to be named Secretary of 
Agriculture. Ironically, the position went to a man he him­
self had recommended. ̂  He was considered for Secretary of 
Interior, but some of the President's advisers believed that 
a southerner would be an inappropriate choice to manage the
Civil War veterans' pension system, which the Department of
24Interior controlled. By early March, Page was visibly 
upset by all the political maneuvering. In a letter to 
"Uncle Henry" Wallace, he said:
Ibid.. , 16-20. Besides helping determine strategy,
Page used World's Work* to promote Wilson's candidacy and 
election, . See.also Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters 
of Walter Hines Page, Vol.. I (Garden City, New York: Double- 
day, Page. and.Co ., 19 23), 130. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Hendrick, Page, I); H.C.F. Bell, Woodrow.. Wilson. and the People 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1945), 
40-41.
^Gregory, Page> 22-23.
^Hendrick stated that Page was an "outspoken enemy" 
of the pension program.. See.his Page, I, 118-19. See also 
Baker, Governor 1910-1913, Vol. Ill of Wilson, 454; Gregory, 
Page, 23-24. ’
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God pity our.new masters! The President 
is all. right,. He's sound, earnest, courageous*
But-his party! I still have some muscular 
strength* In certain remote regions they still 
break stones in the road by hand. Now I'll 
break stones, before: I' d have, a job at Washing­
ton now* I spent four days with them lastweekr- 
the new crowd* They'll try their best. I think 
they'll succeed* But, if they do succeed and 
survive, they'll come out of the scrimmage bleed-, 
ing and torn* We've got to.stand off and run 'em,
Uncle Henry. That's the only hope I see for the 
country.... 25
Although the opportunity for a Cabinet position dimin­
ished, Page was offered the ambassadorship to London through 
some fortunate circumstances. Originally, Wilson had asked 
the former president of Harvard, Charles W. Eliot, but he 
refused primarily for financial reasons. The President then 
turned to Richard Olney, the elderly former Secretary of 
State during the administration of Grover Cleveland. Once
7 f \again his offer was'rebuffed. With the advice of House
and,the new Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo,
27the President offered the post to Page. After allowing 
himself a few days to consider, Page eagerly accepted. How­
ever, he had had some problems to resolve before he made his 
decision, such as the education of his daughter, Katherine,
25Page to Henry Wallace, March 11, 1913, in Hendrick, 
Page, I, 117.
^Baker , Wilson, IV, 26- 2 7. Baker stated that Olney 
later wrote to Wilgdn expressing regret.for not taking the 
post. See 311. See also.. Link, Wilson, II, 99; Ilchman., 
Professional Diplomacy, 121; Gregory, Page, 24; Coletta, 
Bryan, 113; No11er, Wilson, 234-35.
22Link, Wilson, II, 99.
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and especially finances, Page's financial problems were 
eventually solved when Wilson persuaded his friend, Cleve­
land H. Dodge, a New York millionaire and Princeton trustee, 
to subsidize the new ambassador with $25,000 a year over and
above his salary, to help operate the American embassy in 
29London. In his published letters, Page made no pertinent 
references to his appointment. However, historians have 
provided most of the details--he was a southerner, a respected 
journalist, a close friend of the President, and a third 
choice for the ambassadorship to London.
The Brussels post; although not ranking in prestige with 
London, was considered an idyllic assignment■in 1913. The 
reform mayor of Toledo, Brand Whitlock, became the new minis­
ter to Belgium. A novelist, he had experience in journalism, 
government work, and law. Beginning in,1905, he served four 
two-year terms as mayor of Toledo, after having been legal' 
adviser to. Progressive mayor Samuel "Golden Rule" Jones.
^Gregory, Page, 22-25.
29Robert L„ Daniel, "The Friendship of Woodrow.Wilson, 
and Cleveland H. Dodge," Mid-America, XLIII (July, 19.61.).,
184. See also.Link, Wilson,. II, 99-101; Bell, Woodrow 
Wilson and.the People, 19 5; Hendrick, Page, I,.130; Wal­
worth, Wilson, I, 3T7-48, "
■ ^ H a r r i s o n  g„ Dwight, "Brand,Whitlock," D„A.B„, XX, 
137-38. ..See. also.Neil Alfred Thorburn, "Brand Whitlock,:
An Intellectual Biography,". (Unpublished. Ph.D. dissertationj 
Northwestern,University, 1965),.i-ii. (Hereinafter 
referred to as Thorburn, "Whitlock,")
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Whitlock’s biographers summarized the reasons for his
selbctionas minister to Belgium. Robert M. Crunden stated
that Newton D. Baker, an adviser to Wilson and later his
Secretary of War, gained eminence with the President-elect
after the victory of 1912. And Baker wanted nothing more
than to place his dear friend, Whitlock, in a diplomatic
post where he could meet interesting pedple~and have plenty
of time to write. Whitlock, Crunden added, did not want;to
assume the "attitude of an office seeker,” but he knew that
Baker would try to get him a position, and that Governor
31James Mo Cox was also favorable. However, he also realized 
that: Ohio Democrats were reluctant to recommend an "Indê - 
pendent" for;a diplomatic post, and some of the "less cerebral" 
Southern senators were opposed in principle to intellectuals 
in high office. Therefore, Whitlock did not place all his 
trust in others to secure him a nomination, and asked Rutger 
B. Jewett, the editor of D. Appleton Company, to obtain an- 
endorsement.from William D. Howells, the literateur and.for­
mer ambassador to Italy. Crunden concluded that Wilson con­
firmed the appointment either because of the endorsement of 
Howells or Baker.32
^Robert. M. Crunden, A Hero, in Spite of Himself.: Brand 
Whitlock in Art> Politics,~and War (New York: Alfred.A.
Knopf, 19 69) , 2297 (Here!nafter referred to as Crunden,, , 
Whitlock.) Whitlock had written to Cox, intimating that he 
would like a diplomatic assignment.
32Ibid,, 233-34.
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Jack Tager also believed that:Baker was, vital in acquir­
ing a diplomatic post for Whitlock, although he intimated 
that Whitlock, on his own volition, initially sought -it,,
During his last years as mayor of Toledo, Whitlock consid­
ered his future plans. Higher public offices, such as the 
senatorship, had been denied him, and he concluded that it 
was time to commit himself fully to a writing career. Since 
authorship usually provided only a minimal income, a dip­
lomatic post became his goal. Although Cox told Whitlock 
to file an official application for the diplomatic corps, 
he refused on the grounds that by actively seeking patronage 
he would tarnish his reputation as a "devoted public servant." 
Thus, he tried to induce his influential friends and asso­
ciates to acquire a position for him. Finally, through his 
profession of fidelity to the Democrats and the persuasion 
of Baker, Cox, Jewett and Howells, he was sent to Belgium.
Allan Nevins added still another perspective to Whit­
lock’s appointment. He asserted that Republicans as well 
as Democrats attempted to secure a diplomatic assignment 
for the Toledo mayor. However, the possibility was not 
promising, since Whitlock had not taken an active part in 
the Wilson campaign. In fact, he had hesitated whether to 
vote the Democrat or Socialist ticket. Fortunately, the
33Jack Tager, The Intellectual as. Urban Reformer. Brand 
Whitlock and the Progressive Movement (Cleveland: The Press 
of Case Western Reserve University, 1968), 148-50.
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efforts of Whitlock's friends produced results, probably-
because Wilson was familiar with the writings of Whitlock
34and admired his "progressive temper," Thus, Whitlock 
secured an appointment to Belgium, since the combination 
of influential friends and a progressive background seemed 
to outweigh the fact that the Toledo mayor was not a 
"regular" Democrat.
The selection of James W„ Gerard as ambassador to 
Germany was clearly political. The opulent New Yorker began 
his career as a lawyer in 1892* and by 1907 he was an asso­
ciate justice of the New York Supreme Court. In the family
tradition* he became a successful financier, with holdings
3 5in,New York and Montana, among others. Active in politics, 
he served as chairman^of the New York Democratic campaign 
committee* and reportedly contributed approximately $120,000
•7 (L
in 1912 to various local and national Democratic candidates.
In 1913,- he was appointed ambassador to Germany, after Dean
^Allan Nevins, ed„ , The Letters and Journal of .Brand 
Whitlock The. Letters (New York: D. Appleton-CentUry-Co„.,
1936), V j  (Hereinafter referred to as Nevins, Whitlock
The Letters.)
*2 r In 1901, he. married. Mary,A..; Daly , daughter, of. Marcus. 
Daly , a powerful, "Copper King".and,ranch-owner in Montana 
during the late nineteenth century.
^Henry : White, to Edith B*: Wilson, February 22., 1925,,. 
Baker Collection, cited in Link,. Wilson, II, 101 i-. For.
Gerard's ,biography, see. also. National Cyclopaedia,.: of 
American Biography,, Vol., XLIX (New York; James 1. White and 
Co, , 1966), 124.
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Henry B. Fine, a friend and Princeton associate of Wilson,
37declined the offer for personal and financial reasons.
Completely unabashed, Gerard explained the nature of 
his appointment in his memoirs:
It had always been my ambition to be an ambassa­
dor, and after the election of President Wilson, in 
1912, my desire was realized. President Wilson's 
decision to appoint me Ambassador to Germany was 
brought about, I think, by the friendly intervention 
of a, combination of Tammany, Senator James A.
O’Gorman of New York, William G. McAdoo, William F„ 
McCombs, and William Jennings Bryan. Bryan, in 
particular, helped me because my father-in-law had 
so lavishly supported him in his ’96 campaign. For. 
a while Colonel E. M. House, the Harry Hopkins of 
the Wilson administration, very cleverly succeeded 
in persuading me that he had been the principal fac­
tor in my, appointment, but this conviction wore 
off....3*
He went on to say that he was initially offered Spain, 
but demurred, although O’Gorman advised him to take it or 
he might get nothing. However, Gerard wanted an ambassa­
dorship, and when 0’Gorman convinced him that Madrid was 
to be made an embassy, he was ready to accept. Shortly 
after this, he received an offer to go to Germany. He 
said:
Baker,,Wilson, IV, 28. See.also Kerney, Political 
Education, 310-11; Notter, Wilson, 234-35. According to 
Link, Dodge also offered Fine a.subsidy of $25,000 a year. 
See his Wilson, II, 101.
38James W. Gerard, My First. Eighty-Three Years in 
America The. Memoirs of James W. Gerard (Garden City,
New York:. Doubleday. and, Co.., Inc.,, 191)1) , 168. (Herein­
after referred to as Gerard, Eighty-Three. Years.) There 
is no mention.of this in his My four. Years in Germany 
(New York: George H. Doran Co., 1917).
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I have heard that a number. of gentlemen;.whom 
Wilson proposed:to send to Germany were in each 
instance, turned.down by the.Kaiser. It is the . 
custom, of.course, to appoint a man who is persona 
grata to the country to which he is to be sent.
Finally someone.close to.the President said, "Well, 
let Gerard go.to.Germany and try his luck with 
that hoodoo jobl"-^
He sardonically concluded:
When an ambassador is.appointed, the White 
House announcements are unctuously, flattering 
and give no. hint, of the pulling.and hauling, 
the promises and maneuvering, and the blasted 
hopes that have preceded the appointment. It 
is frequently more difficult.to become a 
diplomat than it is to be.one.^O
Gerard's explanation of his appointment has generally 
been accepted,but Kerney and-Stuart have drawn different 
conclusions. Kerney believed that Senator William Hughes 
of New Jersey, the spokesman of the administration in the 
Senate, had some responsibility for the selection of Gerard. 
Since Gerard had contributed "on a lavish scale" to the 
Wilson election fund, he no doubt had wanted a place in the 
Cabinet. Thus, Kerney continued, an elaborate publicity 
campaign was operated through his friends in New York to 
obtain a Cabinet post for him. However, Wilson would not 
accept him in this capacity. Finally at the urging of Hughes,
•^Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 168.
40Ibid., 167.
41See Coletta, Bryan, II, 113;,Spaulding, Ambassadors, 
9-10; Barnes.and Morgan, Foreign. Service, 185-86; Baker,. . 
Wilson, IV, 35; Link, Wilson The Diplomatist, 24.
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42Gerard was assigned to Germany. Stuart maintained that 
Gerard had also been considered for Mexico City, but he was 
regarded as persona,non grata because of the reputed.ill- 
treatment accorded the peons on his mining properties in 
Mexico.^ No matter who urged his selection or for what 
post,, Gerard was1 purely a patronage appointment.
The embassy in Paris took inordinately long to fill.
Myron T, Herrick, a Taft appointee, was retained until the 
spring of 1914, and hence represented the Wilson administra- 
tion for more than a year. Like many of the President's 
own, choices for European posts, Herrick was a non-professional 
diplomat-. A former Ohio lawyer, president of a successful 
banking organization and director of several railroads and 
trust companies, he became active in politics in,1885„ An 
important Republican* he was a close associate of Marcus A„ 
Hainna, and’was an important figure in, the election of McKin*; 
ley in 1896, after which he was offered positions'as,ambassa­
dor to Italy and Secretary of the Treasury. He declined 
both. In-190 3; Herrick was elected governor of Ohio, but 
failed to be re-elected in 1905. He remained an active 
Republican,, however, and in,1912 accepted Taft’s offer to
^Kerney, Political Education, 309-10. See also 
Walworth, Wilson, I, 347 48.
^Stuart,,Diplomatic Practice, 211.
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become, ambassador to France.
About his selection, Herrick stated in-his autobio:- 
graphy:
When,.I was, running,for,..governor: in, 1905,
Taft came , to Akron.and made a speech. He in­
tended to. help, me.,. but it had.Just the opposite, 
effect.,.... .My friends all. thought that: without 
meaning to do so, he contributed,.a certain, amount, 
to my defeat. I have:always, had an idea that-his 
regret1 over . this occurrence, as much as anything, 
else, led .him . to. offer..me., a-.place- in his, cabinet, 
when he became President.. There was. also some 
talk of my taking a mission:abroad.. „ .
With.the election of Wilson, Herrick realized that his
continuation at Paris was merely a convenience for the
White H o u s e , 46 And while Herrick waited in Paris, the
selection .process continued in Washington, William F.
McCombs, Wilson'.s campaign manager, was considered, but he
declined. He was more interested in a Cabinet assignment,
which was never offered him, and he believed the Paris post
A 7would be too expensive for a man of his means. Kerney and:
^^DavidJ. Hill, "Myron Timothy Herrick," D.A.B., 
VIII, 587-89.
^^Colonel-T. Bentley Mott, Myron T. Herrick, Friend 
of France An,Autobiographical,Biography (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co.. , inc., 1929), 94. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Mott, Herrick.)
^^ibid. , 115-16. See. also . Spaulding, Ambassadors,.. 
9-10; Walter. Millis, Road to War . America 1914-1917 
(Cambridge: Riverside Press,.19 35), 20.
4^See Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 323; Mott, 
Herrick, 218-21.
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Joseph P. Tumulty, Wilson’s private secretary, then 
suggested George Harvey, an early Wilson.supporter and 
editor of the North American. Review. However, a few days 
before,Harvey's nomination was to go to the Senate, the 
disgruntled.editor wrote an untimely "swift blast” against
the President. This terminated Harvey's ;opportunity for a
. .. 48mission,
The search for an ambassador to France ended with the 
designation of William Graves Sharp in,1914. An Ohio law­
yer, turned manufacturer of pig-iron, chemicals, and charcoal, 
Sharp became involved in national politics in,1892* when he 
served as a Cleveland elector. In 1896, he had opposed 
Bryan, and free silver, but remained a staunch Democrat. He
was elected to the House of Representatives in 1908, and soon
49became a ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
In h?.s memoirs, Sharp made only passing reference to. his 
appointment: "My colleagues from Ohio, [Senator Atlee
Pomerene and Newton D. Baker] without'my knowledge, had also 
recommended my selection to the President, and tjie Senate 
had paid me the compliment of confirming my nomination without
^Kerney, Political Education, 315-16. Harvey believed 
that his .work.in the campaign.deserved some reward.. When.it 
did not,seem,forthcoming, he-became;a.critic of Wilson's, 
policies, especially the selection of-diplomatic chiefs-of- 
mission.
49Spaulding, "William Graves. Sharp," D.A.B., XYII* 25.
See also;Stuarti Diplomatic Practice, 238-39„
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the customary referral to a committee."^ But some histor­
ians have given more detailo According to Link, Sharp had 
been originally considered for the Petrograd mission,- but, 
the Russian ambassador in Washington-hinted that Sharp would 
not be welcomed because he had denounced the 1832 Russian- 
American commercial treaty in 1911.'’'*' It is also widely 
accepted that Sharp was considered for France because he had
contributed liberally to the 1912 campaign fund, and was an
c 2ardent supporter of the administration.
More political favorites and former associates of Wilson
and Bryan*filled the other Western European embassies and
legations. For the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Wilson chose
a Pennsylvania Dutchman, Dr. Henry Van Dyke, who was a pro-
53lific writer and poet teaching at Princeton University.
Prior to his appointment, a rumor circulated that the New 
York Sun was about to publish a letter written by Cleveland
^Warrington;Dawson, ed., The War Memoirs of William 
Graves Sharp American,Ambassador to France 1914-1919 
(London: Constable and Co., Ltd., 1931) , 1„ (Hereinafter 
referred to as Dawson, Sharp.)
^Link, Wilson, II, 102. Dawson stated that Sharp was 
also considered for Argentina, butiitwas scarcely important 
enough for him. See Dawson, Sharp, xviii
^Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, 11,102; 
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign.Service,.185-86; Kerney,: 
Political Education^ 315-16. —
53John. D. Spaeth, "Henry Van Dyke,".D.A.B., XIX,
186-88; Coletta, Bryan, II, 113;- Link, Road to the White 
House, Vol. I of Wilson (1947), 48; Barnes and Morgan, . 
Foreign Service, 185- 86. - See also Frederick H. Law,
Modern Great Americans (Freeport, New.York: Books.for 
Libraries Press, 1969), 248-60.
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to Van- Dyke, severely castigating Wilson-. However, Van Dyke 
refused to give a.copy to the New York, editor.^  This 
incident might have had some bearing upon.Van Dyke's nomina­
tion, as it certainly would have, helped sustain the friend-
55ship between the former Princeton colleagues. Van.Dyke
was appointed in 1913 and remained until 1917b He was.
succeeded by John Work Garrett, a career diplomat who had
S 6been minister to Venezuela and Argentina.
Another friend of Wilson, Pleasant-A. Stovall, was
appointed to Switzerland in 1913. He and the President
were boyhood friends, who had attended a private boys'
school together in Georgia. Stovall was. a journalist, and,
in 1891, with David Robinson, established the Savannah
Evening Press, of which he served as editor. An-active
Democrat, he had been chairman of the Georgia Democratic
Convention, aide-de-camp to two Georgia governors, and a
representative to his state's General Assembly from 1902 
c 7to 1906. Like many of Wilson's friends, he had been a,
•^Link, Wilson. II, 358; Kerney, Political Education. 
310-11,
‘’Kerney said that Ellen A. Wilson originally suggested 
to her husband.that he send Van.Dyke, to.the Netherlands.
See his Political Education, 310-11.
^ Register of the Department of State 1917 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office,'1918), 96~ (Hereinafter 
referred to as Register 1917.)
c 7 ...° Irving.L. Thompson, "Pleasant Alexander Stovall,"
D.A .B., XXI, 675-76; Link, Wilson, 1,4. Stovall wrote,a 
book analyzing the political conditions in Switzerland and 
Europe during the war. See his-Switzerland and the World
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devoted supporter in the 19X2 campaign.
Two Virginians, Thomas. Nelson Pag©58 and Joseph Edward 
Willard^ were appointed to Rome'and Madrid, respectively.
Page was a romantic Southern novelist and essayist, A 
social acquaintance of Wilson, he.had been chairman1©f the 
reception.committee at the inauguration in.1913, Page was
selected primarily to appease Virginia's two powerful sena-;
59tors,: Claude A, Swanson and Thomas S, Martin, The Vir­
ginia senators'also supported the nomination of Willard, a 
wealthy lawyer, a former member of the Virginia House of 
Delegates, and lieutenant governor,^® Neither Page nor 
Willard had any prior experience, in foreign affairs.
In another strictly political maneuver, Thomas‘H„ Birch 
was, commissioned as minister to Portugal„ It was at his 
home that Wilson and Bryan were first introduced.^ Further­
more, Bryan and the New Jersey carriage■manufacturer had been 
friends ever since Birch and his>father supported the Secre­
tary of State in the 1896 presidential campaign. He was no
War (Savannah, Georgia: Mason, Inc., 1939),
S^Thomas Nelson Page also wrote,a book assessing European 
political conditions during the war. See his Italy and the 
World War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19 20),
■^Link, Wilson, II, 102, See also RosewelX Page, Thomas 
Nelson Page , A Memoir of a Virginia Gentleman . (New York': 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923)',.. 150,
^Link, Wilson, II, 102, See also Spaulding, "Joseph 
Edward Willard," DTA.B., XX, 236; Register 1916 (1917), 142.
^Baker, Wilson, III, 209; Link, Wilson,'II, 102, See 
also;Register■1916, 74.
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stranger to the President either, since Wilson, before, he 
retired from Trenton^in 1912, named-Birch as an aide on the 
governor’s staff. After the campaign, Birch made known his> 
desire to be named minister to Belgium, and Bryan urged his 
selection. But the President balked, and offered him Russia 
instead. When he declined, a compromise was reached'on.
f\ '7Portugal. The new minister quickly gained the attention 
of the Department of State by ordering stationery embossed 
with "American Embassy, Lisbon," instead of "American, Lega?- 
tion, Lisbon.
SCANDINAVIA
Of the three key ministers to Scandinavia, two had some 
diplomatic experience. Wilson personally selected Ira,
Nelson Morris for Sweden. He had been a businessman for 
many years before Bryan,sent him on a, special diplomatic 
mission to Italy early in 1913. He was, appointed minister 
to Sweden little more than a year later.^ In his memoirs, 
he gave minimal attention to the reasons for his designa^- 
tion, yet.he complained how ludicrous it seemed to use
^2Kerney, Political Education, 163, 315-16.
^ Ibid., 313-15. See also George.Harvey, "The Diplomats 
of Democracy," North American Review, CLXXXIX (February,
1914),'183, ! ;
^ Regis ter 1916, 117.
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’ personal funds for diplomatic expenses. He added, 
"Throughout Europe certain men are, as it were, born
to diplomacy... In America, however , diplomats like Topsy,
,,66 just grow."
Maurice Francis Egan, originally a Roosevelt appointee, 
remained at his post in Denmark during the Wilson adminis­
tration. A Philadelphia connoisseur of "the good life" and 
a prominent Catholic, he had been a teacher and journalist 
with a desultory interest in law. He had taught at George­
town University, Notre Dame, and the Catholic University of 
America, and, in 1888, he became part-owner and editor of 
the Freeman's Journal. Since he was familiar with Europe, 
he had been ah unofficial adviser to McKinley and Roosevelt. 
The latter appointed him minister to Denmark in 1907.to purr
chase the Danish West Indies and to keep the administration
f t  7informed on European affairs.
In his memoirs, Egan, discussed his appointments in 
detail. Cleveland had offered him a post, but as he said:
"I had very little respect for our foreign service. The
65lra Nelson Morris, From an American Legation (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923) , 5.
^ Ibid., 3-4. However, he believed a beginning was. 
being made toward, professionalism in the corps, which he 
heartily approved.
67Allen Westcott, "Maurice Francis Egan," D.A.B.,
VI, 49.
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tenure was so unstable and the expense for the pleasure of 
enjoying a little brief authority so.crushing, that I was
f\ ftungrateful enough to refuse.” He eventually accepted a
post from Roosevelt. As he stated:
...Mr. Roosevelt one day,gently suggested that I 
should go to Japan, 1 was horrified. I knew 
nothing of the Eastern situation. While I was no 
novice, I had always felt that if a man was unfort­
unate enough to be an Ambassador from the United, 
States.to any other country, he ought to have 
served as'a Minis ter Plenipotentiary for a time,at 
least.... Besides this, Mr. O'Brien had been spoken, 
of in connection with Tokio. I considered myself 
well out of the diplomatic service. President 
Roosevelt said to me, combating one of my object 
tions--”Oh, you can manage very well on $10,000a 
year. You and Mrs. Egan,will always make a house 
so agreeable that everybody will come to you.”
But I knew better than that. I agreed with him 
that Copenhagen.offered.many attractions. It. was,. 
what our.State Department has never quite found 
out,, the. whispering gallery of Europe, and Presi­
dent Roosevelt knew this very well. He said:
"Perhaps Portugal, a Catholic country, would suit 
you better.” "No, not at all,” I answered. "I 
shall probably meet too many Catholics in the next, 
world and.I do not always find them so very amusing 
here." I declined to take any post. Then several 
members of.the Cabinet spoke to me about it;.One 
day the President sent for me .and,said;
"I am going down.to my little house in Vir­
ginia for . about a week. When I return I expect you 
to say yes, and I will send you to Copenhagen,
He accepted.
When the Wilson administration took office, Egad paid 
a visit to the President. He said:
^^Egan, ■ Recollections of a Happy Life (New York.: 
George H. Doran,Co., 19 24j, 181-82. [Hereinafter referred 
to as Egan, Recollections.)
69Ibid., 217.
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...The President was amiable enough to give me 
five minutes one day. I dared not, under the 
circumstances, go further than to thank him for 
keeping me at my post. "I never make merely 
political appointments," he said. "If I find a 
man 'in,' who is not of my party and is better 
than the man-who is ’out ' and who, wants to get 
'in,' I retain the better man."... 0
Egan later met with Bryan:
...I found that he was more interested in filling 
the diplomatic places with worthy politicians than 
with the expert or experienced. He told me he was 
glad there was a Catholic in the diplomatic service, 
to which I replied that neither Mr. Roosevelt nor 
Mr. Taft nor Mr. Wilson,had appointed me because 
I was- a -Catholic; ... I seemed to be looked on as a 
political appointee, who'had dropped,from somewhere 
into a circle,of white-souled charity and religious 
beauty.7^
Egan's perception of the appointment process in Washing­
ton during Wilson's administration, and his disdain for being 
considered "just another political appointee," were quite re­
vealing. He was one of the few chiefs-of-missiOn with some 
experience, and Wilson seemed to retain him for merit, rather 
than convenience, unlike Herrick. This was likely since Wil­
son asked Egan to accept the Vienna embassy. However, Egan 
declined for financial reasons, and remained in Copenhagen.7  ̂
In contrast to the more experienced Egan, Albert George 
Schmedeman, of Wisconsin, an obscure son of German immigrants,
70Ibid., 295.
71Ibid., 295-96.
7^Baker, Wilson, IV, 32; Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 
322. ' ' -
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obtained the post in Norway. Prior to his nomination, he
had been a partner in Winden, Grinde and Schmedeman,, a
prominent clothing firm in Madison. He also had served as
treasurer of the Guardian Life Insurance Company and the
Bank of Wisconsin, Active.in Madison civic affairs, he had
been a member of the Common Council of Madison from 1903 to
1907. From his early years, he was an ardent Democrat, at
one time serving as treasurer of the Wisconsin Democrat
7 3central committee. The reasons for his appointment as an 
envoy are unclear,
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The major appointments to Central and Eastern Europe 
were as politically oriented as- any made by the Wilson 
administration. The selection of an ambassador to Russia 
was an excellent example, especially.since the administra­
tion had such difficulty filling the post, Sharp had 
refused, as has;already been stated, and Charles:R. Crane, 
a Chicago.industrialist and Wilson supporter, had also 
declined*, ̂  With the support of Senator J. Hamilton Lewis 
of Illinois; Henry M. Pindell, an editor in, Peoria and a
^ National Cyclopaedia of American, Biography, XXXIII, 
440; Register 1916, 128; New York Times, November 27, 1946, 
25. After eight years as minister to Norway he returned to 
Madison and became mayor. Later he,was elected governor of 
Wisconsin.
^Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 
84; Link, Wilson, II, 102,
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strong Wilson supporter, was appointed. This proved to be 
a fiasco, since a dissatisfied clerk in Lewis’s office stole 
letters relating to Pindell’s selection and sold them to 
some newspapermen. In an article which soon appeared,
Wilson and Bryan were said to have agreed to select Pindell 
on the condition that he resign by October, 1914, When the 
Russian Foreign Minister learned of this, he immediately 
informed the secretary of.the American Embassy that his 
government would refuse publicly to.accept Pindell. This 
situation forced the Peoria editor to rescind his accep­
tance , and seriously, embarrassed the Wilson administration, ”■ ̂  
George T, Marye, a Democratic leader of California and a
7 £\friend of Bryan, was then selected to replace Pindell,
Two years later, Marye resigned and was replaced by 
David Rowland Francis, a prosperous former grain.merchant 
from,Missouri. He had a lpng record as a loyal Democrat, 
first service as delegate--at-large to the National Demo­
cratic Convention of 1884, He then had been a reform mayor 
of St, Louis, governor of Missouri, and Secretary of the 
Interior under Cleveland, Francis's opposition,to Bryan and 
free silver had damaged'his political career and, it was
^Link, Wilson, II, 102. See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 
113; Coletta, Mid^-America, XLVIII, 83-84 ; Kerney, Political 
Education, 312.
7^Coletta, Bryan, II, 113; Coletta, Mid-America, XLVIII, 
84; Link, Wilson," II, 102.
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not until 1908, when he sought peace with Bryan and advo­
cated his nomination in the Democratic National Convention,
77that he returned to politics. After an unsuccessful 
campaign for the Senate' in 1910, he went behind the scenes
and managed Champ Clark's campaign in Missouri in 1912.
7 8Four years later he was appointed to Russia,
Francis's memoirs tell nothing of his nomination, but 
there is a passage which characterized his attitude when 
he arrived in Russia:
At two o'clock, in the morning on the 28th 
of April, 1916, with the grinding of brakes and 
the pushing of people toward the doors, the 
Stockholm Express came to a stop in the Finland 
Station of Petrograd, and I realized that my 
duties as Ambassador from- the greatest Republic 
of the New World to the Court of the mightiest 
Autocracy of the Old had virtually begun. It 
was dark and cold. I was alone except for my 
loyal colored:valet, Philip Jordan. I had 
never been to Russia before. My knowledge of 
Russia up to the time of my appointment had 
been that of the average intelligent American 
citizen--unhappily slight and vague,..,'®
Many historians agree that Francis's business exper-
^Walter B. Stevens, "David Rowland Francis," D.A.B.,
VI, 577-78. See also Stevens, "David R. Francis, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to.Russia," Missouri 
Historical Review, XIII (April, 1919), 195-225; Charles 
Daniel DeYoung, "David Rowland; Francis--American in Russia" 
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 19.49),
9-11, 14-18. (Hereinafter referred to as DeYoung, "Francis.")
^William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work (Garden 
City, N.ew York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), 96; Link, 
Wilson, I, 410.
^David R. Francis, Russia from the-American Embassy 
April 1916-Noyember,! 1918 (New York.:. Charles Scribner.'s.
Sons, 19 21) , T ! (Hereinafter referred to as Francis, Russia.)
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ience was the principal, reason for his appointment. For 
many years, the United States government had been desirous 
of negotiating a new commercial treaty with Russia, and in
801916, the Russian Foreign Office had finally shown interest. 
When Marye tendered his resignation that year, the Wilson 
administration naturally sought a man with business exper­
ience , and Francis ' s name was familiar to the President. In 
1913, Edward F. Goltra, a national Democratic committeeman 
from Missouri, had recommended Francis for a diplomatic post, 
but nothing had been available. In 1914, Francis was offered 
Argentina, but; declined because of the uncertainty of busi­
ness conditions. When the Petrograd embassy.became avail­
able, Wilson immediately turned to Francis.^ Certainly, 
Francis's wealth and his loyalty to the Democratic party 
were further grounds for his selection.
^Thomas A. Bailey, America Faces Russia Russian- 
American Relations from Early Time to Our Day (Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1950) , 2T2; Gilbert C. 
Kohlenberg, "David Rowland Francis: American Businessman
in Russia," Mid-America, XL (October, 1958) , 197; William 
App1eman Williams, American-Russian Relations 1781-1947 
(New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 19 5 2) , 84; DeYoung,> 
"Francis," 9-11. George F. Kennan believed the precise 
reasons for the appointment were unclear, but Francis's 
extensive business experience certainly was a factor. See 
his Russia Leaves the War, Vol. I of Soviet-American Rela­
tions 1917-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1956), 35. (Hereinafter referred to as Kennan,ISoviet- 
American Relations ,. I.)
SlDeYoung, "Francis," 11; Kennan, Soviet-American 
Relations, I, 35; Bailey, America Faces Russiaj 22; 
Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 197.
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Charles Joseph Vopicka was chosen as minister to 
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, A Czech, born in Dolni 
Hbitz, Bohemia, Vopicka emigrated to America in 1880 and 
became a bookkeeper for a truck factory. In 1881, he 
helped organize a real estate and banking concern in 
Chicago, and then in 1891, he became a partner in,the 
Bohemian Brewing Company (later called the Atlas Brewing 
Company). He was a prominent member of the large Bohemian; 
community in Chicago and was active in many civic and
O Opolitical organizations. Victor S. Mamatey said about 
Vopicka's nomination as minister: "In 1912 he wished to
crown his success in the world of business by the dignity 
of public office and ran for Congress as a Democratic can­
didate. He was not elected, but the grateful Democratic 
party 'compensated' his services, by securing for him-the
O 7appointment..." Undoubtedly, Vopicka's nationality as 
well as his Democratic affiliation was instrumental in his 
selection.
The appointment of Frederick C. Penfield to Austria- 
Hungary came after Egan's refusal to transfer from Copen­
hagen to Vienna. Penfield had some diplomatic experience 
during the Cleveland administration as a vice-consul general 
in London and a diplomatic agent and consul general in
82Thomson, "Charles Joseph Vopicka," D.A .B., XXI, 
694-95. Ilchman mistakenly stated Vopicka became minister 
to Greece. See his Professional Diplomacy,.122.
0 7
Mamatey, Central Europe, 122.
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Cairo. The sixteen years that followed were devoted to 
travel and writing. About Penfield’s qualifications,
Joseph V. Fuller wrote: "His service under the previous
Democratic administration, his wealthy and his Catholic 
faith qualified him: for appointment by President Wilson
O Aas ambassador to Austria-Hungary." It was his'wealth 
which Kerney and Link have emphasized. Kerney stated that'
Penfield had made a ten thousand dollar contribution to
85McCombs for the 1912 campaign. In Link’s account, Penfield
8 6with $120,000 was one of Wilson’s heaviest contributors.
The post at Athens went to Garret Droppers, a professor 
of political economy and a former president of the University 
of South Dakota. Besides his academic career, he had also
o 7been active in Massachusetts civic organizations. After 
Wilson had appointed him in 1913,.it was learned that he
O gcould not serve until June;, 1914. Bryan viewed this as an 
opportunity to.place his personal friend, George F. Williams,
^Joseph V. Fuller, "Frederick C. Penfield," D.A.B.,
XIV, 425-26.
o 5Kerney, Political Education, 151. See also Baker, 
Wilson, III, 29757“
86Link, Wilson, II, 102; I, 403.
87Register 1916, 87.
88Link, Wilson, I, 380.
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89at the post until Droppers could assume it. This decision 
demonstrated a most flagrant use of the spoils system.
AFRICA AND THE EAST
Liberia was one of the few major American missions in
Africa during the Wilson,administration. Fred R. Moore of
New York was' appointed in March, 1913, but did not go to 
90the post. He was replaced by George Washington Buckner,
a former public school teacher and doctor from Indiana,:who
91served for two years in Liberia. In 1915, James Curtis 
was appointed. He was a lawyer and the only negro to receive 
an upper level diplomatic post during the Wilson administra­
tion. The Liberian mission had been offered previously to 
the prominent Alexander Walters, head of the National ,
Colored Democratic League and bishop of the African,Methodist 
Episcopal Zion Church. When he declined, he recommended 
Curtis, who was then actively working with negro Democrats. 
Hence, negro support for the Democrats in 1912 was a major
q 2factor in.the appointment of a negro as a chief-of-mission.
^^Coletta, Mid^America, XLVIII, 86; Baker* Wilson, IV, 
40-41.
90Register 1916, 116.-
^ Register 1914, .62.
^Kathleen Long Wolgemuth, "Woodrow Wilson’s Appoint­
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of Southern History,
XXIV (November, 1954), 466. See also Register 1916, ST.
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In succession, two notable contributors to the Demo­
cratic coffers were selected as ambassador to Turkey. In 
the autumn of 1913, Wilson nominated the eminent Jewish 
New York financier, Henry Morgenthau. He had donated four
Q 3thousand dollars a month to Wilson's pre-primary campaign.
During the latter days of the campaign, Wilson,asked him to
head the national Democratic finance committee. In that
position he was able to acquire sizable contributions, and
94he dispensed the money wisely. It is generally accepted 
that his financial support in the 1912 campaign was,the
9 5primary reason for his selection as ambassador to Turkey, 
Morgenthau's Jewish heritage was also a consideration 
in his appointment, since Wilson believed a Jew was needed 
in.Constantinople in the interest of American Jews in 
Palestine.^ However, Morgenthau wanted a cabinet position
^Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Walworth, Wilson, I, 347- 
48; Bell, Woodrow Wilson and the People, 70-71. Link said 
Morgenthau contributed $5,000 a month,for four months. See 
his Wilson, I, 338, 403; II, 102.
^Baker, Wilson, III, 290; Link, Wilson, I, 338;
Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service, 18,4-85.
9^Walworth, Wilson, I, 347-48; Link, Wilson, 1,-328, 
403; II, 102; Baker, Wilson, III, 290;.Bell, WoodrOw Wilson 
and the People, 70-71; Coletta, Bryan., II, 11?" “
^^Coletta, Bryan, II, 114; Kerney, Political Education, 
313; Laurence Evans, United States and tFe Partition of 
TUrkey 1914-19 24 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, T965), 
29. Evans stated that House originally suggested Morgenthau 
for Turkey. (Hereinafter referred to as Evans, Partition of 
Turkey.)
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as a reward for his campaign labors, and he was supported 
by McCombs. When he was offered Turkey instead, he hesi­
tated, stating a preference fora Western European post...
But'Wilson argued that: a Jew was indispensable.for the 
Turkish embassy. Morgenthau contended that many of his 
coreligionists urged him to decline the nomination because 
they felt it was the only mission open; to Jews in,the dip­
lomatic service. Wilson.was finally able to convince
9 7Morgenthau to actept. When he eventually resigned in
1916, he was. replaced by Abram I. Elkus, a lawyer and another;
9 8wealthy Jew from New York. Elkus had also actively cam­
paigned for Wilson and made substantial contributions to
99the Democratic party.
Bryan was most'influential in the selection of his. 
friend, John L. Caldwell, a Kansas lawyer, for the Persian 
mission. Caldwell had no experience in foreign affairs,
and his only public service was three years as a Kansas
* * * 1°° state senator.
97Kerney, Political Education, 313.
" Register 1916, 89. He had also been president of the 
Hebrew Technical School for Girls, and a regent of the 
University of the State of New York.
"Link, Wilson, I, 403; Baker, Wilson, I, 290;
J.C. Long, Bryan The Great Commoner (New York: D. Appleton 
and Co., 1928), 268.
1^0Register 1916, 78.
52
The search for a minister to China was an arduous'task. 
The Peking legation was of considerable importance in Asian 
and world affairs, requiring a man of superior ability.
Paul Samuel Reinsch, the eventual choice, was one of the 
most highly praised appointments Wilson made. Like Page, 
Gerard, and others, he was not1the first nominee. The 
President once again had turned to Eliot, who declined for 
a second time. 101 Wilson’s next choice was John R. Mott, 
a leading official in the International Y.M.C.A., who also 
declinedil02 Wilson also considered Edward A. Ross, a noted 
and controversial professor of sociology at the University 
of Wisconsin, who. was endorsed by Crane. While Wilson was 
considering Ross, Joseph E. Davies, the newly appointed 
Commisioner.of Corporations, wrote the President advising 
him to read Reinsch’s Intellectual and Political Currents 
in the Par East. Davies also praised Reinsch’s qualifica­
tions and attacked Ross’s. Wilsonhad met Reinsch through
lOlgryan was pleased by this, since he believed-an. 
orthodox Christian should go to China, and Eliot was. a . 
Unitarian.. See Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and' the 
Far East The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question ' .(New. York: 
Thomas Y„ Crowell Co. , 195-2), 13-14. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Fifield, Far East). See also Coletta, Bryan, II, 114; 
Link, Wilson, II, 98.
102isiQel Harvey Pugach, "Making the Open Door Work:.
Paul S.. Reinsch. in China, 1913-1919," Pacific^Historical 
Review, XXXVIII (May, 1969), 157-58; Coletta, Fry an, IT,"
114; Fifield, Far East, 13-14. According to Daniel,. Dodge 
was asked-to help induce Mott ,to take .the post in China.
See Daniel, Mid-America, XLIII, 184.
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the American Political, Sciep.ce Association, which both, had 
helped organize. The President had plso been made aware 
that the ideas of the Wisconsin professor paralleled his 
own thinking. Finally, Wilson.recommended Reinsch for the 
Peking mission, after clearing him with Senator Robert M. 
LaFollette, who gave his hearty approval.10^
Although not a,professional,diplomat, Reinsch had a 
wide variety of experiences. A son of a,Wisconsin Lutheran 
minister, he practiced law for a short time, but upon 
receiving his doctorate in.political science, began an, 
academic career. By 1901, he was a full professor at the 
University of Wisconsin. In 1904, as has been.stated, he 
helped organize the American Political Science Association; 
he served as vice-president the first year and later was 
one of the editors. of the American Political Science Review. 
He was’considered one of the few American authorities on the 
Far East, and a productive scholar in the areas of world
103pUgach } "Progress, Prosperity and the Open,Door:
The Ideas and Career of Paul-S. Reinsch,” (Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1967), 9-11. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Pugach, "Reinsch."). Pugach 
argued that Reinsch. actively sought a diplomatic post in 
the Far East or Latin America.. This was made possible.by 
the support of.his influential friends.in,Wisconsin and 
Washington D.C. and his academic fame. See 87-91.. See 
also Roy.Watson.Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far^Eastern Policy 
1913-1921:(New York; Bookman Associates, 1957), 38. (Here­
inafter referred to as Curry, Far Eastern Policy.); Daniel 
James Gage, "Paul S. Reinsch and Sino-American Relations.,." 
(Unpublished. Ph..D.. dissertation, Stanford University,, 1939) , 
37. (Hereinafter,referred.to as~Gage,'"Reinsch."); Notter, 
Wilson, 207; Fifield, Far East, 13-14.
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organizations and politics. Reinsch also became active in 
civic and political affairs, especially as a major figure in 
Governor LaFollette's "brain trust" in Madison. Roosevelt 
and Taft both included Reinsch in the delegations to the 
third and fourth Pan-American Conferences and the first 
American Science Conference.*^ Furthermore, Reinsch 
planned studies for the Carnegie Endowment, and joined 
Elihu Root,,Robert Lansing and others in sponsoring a code 
of international law. In the field of business, he was a 
consultant and confidential adviser to businessmen and 
bankers in Milwaukee and Chicago, and aided in the organiza­
tion of the National Chapter of the American Institute of 
Banking. From his scholarly, political and business back­
ground, he became a forceful advocate of the Open Door
policy, and appreciated the need for modern financial tech-
10 5niques in national and world affairs. It seems clear
that Reinsch came close to fulfilling Wilson's "ideal" dip­
lomat;: an intellectual familiar with world affairs, a devoted
l^Grayson c. Kirk, "Paul Samuel Reinsch," D.A.B. ,
XV, 491-92. See also Link, Wilson, III, 273-74.
105pUgach, Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 15 7-58. 
See also Pugach, "Reinsch," 17-71; Tien-ryi Li, Woodrow 
Wilson1 s..China Policy 1913-1917 (New York: University of 
Kansas City Press-Twayne Publishers, 1952), 83-84. (Here­
inafter .referred^to.as Li, China,Policy.); Alan E. Kent,
"Down ftom the.Ivory Tower: Paul:Samuel.Reinsch, Minister, 
to China," Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV (Winter,
1951) , 114. ' '
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Democrat who favored progressive politics, and a man of 
integrity, But as Alan E. Kent suggested: ’’Reinsch pos­
sessed decided knowledge of the Far East as a whole...Of 
course his information was gleaned in the scholar’s ivory 
tower, not in the rough and tumble diplomatic - service.nl06 
It will remain to be. seen if Reinsch persevered under the 
rigors of day-to-day diplomacyi
Two Pennsylvania politicians were successively appointed 
to the important Tokyo mission during the Wilson adminis­
tration. The first was George W, Guthrie, a powerful Pitts­
burg. lawyer and devoted Democrat; who, like his father, had 
served as mayor of Pittsburg. He also had been secretary for 
the National Democratic Convention of 1884,.a delegate from 
1904 to 1912, and chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic 
Committee. In 1912, Guthrie and other progressives were
prominent in the - campaign which culminated in the nomination
1 07of Wilson for President. With the choice of Guthrie for 
Japan, one more,political debt was paid. On his death, Guthrie 
was succeeded by an old associate, Roland Morris, who had 
practiced law in Philadelphia, was a director of several 
educational and philanthropic institutions in Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV, 114;
lO^joseph H. Frederick, "George W. Guthrie," D„A*B..,
VIII, 60.; Baker, Wilson, III, 285; Link, Wilson, I, 352.
For a laudatory account of Guthrie, see Post Wheeler and 
Hallie Erminie Rives, Dome of.Many Colored Glass. (Garden.
City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 195S.),' 548.
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and also had served as chairman of the Pennsylvania Demo­
cratic Committee.1^  Like Guthrie, he had actively sup­
ported Wilson's nomination for President.1 )̂®
The Siamese post changed hands three times by 1917. 
Fred W. Carpenter, a Taft appointee, was retained until 
1915. A Minnesota lawyer and former confidential secre­
tary to Taft before he was President, Carpenter had been
minister to Morocco before being assigned to,Siam;in 
1101912; Wilson finally replaced him with William Harrison
Hornibrook, who had been a newspaper editor and publisher
in Idaho and Oregon, and an Idaho state senator from 1910 
1 1 1to 1912. Hornibrook served two years in Siam, and was,
followed by George Pratt Ingersoll, a lawyer in Connecticut 
112and New York. Both of the ministers appointed under 
Wilson were novices in. international affairs;
LATIN AMERICA
George Harvey has called Wilson's diplomatic appoint­
ments to Latin America a "political debauchery,"113 and 
many historians have continued this theme. While there
108Register 1917, 122.
1Q9Baker, Wilson, III, 202, 285; Link, Wilson, I, 332.
llONew York Times, August 29, 1957, 27.
111Register 1915, 90.
11^Register 1917, 107.
113Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 169.
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were some dramatic examples of this "debauchery,” the types 
of nominees for the Latin American missions varied little 
from their counterparts assigned to Europe, Asia and Africa.
Mexico City was one of the most important posts in 
Latin;America, not only for its proximity to.the United 
States, but on account of the years of internal strife 
it was passing through. The Wilson administration retained 
Henry Lane Wilson,,a Taft appointee, until the autumn of
1913. Coming from a family of "public servants,” Wilson 
had studied law in the office of Benjamin Harrison. From 
1882 to 1885, he was editor and owner of the Lafayette 
Journal, an Indiana newspaper. He moved to Washington 
Territory, and for the next eleven years acquired a small 
fortune there in real estate, banking, and law. The panic 
of 1893 bankrupted him, and two years later he became active 
in the political career of his brother, John L„, a senator 
from Washington, As early as 1889, Harrison offered him a 
position as minister to Venezuela, but he declined. Later,, 
he accepted McKinley's offer to become minister to Chile. 
After Roosevelt was elected in 1904, Wilson was transferred 
to Belgium. In 1909, Taft sent him to Mexico.
1-^Spaulding, "Henry Lane Wilson," D.A.B., XX, 325; 
Eugene Frank Masingill, "The Diplomatic Career of Henry 
Lane Wilson in,Latin America," {Unpublished Ph.D. disser­
tation, Louisiana State University, 1957), 6-9. (Herein­
after referred to as Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson.").
For further information about.the appointments of Wilson 
to Chile and Belgium, see Henry Lane Wilson, Diplomatic 
Episodes in Mexico, Belgium, and Chile. (New York: Doubleday,
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Since Wilson was, ambassador to Mexico during the first 
few months of 1913, it should be worthwhile to examine his 
appointment there in more detail. In his memoirs, Wilson, 
intimated that his transfer from,Belgium to Mexico in 1909 
was somewhat routine. He further asserted that Taft con­
sidered sending him to Russia. But the expense of maintain­
ing the embassy in Petrograd was excessive for Wilson, 
which he made known to the President. As a result, Taft 
offered him the ambassadorship to-Mexico, especially because 
Root and Henry Cabot Lodge had told the President that a man,
who understood "Latin American psychology" and the Spanish
115language should be sent there.
The appointment of Wilson to Mexico has inspired a minor 
historical controversy. Peter Calvert stated that Wilson's 
transfer from,Belgium to Mexico was said to have been due to 
the Guggenheim copper interests as well as his brother’s 
political connections and the support of the Secretary of 
the Interior, Richard A. Ballinger Jr. Calvert added that 
if this influence meant much to Wilson, he was not likely 
to be predisposed to favor the Mexican President, Francisco
Page and Co., 1927), 1-4, 85-86, 93-95, 109-113. (Herein­
after referred to as'Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes.)» See 
also Peter Calvert, The Mexican,, Revolution, 1910"-1914 
Thê ; Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, l'9'68) , 38. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Calvert, Mexican Revolution,); Lowell L. Blaisdell, 
"Henry Lane Wilson and the Overthrow of Madero," Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, XL (September, 1962), 127.
HSWilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 158-59.
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Madero, since the Guggenheim interests had been in direct 
collusion with those o£ the Madero,family in,the area of 
TOrreon,
Eugene Frank Masingill, in a dissertation, defended 
the ambassador's own interpretation, and was critical of 
the accusations made by other historians that the transfer 
entailed some sort of political maneuvering. Masingill 
declared that Wilson's reasons for desiring a transfer were 
obvious: 1) to obtain a promotion,from minis ter to ambassa­
dor, and 2) to be nearer the United States, because his
117mother was, sick and his brother was, dying. x
Wilfrid Hardy Callcott compromised between the inter­
pretations of Calvert and Masingill. He asserted that al­
though Wilson had wanted to be sent to Mexico, he was not 
informed of his selection until October, 1909. Callcott 
also insisted that Taft had sent Wilson,, to Mexico at the 
urging of Root and Lodge, because the situation in Mexico 
requited a man with some knowledge of the problems. Con­
currently, he stated that Wilson certainly had intimate 
connections with wealthy United States corporations doing 
business in Mexico, and surrounded himself,with;their agents
H^calvert, Mexican Revolution, 38-39. See also George 
M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1935), 306-11.
117Masingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," 60, See also .. 
Philip Holt Lowry,,"The Mexican Policy of Woodrow Wilson,"
(Unpublished.Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1949),..
26. (Hereinafter referred to as Lowry, "Mexican Policy,")
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"in: a most indiscreet fashion. ■
The cojitfoversy concerning Wilson's appointment to 
Mexico seems hest resolved by Callcott1s assessment. How­
ever* there.also has been considerable speculation about 
the decision of President Wilson to retain Ambassador Wil­
son until August, 1913. In February, 1913, rebels led by 
generals Victorian© Huerta and Felix;Diaz overthrew the 
Madero government, which resulted in.the accession to power 
of Huerta and the execution of Madero. Soon thereafter, 
many American and Mexican, journalists accused Ambassador, 
Wilson of being in collusion with the rebels. President 
Wilson became greatly disturbed by these accusations, and, 
as historian Kenneth J. Grieb argued, the President would 
gladly have dismissed the ambassador, but-for the fact that 
sending an official replacement would have constituted
recognition of the de facto Huerta government, which the
119American president detested. Also, as Baker suggested, 
the President most likely believed that the ambassador,might 
cooperate with his administration, and he further realized 
that a change-of personnel would be a serious detriment to
H.%.ilfrid..Hardy Callcott., The Caribbean Policy of...the 
United States 1890-1920.(Baltimore: .The Johns’ Hopkins Press, 
1942) , 2 9 $ -294. (Hereinafter referred to as Callcott, 
Caribbean Policy.)
1-^Kenneth J. Grieb, The.United States and-Huerta
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 75. [Here­
inafter referred to as Grieb, Huerta.)
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1 2 0a quick solution of, the Mexican problem. However, Presî -
dent Wilson sent a series,of confidential agents to Mexico 
to keep him informed of the ambassador1s ■activities. Finally, 
after it seemed that Ambassador Wilson would not cooperate 
with the administration, the President called him to Wash-- 
ington "for consultation," and subsequently despatched John 
Lind to Mexico as a special - representative of the adminis­
tration. Thus * the retention of Ambassador Wilson was much, 
more complex than that of Herrick or Egan.
Two Taft appointees, Edwin Vernop Morgan and Henry P. 
Fletcher, were also retained by the Wilson administration. 
Morgan had traveled widely, studied in Berlin, and eventually 
taught history at Harvard and Western Reserve University. In 
1899, he began a diplomatic career, and by 1905, he was min­
ister to Korea. He later served as minister to Cuba, Uruguay, 
Portugal, and finally Brazil under Taft and Wilson.121 
Fletcher became a career diplomat, after serving in the 
Spanish^American War. His first important assignment was as
second secretary to the Havana legation. He was eventually
12 2selected minister to Chile in 1909, According to Ilchman* 
it was,, only through the intervention of. House that Fletcher
120Baker, Wilson, IV, 262-263.
121Thomson,. "Edwin•Vernon-Morgan," D.A.B., XXI, 563-64.
12-2-In 1914, the Chile post became an embassy, and thus 
Fletcher was promoted to ambassador.
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1 1 7was retained. When Fletcher was'promoted to the Mexico 
City embassy in 1916, he was replaced.by Joseph H. Shea, a 
former lawyer, circuit and appellate court judge, and a 
Democratic member of the Indiana Senate.*24
The choice of James M. Sullivan for the Dominican 
Republic post has been criticized severely. Sullivan was 
a:former prize-fight promoter and.a New York "police court" 
lawyer, who had intimate ties to.the underworld and gambling 
interests. He also had been active in Irish ward politics• 
in the northeast. Sullivan had supported Wilson in 1912, 
and was endorsed for a diplomatic post by Tumulty, O ’Gorman-, 
Governor Simeon E. Baldwin of Connecticut and other "reput­
able Democrats." With some hesitation, Bryan brought 
Sullivan's name to, Wilson, and he was subsequently nominated. 
Not only did the new minister prove to be an inept diplomat, 
but his questionable dealings brought public attention to his 
activities. Link stated that the man who was actually re­
sponsible for Sullivan's appointment was Willian C. Beer, a 
New York lobbyist and agent for Samuel M. Jarvis and his 
Banco Nacional of the Dominican Republic. Jarvis sought con­
trol: of the deposits held by the American receiver-general 
of the Dominican customs, and he asked Sullivan to help 
transfer the funds. Not only was Sullivan in,collusion with
i^Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; See-also 
Register 1916, 91,
i^Regis ter 1916, 130.
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Jarvisj but he also had a clandestine financial relationship 
with the President of the Dominican Republic; Jose Bordas 
Valdes, as well.as with many corrupt concessionaires„ If 
that were not enough, his cousin Timothy Sullivan.received 
a large share of government construction contracts. Finally, 
the receiver-general, Walter W. Vick, wrote to Wilson, Bryan, 
House and Tumulty about Sullivan's activities, but the 
President and Secretary of State refused to investigate him. 
Vick then resigned and told his story to the New York World, • 
which severely criticized Bryan. Wilson finally instructed 
Secretary of Wary Lindley M. Garrison to investigate Vicki 
Sullivan was "permitted to resign" in July, 1915.1^5 Robert 
Lansing, the new Secretary of State, suggested that William W. 
Russell, a professional diplomat who was Sullivan's immediate 
predecessor, be sent back to the Dominican Republic to avoid 
more scandal.
A career man, Arthur Bailly-Blanchard, was selected for 
Haiti in;1914, after Madison R. Smith, a lawyer, an editor,' 
a former state senator and United States congressman, and a
l^Link, Wilson, II, 107-08, 541-42; Link, The Struggle 
for Neutrality, Vol. Ill of Wilson, 499; Progressive Era, 
97-98; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service^ 184-85;TColetta, 
Bryan, II, 116-17;,Coletta, Mid-Americar~XLVIII, 86-87;
Baker, Wilson, IV, 449-50; Summer Welles, Naboth's Vineyard 
The Dominican Republic 1844-19 24, Vol. II (New York: Payson 
Clark, Ltd., 1918), 718-19.
-*-^^Barnes-and Morgan, Foreign Service, 184-85. See 
also Register 1916, 127;.Link, Wilson, ifT, 541-42; Link, 
Professional.Era, 26-27, 98; Coletta, Bryan, 116-17.
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12 7Bryan man, resigned after only, a year's service,, Before
joining the Foreign Service Bailly-Blanchard had been an 
associate editor of Le Courier de la Louisiana,and Le Petit 
Journal and an aide-de-camp to the Louisiana governor. In 
188 5, he became active in the diplomatic corps, and by 1914 
he was made minister to Haiti. 128-. n chman believed that 
Bailly-Blanchard's appointment was made because of the in-- 
creasing pressure on the administration to nominate more
career diplomats for the upper positions in,the diplomatic
, 129service.
The selection of Boaz Walton Long, as minister to El 
Salvador could be called an appointment of a,professional. 
only,in the broadest sense. He had managed a commission com­
pany in, San Francisco and finally became,the proprietor of 
one with offices in San Francisco, Chicago, and Mexico City. 
In 1913, Bryan chose him as Chief of the Division of Latin 
American Affairs and, in.1914, as minister to El Salvador.
An experienced diplomat was appointed to Columbia, but-
•̂ ■̂ Ŝee James A. Padgett, "Diplomats to, Haiti and Their 
Diplomacy," The Journal of Negro History, XXV (July,'1940), 
307-08. Smith's appointment broke a long tradition of 
having negroes serve as ministers to Haiti.
^Register 1916, 71; Padgett, The Journal of Negro,. 
History, t x V , 309; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign Service,
184-85.
■■■̂ Piichman, Professional Diplomacy, 126.
■^®Register 1916,.llOrlll;, Stuart, Diplomatic Practice,
2 26; Link, Wilson, III, 498-99.)
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not until Wilson's second term. The original selection was
Thaddeus A. Thomson, a rancher from Austin, Texas, and a
131friend of House. He was replaced in 1917 by Hoffman
Philip, a law graduate, who joined,the diplomatic corps in-
1901v In 1908, he became minister resident and consul
general to Abyssinia; in 1909, secretary to the legation in
Rio; in 1910^ secretary in Constantinople; in ,1912^ Chief of
the Division of Near Eastern Affairs; and finally minister 
132to Colombia. He was as experienced as any of the selec-. 
tions of the Wilson., administration.
A North Carolinan and ex-Confederate, Edward Joseph 
Hale, was,,editor of the Fayetteville Observer until his 
selection,as minister to Costa Ric$ in 1913. He had had 
some consular;experience'in Manchester, England, in 1885. 
After his term as-consul, the North of England-Trust Com­
pany commissioned him- to deal with problems connected with 
the indigo crop in India. He was offered a permanent 
position wiph the company, but? refused in order to retain 
his American citizenship. In 1890, he was vice-president 
of the International Congress on Navigation and, in the 
same year,- declined a nomination as. American envoy to
■ ^ Register 1916, 136. -Harvey,mistakenly called .Thom­
son. '’ThomaS~T7~Tusten." See .Harvey, North,American. Review, 
CLXXXXIX, 171.  !--------- -
13^Register 1917, 128; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign 
Service, 185-86.
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Turkey. He was-very, interested in.shipping and navigation, 
and was, the founder of the National Rivers and Harbors 
Congress. He also took a vital interest in politics as a 
delegate to the Democratic Conventions of 1884, 1896, and 
1 9 1 2 In the pre-nomination campaign, Hale was an,active 
supporter of Wilson.13  ̂ This partisanship and Hale’s .in­
ternational commercial•experience appear to have been factors 
in his appointment. However, as one contemporary observer 
noted, the new minister's experience "...belongs to the last 
generation and was acquired practically everywhere except in
ILatin America."
The remaining major appointments to Latin America were, 
strictly political in nature. Frederic Jesup Stimson, a 
Massachusetts lawyer, businessman, and professor of political 
science at Harvard,;was the new ambassador to Argentina in- 
1914. He had also served on the United States Industrial
1 /r
Cominission and various Massachusetts legal committees. 
Stimson,was almost alone in discussing his nomination to the 
Argentine , pos t.. He said in his memoirs :
G.-deR. Hamilton, "Edward Joseph Hale," D.A.B.,
VIII, 100-01. — —
•̂3^Link, Wilson, II, 107; Link, Progressive Era, 26-27.
135,,The Last Refuge of the Spoilsman," Atlantic Monthly, 
CXIII (April, 1914), 441.
136^egis ter 1916, 134.
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...he [Walter Hines Page] told me that they had 
fixed on me to go to Argentina as the 1st am­
bassador, but that it was..a month that the 
State Department had been trying vainly to find 
where I was; I was still reputed as being "lost 
in Germany."
But I was absorbed in.the war; and felt 
that BUenos Aires was too far. to go. Moreover, 
a South American post had hitherto beOn regarded 
as the pis aller of a,diplomatic career, and I 
had no disposition to abandon fox it my work,in 
teaching the United States Constitution to our 
future leading citizens at Harvard.. Mr. Page 
told me that I was'quite wrong, and earnestly 
urged me to accept.... 137
Page was able to convince Stimson to accept.
Other appointments to Latin America included an assort­
ment of novices. William HayneLeavell of Texas, an ordained 
minister with a law degree , was., sent to Guatemala. He was
] 70
a friend of House. John Ewing of Alabama went to Honduras. 
He had been, at various times * a lawyer, a newspaperman, a
customs clerk, a land agent, and a road observer^ He was.
1 3 9also an ardent Wilson supporter in New Orleans. For
Nicaragua, Benjamin:Lafayette Jefferson was chosen. He-had 
been a doctor turned politician; and a Bryan e l e c t o r . - ^ 0  
Charles S. Hartman-was appointed to Ecuador. He had been a 
probate judge in Gallatin■County, Montana, a delegate to the
137prede ric.Jesup Stimson, My United States (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), 265-66, ”
•̂— Register 1916, 109. Harvey misspelled Leavell's name 
"Lovell.". See Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 171.
•̂ -̂ Register 1916, 89.
l^Oj^id^, io4; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX,
1.71. '
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Montana Constitutional Conventionrof 1888, and a former 
United States congressman,, He also had been a free silver 
man-and a supporter of Bryan, for President./*-4* Benton 
McMillin was commissioned to Peru. The Tennesseean had been 
a lawyer, a circuit judge, a member of the Tennessee House, 
a United States - congressman, and governor of his state. 
Harvey characterized him as the "Democratic War Horse of 
Tennessee." At the time of his appointment, he was,selling 
insurance in Nashville.*4  ̂ Preston B. McCoodwin, an Okla­
homa journalist, was selected for Venezuela.*4  ̂ William 
Jennings Price was sent to Panama. He had practiced law* 
and had been a member of the law faculty of Central Univer^- 
sity in Kentucky.144 John O'Rear, a former school teacher,
a lawyer, and a city councilman of Mexico, Missouri, was
145nomihated for the Bolivian post. William Elliott 
Gonzales, a moderate Democrat and editor of the Columbia 
State (a South, Carolina,newspaper) went to Cuba. He had 
introduced Wilson to all the leading editors.and prominent
141££ gister 1916, 98; Harvey, North American Review,
CLXXXXIX, 170. “ 1
^•^^Daniel M. Robison, "Benton McMillip," D.A.B. ,
XXI, 533-34; Harvey, North American Review, CLXXXXIX, 171,*
145Register 1917, 117.
*44Ibid., 1916, 123- 24; Harvey, . North American Review, 
CLXXXXIXj 170. ’
*45Register 1916, 120; Harvey, North American Review, 
CLXXXXIX, 170.
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146politicians of South Carolina. Daniel F. Mooney, a
lawyer, an Ohio state senator, and a former city solicitor
147of St. Marys, Ohio, was appointed to the Paraguay legation.
John L. De Saules of Pennsylvania served in Uruguay. He was
replaced in 1915 by Robert E. Jeffery, a.lawyer, a,circuit
148judge, and a state legislator from Arkansas.
From the previous lengthy discussion of the various
diplomatic appointments, it is not-difficult to understand
why,, his torians, former diplomats, and journalists differed
in their evaluation of the diplomatic service during the
Wilson administration. Those,who approved of Wilson's
chiefs-of-mission, with the prevalent exception of the Latin
American group, usually claimed that many of the nominees
were eminently qualified, and while they lacked practical
experience, they proved their abilities after they assumed
their missions. For instance, William E. Dodd, a former
ambassador to Germany and a historian, stated apologetically:
A great deal has been said, both in-bitter 
anger and in friendly remonstrance, about the 
character of the men.whom Wilson sent abroad, to 
carry out his new policy. But men have forgotten 
in,the presence of a great world war that the 
diplomats of the Wilson Administration were 
appointed when there was no thought of war or 
the complications that followed. Still, one
146Reglster 1916, 94; Link, Wilson, I, 327.
44^Register 1916 , 116.
148Ibid., 104.
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might'read much American history without.find­
ing better men in foreign courts than;Walter 
' Hines Page...James W» Gerard...and Henry Morgen­
thau... These were new men, to be sure. Wilson 
would not retain the older diplomats and expect 
a satisfactory execution of his’plans. But new 
or old, these men have never been accused of 
want of ability or devotion to the cause of 
their country.„..149
On the other extreme, those who. censured the choice of 
the new ministers and ambassadors frequently cited.their 
inexperience in foreign • affairs as the major shortcoming of. 
the diplomatic service under Wilson. An excellent example 
was the criticism by Walter Mi11is --here referring to Walter 
Hines Page: "Unfortunately, Mr. Page, like the other repre­
sentatives whom Mr. Wilson had scattered through Eruope-- 
.like mest American diplomats, indeed, in the opening years 
of the twentieth century--knew almost nothing about European 
diplomacy."1^
A larger group of historians, who presented more 
moderate interpretations of the diplomats, were often 
excessive in their praise of Wilson,and severe in their 
criticism of Bryan. Most prominent here is Link. He 
supported the statement of one editor who said that'many of. 
Wilson's.own appointments in the ministerial category were
l^Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work, 129-30. See. 
also Notter, Wilson, 234-35.
15GMillis, Road to War, 20. See also Walworth, I, 
348; Mamatey, Central Europe, 85,
71
I C I’the peers, if not-the superiors,. o£ their-predecessors.'
Link had a different opinion of Bryan.: "Because of his
tenderness for 'deserving Democrats,' especially for veterans 
of the campaign of 1896, Bryan made many unfortunate appointi 
ments on. the ministerial level-. Most of them were mere 
incompetents, not s c o u n d r e l s . L i n k  also stated that; 
in the "greatest debauchery of the Foreign Service in the 
twentieth century," Bryan dismissed all the ministers who 
had earned their posts by merit and training and installed
1 r?"an aggregation of friends and party hacks."
A few evaluations emphasized the'effect of World War I 
upon the appointment of diplomats from late:1914 to the end 
of'the war. For example, Ilchman believed that the nation's 
view of the "causes," conduct, and consequences" of the war 
required a re-evaluation of professional diplomacy as well. 
The Department of State, particularly under Lansing, increas­
ingly recognized the value of professional diplomacy.
Ilchman added;;that; pressure- for change in the process of
154selecting, diplomats was- developing even-under Bryan.
■*-^Link, Wilson, II, 106.
•^^Link, Progressive Era, 97-98.
•*-̂ L,ink, Wilson,' II, 106 . See also Coletta, Bryan,
II, 112.-15; Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy, 121; Spaulding, 
Ambassadors, 9-11.
^■^llchman, Prof ess ional; Diplomacy, 126, 132- 37. See' 
also,Coletta, Bryan, II, 119; Barnes and Morgan, Foreign 
Service, 18 5.
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A number of pertinent questions arise from these 
various assessments of the diplomatic service under Wilson.
The ability of the new chiefs-of-mission to perform well is 
the salient issue, but it requires further scrutiny, and 
shall be examined in the following chapters. However, there 
are three points that should be considered here: 1) was
Link correct in assuming that Wilson*s,appointments were 
superior to Bryan's? 2) was therea substantial•disparity 
in the type of envoy selected for the various posts, i.e., 
was. Latin America the scene.of "political debauchery?" and 
3) did World War I have some positive effects,upon pro­
fessionalizing the upper positions of the diplomatic ser­
vice, as Ilchman; suggested? Based on the material;presented, 
it would be impossible to make many qualitative judgments 
about these questions.- Hence, this evaluation will emphasize 
some statistical observations about, the selections.
The indictment of Bryan as primarily responsible-for 
the rampant use of spoils politics in.the diplomatic service 
is unfounded. As has previously been stated, Wilson.was 
skeptical, of’career diplomats, and was .inclined to favor non­
professionals for the ministerial and ambassadorial positions„ 
Also, the President was immediately responsible for the 
appointment of ambassadors, and rarely left this task to the 
Department of State. In 1913,.there,were twelve ambassador­
ships , with an additional embassy created in Argentina in
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1914.^^ Wilson retained four of Taft's ambassadors, one 
of whom,.Herrick, remained-only until a suitable replacement 
could be found. Of the remainder, only Penfield had any 
diplomatic experience, and there was a gap of sixteen years 
before his nomination to the Vienna post. The men Wilson 
selected were, heavy campaign contributors, political assoc­
iates, andfriendsi It cannot be denied that Bryan, certainly 
had’ influence in some of these selections, especially in the 
case of Birch, but Wilson was, directly responsible for these 
top appointments.
In the ministerial choices, Wilson's influence could 
also be recognized. Of twelve ministers appointed to 
European posts, including two replacements, Van\Dyke, and 
Stovall were his personal friends, Birch was a former 
associate in New Jersey, Egan was retained at'the President's 
request,, and Whitlock was personally designated. Wilson was, 
also directly responsible for Reinsch and Curtis, two of the 
five ministers selected for Asian,and African posts. The 
President seemed to havethe least,direct influence in the 
nominations for Latin American missions. However,, he had 
had political associations with Hale, Ewing, and Gonzales.
Of the remaining eighteen Latin American nominees, four were 
career men, and two were the choices of House. Thus, while 
it,is justified by all-evidence to criticize the appointment
155By the end of the war, Brussels was raised to an 
embassy, but' Wilson merely promoted Whitlock from minister 
to ambassador.
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policy of Bryan, the role,of Wilson in the issuance of 
spoils was, marked. Furthermore, even if the President was 
not directly responsible for every selection, he was 
officially responsible for all of them.
The criticism of the appointments to Latin America as 
the most wanton application of the spoils system is also 
unjustified. Twenty new chiefs-of-mission were sent to 
Latin America early in the Wilson.administration. Of these, 
five had some diplomatic experience in the broadest sense. 
Five replacements later were selected, three of whom were 
career men. Only one of the initial;seven appointments to 
Africa and Asia had any diplomatic background, and he was 
replaced by a novice in 1915. Five replacements had to be, 
made during the war; none of these was taken.from the ranks 
of the diplomatic corps. In Europe, the situation was 
similar, since:only four of eighteen envoys had some dip­
lomatic -experience. Of these, Herrick and Egan were hold­
overs. Morris had had one special assignment, and Penfield 
had been out of the diplomatic service for sixteen years.
Two appointments were made during the war; one was a pror 
fessional. As a whole, the European, Asian, African, and 
Latin American ministers and ambassadors were overwhelmingly 
inexperienced. Also, and quite interestingly, the type of 
selections did not seriously vary from one location to the 
other.
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The contention that the war professionalised the dip­
lomatic corps did not apply to the chiefs-of-mission in 
any great degree. Of the two appointments made to Europe 
during the war, one was a career man; of the five made in 
Latin America, three were professional; of the five made in 
Asia and Africa, none were career men. Therefore, only 
four of twelve replacements were experienced diplomats. 
Although even this intimates a minor re-direction for the 
diplomatic service, some further qualifications must be made. 
One of the four professionals, Russell, was chosen to save 
face, not appointed as a result of the war. And Bailly- 
Blanchard's nomination came early•in 1914, before the exact 
nature of the war became evident.. Therefore, with some 
speculation, the remaining two career men, Garrett and Philip, 
might be considered products of the changing attitude about, 
the diplomatic service. However, this is hardly a trend.
Unquestionably, the appointment of the chiefs-of-mission 
during the Wilson administration demonstrated the blatant 
use of the spoils system. The resulting ministers, and 
ambassadors'were a conglomeration, lacking experience in 
international affairs and often unfamiliar with the intri­
cacies of American, domestic matters. It was no wonder that 
they were ill-prepared to face the trials of a major war.
CHAPTER I I I
PERFORMANCE: NEGOTIATING, REPORTING,
AND CEREMONIAL DUTIES
A majority of the chiefs-of-mission of the Wilson ad­
ministration were;confronted with the responsibilities of 
the diplomat inthe field for the first time when they 
arrived at their posts. A few of the ministers and ambassa­
dors retained from the administration of Taft had also begun 
their service without'professional diplomatic training. How 
these amateurs performed is the subject of this chapter„
Thirteen chiefs-of-mission have been selected as 
examples, since they have written (and published) memoirs 
or abundant letters describing their experiences as American 
envoys, and since they have been, for the most,part, studied 
by historians. All of these men were non-professionals,: 
i.e., they did.not rise from the ranks of the-Foreign Service; 
and all but four had no previous diplomatic experience.
Since the duties of the diplomat in the field are 
diverse and complex, each envoy will be evaluated in terms 
of: 1) negotiating--the execution of business at the foreign
post; 2) reporting--informing his government of his activities 
and foreign.developments; and 3) ceremonial duty--attendance 
at social or ritualistic functions in the host country.
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WALTER HINES PAGE
Page was well-known for his Anglophilism, and his 
negotiations and reports demonstrated his penchant of 
favoring British policy over American,, In 1913, he was 
optimistic over the prospect of strengthening Anglo- 
American bondso Attempting to convince Wilson,, he 
argued:
We are in the international: game^--not in 
its Old World intrigues and burdens and sorrows 
and melancholy, but in the inevitable way to. 
leadership and to cheerful mastery in,the future; 
and everybody knows that we are in it but us„ It. 
is sheer blind habit that causes us to continue 
to try to think of ourselves as aloof„1
Page had also urged House to persuade Wilson to come to
England as a gesture of the solid relationship between the
two countries. Page hoped that this might initiate what
2he later called a "real world-alliance."
Before the summer of 1914, Page usually discharged 
his instructions as the Wilson administration prescribed. 
In his first diplomatic task, Page was able to. persuade 
Great Britain to withdraw its recognition of Huerta in 
Mexico, and this aided the United States in bringing about 
the downfall of that'Mexican President. In a . letter to 
Wilson, Page reported:
-*-Page to Wilson, October 25, 1913, in Hendrick, Page,
I, 150-51.
2Page to House, August 25, 1913, in ibid„, 275-76.
See also 282-83.
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I have been trying to find a way to help this 
Government to wake up. to, the effect of its pro- 
Huerta :position;and to give them a chance to re­
frain from repeating that mistake--and to save 
their faces; and I have telegraphed one plan to 
Mr. Bryan to-day. I think they ought now to be 
forced to show.their hand without the possibility 
of evasion, They will not risk losing our good­
will- -if it seem wise to you to put them to a 
square test.-5
After the British acceptance of the American position, Page 
wrote ,to Doubleday and others:
As I look back over these six or seven months,, 
from the pause that has come this week, I’m bound 
to say (being frank, not to say vain) that I had 
the good fortune to do one piece of work that was- 
worth the effort and worth coming to do--about the 
infernal Mexican situation. An abler man would have, 
done it better; but, as it was, I did it, and I. 
have the most appreciative letter about, it from the 
President.4
Gregory attributed little significance to this negotia­
tion. He asserted that the Mexican situation was never a 
critical issue between, the United States and Great Britain, 
since it did not threaten England's influence- in European 
affairs. And, although Page explained "Wilsonian diplomacy" 
to the Foreign Office, it was the desire of Foreign Minister 
Edward Grey to maintain amicable American-British relations, 
that was. most instrumental; in effecting a solution.5
3Page to Wilson,. October 2.4, 1913, in ibid. , 184-85. 
See also 183.
^Page to Doubleday and others, December 28, 1913, in 
ibid., 166-67.
^Gregory, Page, 33-38,
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The advent of war created difficult and complex prob­
lems for Page. Increasingly, he saw the need for strong 
ties between Great Britain and the United States, and this 
became, the ultimate goal of his performance as ambassador. 
Late in 1914, he wrote to House:
Sir Edward [Grey] values American friendship 
more than anything else of that kind. He is not 
going to endanger it. To this day, he hasn’t con­
fiscated a single American cargo, tho' there are 
many that he might have confiscated within his 
rights. Our continued good relations[hip] is the 
only thing that now holds the world together.
That's the big fact. A cargo of copper, I grant 
you, may be important; but it can't be as important 
as our friendship of the Kingdom and our Republic 
will be the most important political fact in the 
world.--Have stiff controversies? Yes; I'm for 
them whole-heartedly, when we have a good reason.
But there's no reason now; and, if there were, 
this is the time to be patient. They'll be plenty, 
of time left to quarrel when this dire period is 
past.... 6
The controversy over the Declaration of London clearly 
demonstrated Page's pro-British sentiments. Drafted by the 
British in 1909, the Declaration of London was an unratified 
code for maritime warfare. When war erupted, the Wilson 
administration was anxious to have it validated, because it 
included a lenient neutral rights clause. But the British 
refused to adhere to it. Convinced that the Declaration 
would only be an obstacle, to the British war effort, Page 
urged the President and the Department of State to refrain 
from forcing England into the restrictive situation the code
6Page to House, November 9, 1914, in Seymour, House, I, 
309-10,
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demanded. In a letter to Wilson, he argued:
Let us take a little farther view into 
the future. If Germany win, will ■ it make any 
difference what position Great Britain took on 
the,Declaration of London? The Monroe Doctrine 
will be shot.through. We will have to have a 
great army and a great navy. But suppose that 
England win. We shall then have an ugly aca­
demic dispute with her because of this control 
versy. Moreover, we shall not hold a good 
position for helping to compose the quarrel- 
or for any other service.
He continued:
So far as our neutrality obligations,are 
concerned, I do not believe that they require 
us to demand that Great Britain should adopt 
for our benefit the Declaration of London.
Great Britain has never ratified it, nor have 
any other nations except the United States.
In its applications1 to.the.situation pre­
sented by this.war it is altogether to the 
advantage of G e r m a n y . .
I have delayed to write you this way too 
long. I have:feared that I might possibly 
seem to be influenced by sympathy with England 
and by the atmosphere here* But I write of 
course solely with reference to our own country’s 
interest and its position after the reorganization 
of Europe.'
Hendrick stated that this letter plainly demonstrated 
Page's "larger view" of the war, which prescribed-standards 
to guide American,policy in Europe. He also asserted that 
Page was able, to arrange a compromise on the controversy 
over the Declaration of London, which permitted the British 
to issue a proclamation expressing a more liberal view of 
maritime rights to which the United States would not offer
7Page to Wilson, October, 15, 1914, in Hendrick,.Page,
I, 371-73. See also,.Page to House, October- 22, 1914, in 
Seymour, House, I, 380-84.
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any objection. Page subsequently informed the Department 
of State that if he was instructed to reopen negotiations 
on,.this issue, he would resign. After this ultimatum, the 
Department withdrew its demands and accepted Page's proposal. 
Hendrick believed that Page's action, with the cooperation 
of Grey, averted a crisis between the United States and 
Great Britain, and was a defeat for Lansing and the Depart­
ment of State o ®
Richard W. Van Alstyne discounted Hendrick's interpre­
tation. He insisted that the "naive ambassador" was unable 
to comprehend the value of the American plan proposed by 
Lahsing, and failed to take the opportunity to provide both 
governments with a way to escape embarrassment over the 
issue.® Agreeing, Daniel M. Smith claimed that Page did 
more harm than good, since he either presented the American 
case ineffectively or never presented it at all. Smith 
speculated that Page would have been dismissed for his 
actions if he had not been a personal friend of the Presi-
1 0dent and if the recall would not have encouraged the Germans.
^Hendrick, Page, I, 370-85.
®Richard W. Van Alstyne, "The Policy of the United States 
Regarding , the Declaration of London, at the Outbreak of the 
Great War," Journal of Modern History, VII (December, 1935), 
445.
•^Daniel M. Smith, Robert Lansing and American Neutral­
ity . 1914-191? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 
28-29. See also Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World 
War- (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19 34), 55-56„ (Here­
inafter referred to as Seymour, World War.); Seymour, House,
I, 304-306. '
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Gregory added that Page's.threat to resign was not only an 
unlikely reason for the American acceptance of the com­
promise, but probably of minor significance, since he had
tried to resign before. In any case, the compromise was
1 1inconclusive and ambiguous.
By 1915, Page had become adamant that the American
government totally support the Allied cause. He reminded
House that the British were losing respect for the United
States, and were apprehensive of the President's inaction.
By 1916, he told Wilson that the United States should break
1 7relations with Germany. He wrote to House:
...The English do not see how there can be any 
mediation, nor (I confess) do I see. German 
militarism must be put down. I don't mean that 
the German people should be thrashed to a frazzle 
nor thrashed at all. I find no spirit of revenge, 
in the English. But-this- German military caste 
caused all the trouble and there can be no security 
in Europe as long as it lives in authority. That's 
the English view. It raped nuns in Belgium, it 
took food from the people, it even now levies in­
demnities on all towns, it planned the destruction 
of the "Lusitania," and it now coos like a sucking 
dove in the United States.. It'll do anything. Now, 
since it has become evident that it is going to be 
beaten, it wants peace--on terms which will give it 
a continued lease on life....13
■^Gregory, Page, 63-74.
■^Page to House, September 8, 1915, in Hendrick, Page,
II, 37-38; Page to Wilson, February 15, 1916, in ibid., Si-52.
1 ̂XJPage to House, May 23, 19X6,.m  Seymour, House, II,
256. For earlier anti-German statements see Foreign Rela­
tions of the United States Supplement 1914 (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1928), 87. (Hereinafter referred 
to as Foreign Relations Supplement 1914..) ; Page to House, 
October 11, 1914 j in Hendrick, Page^ 340.
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The "Dacia" affair, in early 1915, was another conspic­
uous example of Page's negotiations. on behalf of British in­
terests. The "Dacia," a Hamburg-America liner, was sold to 
an,American,firm which planned to use it to deliver cotton 
to Rotterdam. The British had announced their unwillingness 
to recognize any transfer of German, vessels. Yet the Ameri­
can government upheld the legality of the sale, and asked 
that the ship be allowed to pass through the British block­
a d e . ^ ’ The situation was tense;,if the British seized the 
ship, American-British relations would certainly suffer. 
According to Hendrick, Page recommended to Grey that the
French seize the "Dacia," thus relieving England of any
15responsibility.
Hendrick's conclusion was accepted by historians for 
many.years,̂  but new evidence uncovered by Gregory has 
allowed for reevaluation. He demonstrated that Page was not 
the only person, and perhaps not even the first, to suggest 
that the French seize the "Dacia." As the records of the 
British Foreign Office show, at least ten othbrs suggested
14-See May, The World War and American Isolation 1914- 
1917 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 3TT- 32. 
(Hereinafter referred to as May, American Isolation.)
1^Hendrick, Page, I, 392-95. See also III, 222-28.
■^See Stuart, Diplomatic.Practice, 241; C. Hartley . 
Grattan, Why.We Fought (New York: TheVanguard Press, 1929), 
80; Armin.-.Rappapori^. The British Press and Wilsonian Neu­
trality (Palo Altoj California: Stanford University.Press,
19 51), 25. (Hereinafter referred to as Rappaport,'British 
Press.).
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the same plan. Accordingly, the affair would have ended 
as it did if Page had never made the suggestion. Further­
more, Grey did not conspire with the French, because he 
surmised American protests were not serious enough to 
warrant it. He decided to let the matter take its natural 
course, and thus the British were.fully prepared to stop 
the vessel and escort it to Liverpool. This eventually did
not occur, since the "Dacia” sailed into the French patrol
17zone. Thus, in the cases of the,Declaration of London 
and the "Dacia," Page’s attempts at supporting British policy, 
seemed ineffective.
Gregory clearly summarized Page’s role as a reporter 
and a negotiator. He stated that the tragedy of the war 
overwhelmed Page. Thus his earliest despatches reflected 
his relief that the United States was not involved;. But' 
eventually he saw the war as a remarkable opportunity which 
could make America an-international leader. Prior to Ameri­
can intervention, he tried to maintain the policy of neutral­
ity of his country, and was under an obligation to at least 
manifest impartiality. But he certainly was not unbiased.
In his■correspondence, he sought to portray Great Britain.as 
a peace-loving "defender.of democracy and decency," and 
Germany as a nation determined to use any•measure,.however
^Gregory, Page, 83-88;'Gregory, "A Look at the Case 
of the Dacia," Journal of American History, Ly (September, 
1968), 292-96. ! ”  ' '
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inhumane, to conquer the world. Gregory recognized Page's 
disregard for the Department of State and the special rela­
tionship he enjoyed with the President, which at times 
allowed him to bypass the Department, He stated that Wilson, 
at first, seemed understanding and helpful, writing to Page 
as often,as he found time, and expressing in every letter 
delight with the work of the ambassador. As the war devel­
oped, Page continued to write often, but the President
almost, never replied■and,,like House, he became increasingly
1 Rskeptical of the reports and ideas of the ambassador.
Gregory was also dubious of Page's correspondence as 
an:influence on the Wilson.administration. It was astounding, 
he asserted, that Page expected to sway the President with 
messages that did little more than paraphrase British senti­
ments . And although Page said he,was giving British,
opinion, there was little doubt that these attitudes guided
19his own thoughts. Similarly, other historians have tried 
to assess the effects of Page's reports on the administration^ 
Hendrick stated that during the war Page wrote frank letters 
revealing British displeasure with American inaction, and
■ ^ G r e g o r y ,  Page, 47, 53-54, 59, 107, 128. See also 
Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Co. , 1938) , 160; Seymour, House, ~1, 456; Barbara.W. 
Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York; The Viking 
Press, 1958), 122-23. “
•^Gregory, Page, 128. SeealsoH.C. Allen, Great, 
Britain and the.United States A History of Ang1o-Amerxcan
Relations.1 (1783-19 52) (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.,lTSt77'~'6T0.
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German, confidence that the United States government would 
do little more, than talk. These letters, he said, brought 
the most perfunctory acknowledgement from the White House.
But Page continued to warn Washington of the British and 
Germansopinions of America, suggesting that severance of 
diplomatic relations with Germany in 1915 or 1916 would, 
in itself, bring theEuropean war to a conclusion. With 
time, Page became convinced that American intervention 
was, necessary because German atrocities were a menaee:to 
world peace, and that-the United States owed it to demo­
cracy to take up arms against-the imperialistic leaders of 
Gbrmany, who were the enemies of freedom. Hendrick pointed 
out that it was Page's rationale for war, with Germany that 
Wilson employed in his war message to. Congress, Thus-, Page's 
correspondence, irritating in.its later phases as it might 
have been, strongly influenced Wilson in his determination 
to declare war,.
Page's captivation.with England, his amiable relations 
with Grey, and his commitment to an,Anglo-American rap­
prochement., influenced his performance in formal circles as, 
much as it did in his negotiations and;reporting„ The 
ceremonial aspects of his position intrigued him. In a 
letter to Wilson in the spring of 1914 (during the "Season")
^Hendrick, Page,.II, 41-44, 50, 195-96, See also 
Baker, Wilson, V, 282, 3 70; Tans ill, America Goes to War,
133; Seymour, World War, 8 2ff.
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he claimed, "I hear more gossip, get more points of view, 
see more people, get closer to my colleagues, than at-any 
other time of year. I dine with■everybody from the king 
down--this whole Babylon goes on a tearful Hendrick
7  7insisted that Page had- little inclination for "society," 
Gregory generally,agreed with this conclusion, but.indicated 
that Page had some.happy moments traveling in,England before 
the war, and that he entertained in the manner of most am­
bassadors in London. When he met royalty, he took it in 
stride, although he found the protocol and the ritual 
"amazing sights." He did have some trying moments while 
learning the social and diplomatic ritual. On one. occasion, 
he became absorbed in a ;discussion, unaware that the other 
guests could not leave until the ambassador had left. At 
another gathering, he overlooked a member of royalty, moved
too quickly, and left the royal person "without, an ambassa-
2 ̂dorial,conversation." J Page’s difficulty in adapting to 
the formality of the London.post was minimal, however, since 
his social graces and vibrant personality usually allowed 
him to fare well. His social experiences certainly must haye 
been an influence in his Anglophilism.
^Page to Wilson, May 21, 1914,,in Hendrick, Page, IIIi
47.
^ Ibjd. , II, 312. But Spaulding said that Page..did 
like the ambassadorial uniform. See his Ambassadors, 18-19.
2^Gregory, Page, 27-28.
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BRAND WHITLOCK
In contrast to the embassy in London, the American 
legation in Brussels in 1913 and early in 1914 was tranquil, 
Whitlock’s diplomatic duties in Belgium during this period 
were few, and only the continual social events interrupted 
his writing schedule. A. letter to Rutger B. Jewett exem­
plified his attitude prior to the outbreak of war:
Thus far:I haven‘t had much chance to do any 
work,; the social duties here have been very onerous, 
but luckily the season will be over shortly, and 
we hope to go to the seaside...I hope that I shall 
be all the richer for this experience, for it is a 
very interesting one, full of all sorts of life and 
color, and perhaps all this will show in my work 
in due time.24
The eruption of hostilities among the major European 
powers especially surprised Whitlock. Neil Alfred Thorburn 
stated, in a doctoral dissertation, that Whitlock admitted 
a lack of knowledge about international events since his 
Toledo years had not - required attention to world problems.
He had never heard of Sarajevo, but read the newspapers 
more carefully after the assassination. He confidently 
expected the problem would be "smothered by diplomatic' 
notes," because war seemed impossible in "beautiful and 
placid Belgium."25
24whitlock;.to Jewett, April 9, 1914, in Nevins, 
Whitlock The Letters, 179.
^Thorburn, "Whitlock," 126. See; also Whitlock., Bel - 
gium Under the German.Occupation, A Personal Narrative 
(London: William Heinemann, 1919.) ,. Vol. 1 , 27- 29. ’""[Here­
inafter referred to as Whitlock, Belgium.)
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However, Belgium was soon to be engulfed by Germany,
On the eve of the German advance, he notified the Depart­
ment of State that there was great uncertainty and timidity
in, financial circlesiin Brussels, but he was not sure what
26 2 7it meant. The next day he,reported the German invasion.
At that time Whitlock decided to remain in Brussels and not 
leave with-the Belgian,court. As Millis stated, this 
decision left a minister in,occupied territory who was 
wholly in sympathy with the Belgian government, and who 
inevitably became a,"representative of Belgian and Allied 
interests behind the German lines.
His obvious antirGerman sentiments, although not ex­
pressed publicly, were duly recorded in his memoirs and 
journal; For example, he said:
Somehow, I do not,know exactly how, the very 
air is poisoned with militarism, one has a con­
stant sense of personal discomfort, one is every­
where ill at ease, one cannot.voice one's own 
thoughts. There is a menace,everywhere, and in 
this poisoned atmosphere one suffocates. Oh! for 
a breath of free air again-. ^
But in a different context, he stated;
Cable from Department asking for.a full 
report on the German,atrocities in Belgium..„
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 30.
27Ibid., 35.
^Millis; Road to War, 54.
9 qNevins, Whitlock The Journal, January 7, 1915,
84-85. See also 40, 5T, .350; Whitlock, Belgium, II, 415,
443-44; Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 735b
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Gerard has his book out, and going strong, 
divulging state secrets right and left, as­
tounding and appalling the world and para­
lyzing mankind. I've been hanging back, 
from a feeling, outworn in these times, that 
a diplomatist should not go about like a 
peddler of sensations, nor make any money by 
patriotic officiousness--and now, the Depart­
ment wants my story, and will give it to the 
newspapers, and maybe kill it for me. But no, 
that is gratuitous bitterness; that is best 
which wears best in the long run, after all.
So let Gerard record the secrets the Kaiser 
told him, and prove the Kaiser a liar, and 
so on; which he is, of course,,for his empire 
is founded on a lie. But the persistent, mor­
bid interest in America in the German atroc­
ities is’saddening, because it shows how piti­
fully small and feable imagination is, and how 
little conception there is of principles. As 
though the justice of our cause depended on 
whether Germans killed babies in Belgium, or 
not.30
Not only was the war perplexing for Whitlock, but.it
*7 "Iradically altered his role as minister to Belgium. Sym­
pathetically, Nevins asserted that the minister became a
32"tower of refuge" and a "pillar of support" to the Belgians.
More,realistically, Crunden argued that Whitlock was•as con­
fused about'the war as anyone else, and he felt helpless to
do a little more than aid the people supposedly under his 
33protection. For example, on the eve of the German occupa-
3°Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, August 7, 1917, 439-40. 
■^See Tager, Whitlock, 150-51.
■^Nevins, Whitlock The Letters, lvi. See also Thorburn, 
"Whitlock," 1137"
33Crunden, Whitlock, 249, 261, 346.
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tion, large numbers of Americans began pouring into the 
legation. And with each day, Whitlock became increasingly 
fatigued, if not irritated;
The fleeing Americans continued to crowd the-. 
Legation; all day., and we were busy trying to re­
assure and comfort them--a. terrible task. They 
all think that I have some.supernatural power, 
that. I can evoke ships, money, care, comfort 
for them: predict the cause of the war, tell 
them where they will be safe, and how long the 
war will last,...and-so .on. It is maddening, but 
as Carlyle used to say, "Courage and shuffle 
the cards."34-
Other duties involved the protection of Belgian citizens.
He strove to acquire the release-of officials and others 
who had been wrongly imprisoned. When the Germans began 
the deportation of Belgian citizens to work camps, he 
attempted to do what he could to stop it. However, Whit­
lock was powerless , since the Wilson administration only 
issued formal protests. In a futile effort, he did try to
*2 Corganize a bureau of repatriations. In a few instances, 
Whitlock was associated with successful negotiations to 
save the lives of certain individuals. For example, he and 
Persian minister Mahmoud Khan, through a requite en grace 
signed by all the diplomats in Belgium, were able to get 
the death;sentence of Belgian senator Hal^t commuted.^
S^Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, August 3, , 1914 , 3»
•^Whitlock, Belgium, II, 261-367. Ironically, the De^ 
partment of State had communicated a request to Whitlock to 
save monuments from destruction in Antwerp. See ibid., I, 
213. — -
56Ibid., II, 181-82.
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In the much-publicized case of Edith Cavell, an alleged
British spy, the protests of Whitlock, and other diplomats
3 7were in vain, and she was executed.
After the occupation, most of Whitlock's time was 
spent with the Commission.for the Relief in Belgium, an 
organization established predominantly by Americans to 
feed the starving Belgians cut off by the British blockade. 
The spearhead of the group was Herbert Hoover, who, adminis­
tered the operation from England. Whitlock and Marquis de 
Viliaiobar, the Spanish minister, helped coordinate it in 
Belgium, Whitlock's memoirs, journal and letters were 
filled with discussions of the relief project. He habitually 
complained of German pressure to subvert the commission's 
activities and the immeasurable negotiations to maintain
*2 Oit. He considered himself an integral part of the work of
the commission, and was fearful for its fate:if he left Bel- 
39gium.
•^Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, 217-18; Whitlock, 
Belgium, II, 49-51. TKorburn has demonstrated that Whit- 
I o c k ’s account of the execution of Cavell was1largely 
secondhand. The minister had been ill during the tragedy, 
and Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the legation, had done 
most of the investigating and made most of the protests.
See his "Whitlock," 126.
38Nevins, Whitlock The Journal, 90-137, 225-55; Whit­
lock The Letters, 216-18; Whitlock, Belgium, I, 72-77.
39For example, see Nevins, Whitlock The Letters,
217-18. The group was formally abandoned by the Americans 
when they entered the war. See Whitlock, Belgium, I,
396-457. “
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Historians have presented various interpretations of 
Whitlock's performance with the relief commission. Nevins 
lauded the;minis ter' s activities: "With the C.R.B. offi­
cials, with his legation staff, Whitlock spent two and a 
half years of toil, anxiety, and ever-haunting apprehensions; 
years in which the character of the Middle Western idealist 
was- not so much deepened as utterly transformed."4® Tager 
remarked that the necessity for Whitlock to use skillful 
diplomacy was acute because of the continued clash of per­
sonalities in the relief organization, Besides the problems 
inherent in relief work, he was continually confronted with 
petty jealousies, especially,from Viliaiobar and the German 
bureaucrats. Also, his relationship with Hugh Gibson, the 
secretary of the legation, was cool, Whitlock considered 
Gibson "swashbuckling," and the secretary believed his 
superior weak.41 Crunden also believed that discord among 
the commission.members was rampant, and questioned why 
Whitlock'did not include these events in his memoirs,42 
Thorburn added that while the American minister could be 
tactful, he gave his associates the impression that he lacked 
the strength to deal with critical problems. Hoover, specif-
40^evinS, Whitlock The Letters, lix. See also Millis, 
Road to War, 74.
4lTager, Whitlock, 151-53.
4^crunden, Whitlock, 274.
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ically, believed Whitlock acted only when shown the way, 
but nonetheless placed tremendous responsibility on.him.^
Whitlock had little difficulty with his ceremonial 
responsibilities. Before the war, there had been consid­
erable opportunity for protocol and ceremony in Belgium.
As Whitlock.stated in the letter to Jewett, the social 
duties, abundant as they were, became trying. But, in 
general, he,found pleasure in them.^ Tager stated that 
the minister’s fluency in French and his "gentle refine­
ment" made him compatible with the atmosphere of the Belgian 
court. He took full advantage of his;ability in French to 
please the Belgians. At one banquet in his honor, Whitlock 
not only responded in.French, but slipped into Belgian, 
vernacular and a few words of Brussels slang, and received 
a tremendous ovation.Thorburn emphasized the,transition 
Whitlock needed to make in order to become comfortable in 
Belgian society. He explained that the minister lived 
simply, but admired graciousness. He had impeccable taste, 
a loVe for elegance and beauty, and preferred the company of 
wealthy and sophisticated people. Whitlock found this kind
^^Thorburn, "Whitlock," 120-21. He further stated that 
Whitlock gave substantial credit for the success of the 
relief commission to Hoover, which seemed fair because the 
minister's performance did not.match.Hoover's. Also, Whit­
lock’s account of the relief work often was too general, 
and emphasized the failures and.not the strengths of the 
program. See ibid,, 120-21, 126.
^^whitlock, Belgium, I, 3-11.
^Tager, Whitlock, 151.
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of life in Belgium, but brought,with him little savoir 
faire. Protocol and the conventions of social life in a 
European capital were strange. He adapted well, however, 
because of his personality and taste, and delighted in 
the congenial’atmosphere of Belgium.^ It would have been, 
unfortunate for Whitlock if\he had been minister to Bel- 
gium at a more tranquil time in Europe. Social graces 
alone were not sufficient to prepare him for the European 
war.
JAMES W. GERARD
Gerard was in the most volatile post in Europe. Before
the war> Gerard was, equivocal about the European situation.
On July 27, 1914, he optimistically reported, "I have reason
to believe matters will be arranged.without general European
war-. Approximately at this time, he believed one of his
’’delicate diplomatic duties” was to persuade the German
48government to sign Bryan’s peace treaties. These negotia­
tions failed, and by July 30 he wrote: "Think Germany's
efforts toward peace fruitless and general European war-
^Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 112. See also Crunden, 
Whitlock, 239.
A 7Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 16.
^ In :case. of a major dispute, they provided for a . 
negotiating period of a year.before resorting to war. See 
Gerard, Eighty-Three Years, 187.
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AQcertain."
When the war broke out, Gerard was immediately faced
with the protection of the rights of American neutral
shipping. In his memoirs and despatches, he stated that
the German government resented American, shipments of arms
to the Allies. He repeatedly cited the Hague Convention
of 1907 to the Germans, arguing that the unilateral
alteration of international law was, unthinkable. ̂  In a
letter to House he expressed the belief that: the Germans
would never be satisfied unless the United States actually
joined them in. war. However, Gerard remained hopeful
that an early peace could be attained, and he sent.numerous
requests to Housfe, the President, and the Department of
State to encourage the United States and Britain to initiate
some positive action. In one. of his despatches of February,
1915, he said:
...It-is my belief that if you seize the present 
opportunity you will be the instrument of bring­
ing about the greatest peace which has ever been 
signed, but it will be fatal to. hesitate or wait 
a moment: success is dependent upon immediateaction.
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914, 21. See also 
Gerard, My Four Years in Germany , 131- 32.
50See Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 226-27.
^Gerard to House, January 20, 1915, in Seymour,
House, 1,345.
32xbid. See also Foreign Relations Supplement 1915 
(1928) ,T53. “
^^Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 9-10.
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Ironically, he sent many reports to the Department of State 
describing what he called the German "hate campaigns" against
C AAmerican shipment of arms to the Allies.
With the sinking of the "Lusitania" the relations'
between the United States and Germany were sorely strained,
and the ambassador and the German government leveled threats
55and counterthreats. GerardTs anti-Germanism was 5 becoming 
more evident. On June 1, 1915, he asserted, "It is the 
German hope to keep the "Lusitania" matter 'jollied along' 
until the American,people get excited about baseball or a 
new scandal and forget. Meantime the hate of America grows 
d a i l y . A n d  while he tried to pacify the Kaiser and the 
German government in Berlin concerning the munitions ship-, 
ments, he was still smoldering. In a letter to House, he 
said:
...Perhaps it is worth a war to have it decided 
that the United States of America is not to be' 
run from Berlin. The people here are firmly 
convinced that we can. be slapped, insulted, and 
murdered with absolute impunity, and refer to 
our notes as things worse than waste paper.
I hear this is said by persons in very exalted 
stations. They feel that:our ’New Freedom1 is 
against their ideas and ideals, and they hate 
President Wilson because he embodies peace and 
learning rather than caste and war...
54Ibid., 103, 104, 138, 402.
^See Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 227-36.
^Gerard to House, June 1, 1915, in Seymour, House,
I, 454-55.
I hope the President never gives in on the 
arms [export] question; if.he ever gives in on 
that, we might as well hoist the German. Eagle 
on the capital,5'
The submarine issue most provoked the American am­
bassador. From 1915 to 1917 the issue of the unrestricted 
use of submarines raged. For a.time, Gerard believed Ger­
many would hold to its various pledges to refrain from 
torpedoing neutral ships. By early 1916, he was convinced 
that "ruthless" submarine warfare would commence if peace 
was not quickly secured. Realizing that the military was, 
responsible for much of the policy being made in Germany, 
he,suggested to Chancellor Theobold Theodor Friedrich Alfred 
von Bethmann Hollweg that;a meeting be arranged for him with 
generals Erich von Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg. This 
request was denied. When unrestricted submarine warfare, 
commenced, Gerard's forebodings about German sincerity for 
peace were confirmed. After the United States declared war, 
he concluded, "The choice lies with the German people. And 
how admirably has our great President shown that people that 
we war, not with them but with the autocracy which has led 
them into the shambles of dishonor . "58
Gerard's ability as a diplomat has garnered praise 
from some historians. Armin Rappaport, for one, suggested
57cerard to House, July 20, .1915* in ibid. , II, 23.
58Qerard, My Four Years in.Germany, 346-55, 358-59, 
368-73, 402.
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that the ambassador had a reputation as a shrewd observer.59 
Seymour believed that Gerard was "... excelled by none in 
the dignity and capacity with which he maintained the most 
trying diplomatic situation of the war zone." He added that 
the ambassador’s letters to House were "pungent and pro­
phetic," and that through them the President was kept 
informed of the complicated forces that governed Germany.60
These favorable evaluations have been challenged. Link 
argued that in early 1915, when the issue of the submarine 
was vital, the President and his advisers were not aware of 
the division of opinion in-the German government or its • 
outcome. All that they knew came from Gerard, who was so 
highly excitable and gullible that he did not and could not 
distinguish between gossip and truth. He missed what any 
envoy witji the right connections would have discovered--the 
impact of the policy of his government upon the men who were 
making the crucial decisions in the country to which he was 
accredited. Instead of reporting what was necessary•for his 
superiors to know, he "bombarded" the Department of State, 
with telegrams describing the "hate campaign."61 Similarly,
59Rappaport, British Press, 38.
^Seymour, House, I, 185.
^Link, Wilson, III, 331-32. See.also,May,.American 
Isolation, 396. Tansill stated that although Gerard sent 
some alarming and anti-German despatches, House had great 
confidence in Gerard's remarks, because he had little 
patience with the Germans himself. See his America Goes 
to War, 358,366, 394.
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Walworth characterized Gerard as Wilson’s "bumptious am­
bassador at Berlin."62
Probably Karl E. Birnbaum has presented the best treat­
ment of Gerard's activities, especially with respect to 
neutral rights^ He stated that in 1916, Bethmann Hollweg 
was preparing the way- in neutral countries for unrestricted 
submarine warfare, and the German Foreign Office actively 
tried to prevent the American government from taking any 
"radical steps" in case Germany initiated such actions.
They first endeavored to persuade the American;Congress and 
public opinion that1 Britain’s illegal .methods of warfare, 
i.e., the blockade, had placed Germany in a critical position. 
This failed because it came too late to influence Wilson’s 
debate with Congress on the issue of warning American citizens 
against traveling on armed merchantmen; Gerard, under the 
presumption that the German propaganda campaign in America 
was an effort to maintain peace between the two countries, 
assured the Chancellor that the campaign had exerted a posi­
tive effect. Birnbaum argued that Gerard's evaluation was,
f \  ^certainly not true in respect to Wilson and Lansing.
^Walworth, Wilson, II, 22.
63Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves a.nd the U-Boat Warfare 
A Study of Imperial Germany’s Folicy Towards the United 
States April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stockholm: Almquist 
and Wilesell, 19 58), 64-65. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Birnbaum, U-Boat.) See also Link, Progressive Era, 208-14.
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Later, Birnbaum continued, Gerard indirectly invited 
the Chancellor to make use of his services to bring about 
peace negotiations between the belligerents. The manager 
of the German-American Chamber of Commerce in Berlin learned 
of this offer and asked Hans Kramer, a German financier, 
to relay it to the German authorities. In his report,
Kramer had stated that;Gerard believed Germany could not 
be defeated and that October, 1916, seemed an appropriate' 
time for mediation. Kramer said Gerard emphasized that he 
and President Wilson would act as the arbitrators, since no 
official American authorities would offer their-services,on 
account of the rejection of previous American peace notes by 
the German'parliament. This proposal was, likewise rejected.
By early 1917 Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office 
believed that the United States was. still interested in its; 
efforts for peace. Nevertheless, they were evasive, due in 
part to their previous unpleasant experiences with Gerard, 
who had been indiscreet in presenting confidential messages 
to Washington. A,case in point occurred in October, 1916, 
The American ambassador was to return to America for a brief 
visit. The Chancellor had a peace message to present to 
Wilson, but he did not trust Gerard to deliver it. The 
Kaiser thought this was too cautious, but Bethmann Hollweg 
insisted and gave it to Johann H. von,Bernstorff, German 
ambassador to the United States, for transmittal. Mean­
while, on the ship to America, Gerard gave an impolitic
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interview to Herbert G. Swope of the New York World; He 
stated that he was bringing no peace message, and would tell 
the President that Germany would begin unrestricted submarine 
warfare after the 1916 election unless the unexpected hap­
pened and peace occurred,, When. Gerard met with Wilson, he 
related what he had told Swope, and possibly more.^ Birn­
baum concluded that the causes of the eventual collapse of 
American-German relations involved a lack of viable communi­
cations as well as actions by both sides not conducive to 
peace. He said about Gerard's performance:
...These shortcomings were not compensated by Ameri­
can diplomacy. The United States Ambassador in 
Berlin was a rather incompetent diplomatist, and 
neither the German Government nor President Wilson 
had any real confidence in him. His indiscretions 
during the autumn of 1916:apparently deprived the 
officials at Wilhelmstrasse of all inclination to 
employ him as a confidential channel between Berlin 
and Washington. On the other hand. Gerard was, owing 
to the absence of .fundamental> general instructions 
in American diplomatic practice, and on account of 
Wilson's critical opinionof.him, insufficiently 
informed of the Presidents intentions and plans 
during decisive periods.65
In his ceremonial role Gerard, although obligated to
But in keeping with his personal pledge, the Presi­
dent would not make peace overtures until after the elec­
tion. See Birnbaum, U-Boat, 153-65, 293-94. See also 
Link, Wilson> V, 173-75; Tans ill, America Goes to War,
597; Notter, Wilson, 557.
^Birnbaum, U-Boat, 337-38. For additional discussions 
of Gerard, see Grattan, Why We Fought, 148-49, 397-98; Alice 
M. Morrissey, The American,Defense of Neutral Rights 1914- 
1917 (Cambridge: Harvard -University Press, 1939), 70"! [Here­
inafter referred, to.as Morrissey, Neutral Rights.); Tuchmau, 
Zimmermann Telegram, 101; May, American Isolation, 2 51,
103
attend many social functions, did not thrive on protocol„ 
Upon his introduction to the Kaiser he decided to abandon 
the "fancy diplomatic uniform" and return to the "demo­
cratic, if unattractive and uncomfortable, dress suit," 
because American newspapers and certain congressmen had a 
most extraordinary prejudice against American diplomats 
wearing diplomatic uniforms.^ He characterized the court 
life as "frivolous" and "far away,," Stuart acknowledged 
Gerard's contention that!court life was pretentious.^ But 
Millis, who disliked the ambassador,, believed that Gerard 
actually enjoyed,himself at ceremonial functions in the 
"heavy brillance" of the Potsdam coupt, and began to
f\ Rrealize the complexity and difference of European society,,
Gerard came to realize that an ambassador was compelled
to become part'of this system and that he could gather the
69most useful information at-social functions. He.also,
discovered that these occasions could be exploited for what
he considered American advantage:
1 was informed through various channels... of 
the imminence of a return to merciless submarine 
warfare. I.knew of this-on the night of a great 
banquet given to me in Berlin at which I said in 
a speech that the relations between Germany and 
the United States.had never been better. Both the
^Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 22-23.
67stuart,: Diplomatic Practice, 228, 337.
^^Millis, Road to War, 21.
^Gerard, My. Four. Years in Germany, 31.
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President and .Colonel,,House: had:.urged me to show 
myself exceptionally,, frieudly. .to. the Germans .
Knowing .that-,the break would .soon come, I was 
delighted to follow these.orders * I knew that if 
I showed myself excessively friendly, criticism 
of the Wilson,adminis tration- by the great mass 
of German-Americans would be blunted when rela­
tions were finally broken.
Tuchman stated that Arthur von,Zimmermann, foreign minister
of Germany, and Gerard each engaged in lulling the other,
71and "outdid each other in purring." These social engage-, 
ments., to Gerard as well as the German officials, seemed 
to be extensions of the cat-and-mouse negotiations between 
Germany and the United States.
MYRON T. HERRICK
Herrick's performance•as a negotiator and reporter in. 
1913 to early 1914 was quite limited. In his>autobiography, 
he asserted that: he made concerted efforts to protect Ameri­
can, citizens stranded in France,during the early stages.of 
the war-. To do this he organized a committee to develop gold 
credits, established a fund to aid destitute Americans, 
obtained rail and ship passage for those desiring to return 
home, and employed other means to protect .American life and 
property. He also helped establish an American hospital in 
France '
70cerard, Eighty-Three Years, 244-45.
^Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 144.
^Mott, Herrick, 127-35. See also Stuart, Diplomatic 
Practice, 2 70-71.
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His despatches during 1913 and 1914 were not enlight­
ening or numerous until the weeks preceding the war. He 
was'best noted for his July 28, 1914, telegram in which he 
predicted the coming of hostilities:
Situation in Europe is regarded here as the 
gravest in history. It is apprehended that civil­
ization is threatened by demoralization which would 
follow a general conflagration. Demonstrations 
made against war here last night by laboring classes; 
it is said to be the first instance of its kind in 
France. It is felt that if Germany once mobilizes 
no backward step will be taken. France has strong 
reliance on her army but it is not giving away to 
undue excitement....73
Herrick asserted that Bryan did not answer or acknowledge
this message, and that it was not shown to the President.
Thus, the ambassador was perturbed that his forewarnings
74were not heeded.
Herrick's activities in France during the early days 
of the Wilson administration have notvbeen carefully 
analyzed. However, the telegram of July 28 interested' a 
few historians. For example, Millis recognized the note as 
the earliest official suggestion of the war arriving at the 
Department of State. He further contended that even during 
those first days, mediation in Herrick's "excited mind" was 
being altered into a proposal for American intervention to
^ Foreign Relations Supplement 1914,,18-19. See also 
Mott, Herrick, 118-19.
74Mott, Herrick, 199-200.
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75halt Germany.
Although Herrick's diplomatic activities were limited 
in 1913 and 1914, he flourished in the social and ceremoni­
al environment of Paris. During his tenure in France he 
attended innumerable gatherings, and became widely known 
for the July 4 celebrations he gave. As a result, he became 
popular with many of the French dignitaries.7  ̂ His cere­
monial activity also seemed to contribute to the ambassador's 
assiduous Francophilism.
WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP
Little of significance is known,about Sharp’s negotia­
ting ability. In his memoirs, Sharp discussed his assistance
with relief programs and his special interest in the treat-
77ment of Allied prisoners of war. Sharp also maintained 
that he kept abreast of all Allied armistice and peace:pro­
posals, because he desired "...the promptest possible cessa­
tion to this prolonged slaughter of the world's best young 
manhood," and wanted ”... a peaceful future safeguarded against 
further unprovoked onslaughts of militaristic imperialism."78 
However, he never referred to his involvement, if any, in
75Millis* Road to War, 49. See also Grattan, Why We 
Fought, 30; Link, Wilson, III, 5.
7^See Mott, Herrick, 94-115. Of course ceremonial 
occasions were more infrequent during the war. See also 
Stuart, Diplomatic Practice, 276.
77Pawson, Sharp, 68.
78Ibid., 347-49.
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negotiations to bring the war to an end. Spaulding argued 
that since the French ambassador to the United States, Jules 
Jusserand, was of such an impressive stature that many dip­
lomatic problems were often settled in Washington rather than 
through Sharp.79
As a reporter, Sharp was more business-like than Herrick 
and less prone to dramatics. Most of his despatches con­
cerned neutral shipping rights and violations, giving full 
accounts of such cases as the "Dacia," "Lusitania," and 
"Sussex."80 Sharp gave little attention to the continental 
aspects of the war, although when America intervened he sent 
Wilson a list of observations. These gave some insight into 
his attitude during this period. He believed that French 
morale was better than expected, although German advances 
were steady. He conjectured that the internal problems of 
the French government, especially Socialist agitation, could 
disturb the military confidence of France and retard its 
prosecution of the war. In association with this, he further 
believed a radical change in the upper echelon of the govern­
ment was imminent. The war in Europe, he argued, was being 
prolonged by: 1) the equality of men and resources on both 
sides, 2) trench fighting, and 3) the airplane. He saw an
79Spaulding, D.A.B., XVII, 25.
80See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 340, 508;
1916, 107-23,“218.
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indication of change since American troops were beginning 
to redress the balance, and German supplies were rapidly 
diminishing.81 All in all his reports were informative, if 
a little clinical.
MAURICE FRANCIS EGAN
Egan had been in Denmark seven years when Wilson took
office. In this time he came to consider Copenhagen a
strategic post. He was sympathetic: "For myself, when I
had studied the history of Denmark, I could imagine no
people with a more glorious past or a more pathetic present,
except Ireland or Poland."8  ̂ He also feared the aggression
of Germany and was concerned about the preservation of an
83independent Denmark. And he became disgruntled when he 
felt the United States would not give Denmark the attention 
he thought it deserved.8^
As World War I developed, Egan found it difficult to 
remain neutral, but he earnestly attempted to perform his 
duties without a hint of his partiality. Concurrently, he 
was occupied with attempts to purchase the Danish West
Indies for the United States, a project to which he had been
81Sharp to Wilson, August 24, 1917, in Dawson, Sharp, 
195-201.
8^Egan, Recollections, 218.
8^See Egan, Ten Years Near the German Frontier, A
Retrospect and a Warning (New York: George H. Doran, HT19),
231. (Hereinafter referred to as Egan, Ten Years.)
8^Egan, Recollections, 225.
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devoted since 1907.8  ̂ It was not until 1916 that this 
transaction was completed.
In his memoirs, Egan stated that the purchase was one 
of Wilson's dreams and, although he had a carte blanche on 
the timing of the negotiations, he proceeded carefully:
I knew very well that if I could strike 
President Wilson at the psychological moment with 
precision and directness, he would trust me to do 
the job. I must say the chance, until 1916, 
seemed rather remote. The state of political 
parties in Denmark was what may be called 
"incoherent" and confused.... I knew very well 
that for the Minister of a great country like 
the United States to hint at any bargain for the 
islands that might irritate the national pride of 
the Danes would be fatal. 86-
In his despatches to the Department of State, at that time, 
he sought encouragement to begin negotiations, and simulta­
neously warned of the possibility of the subjugation of
8 7Denmark and its possessions by Germany. Subsequent des­
patches revealed Lansing's acknowledgement to begin negotia-
D Otions and the specific nature of the American proposal„Q 
Egan credited Lansing with taking the steps necessary to
oncomplete the transaction, while noting his own role in the
88The American interest in these islands was derived 
from their strategic importance to the Panama Canal.
8^Egan, Recollections, 285-86.
8^For example, see Foreign Relations 1917, (1926), 
557, 564, 588-90.
88Ibid., 592-706.
8^Egan, Recollections, 2 86.
\
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negotiations.
By the time the United States declared war on Germany, 
Egan had completed his major objective.as minister to Den­
mark, His active period as a negotiator was nearly ended.
He then focused attention upon the prosecution of the war. 
American intervention relieved himt
The wretched days of neutrality were over; the
voice of the eagle was heard in the land, and
there was no more need of feeling apologetic, even
when one put on a bold front and pretended to be
too "proud to fight." But the day had gone by 
when anybody who could watch the course of govern­
ment intelligently, really believed that we were 
fighting to make the world safe.for democracy.
England and France were, fighting; for their lives 
and we were fighting because the American, sense of 
honor had not yet perished,"0.
Tansill was one of the few historians who analyzed 
the diplomatic performance of Egan, especially those activ­
ities concerning the purchase of the islands.0* He stated 
that while Egan's attempts to secure the islands were 
persistent, the Danes' impression of the United States as a 
violent, imperialistic nation which hanged negroes, made his 
chore difficult. Egan finally was able to convince the Danes 
that he was far different from what they imagined his country-
90Egan, Recollections, 335.
9*Both Link and Notter mentioned Egan in their studies 
of Wilson, but they only emphasized that the minister 
utilized the threat of German encroachment in Denmark as 
a major reason to negotiate for the islands during the 
Wilson administration. See Link, Wilson, II, 81; Notter, 
Wilson, 421.
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men, to be, and thus gained their confidence* In June,
1915, Lansing authorized Egan to negotiate formally for the 
islands. But, Tansill asserted, Egan delayed for two 
months, probably because the governor of the Danish West 
Indies, Christen Helweg-Larsen, opposed the transaction. 
Surprisingly, Egan made no reference to this delay in his 
memoirs. Also the instructions from Lansing to begin nego­
tiations referred to a "plan" to be.presented to the Danes, 
This "plan" was not the direct,purchase of the Danish West 
Indies, as Egan intimated in his memoirs, but a proposal he 
suggested as early as September, 1910, for the exchange of 
Mindanao for Greenland. Tansill further alleged that Egan 
was never aware of the pressures which Lansing placed on 
the Danish government, and thus inadvertently his reports
and memoirs usually made his own negotiations seem more 
9 2important.
In spite of Egan's concern for the purchase of the Danish
West Indies and the prosecution of the war, he was quite ac-
Q ^tive in endless ceremonial duties. His long service in 
Denmark certainly made him familiar with many of the impor­
tant personages, and this was a great advantage to a diplomat 
who was trying to persuade his host country to sell a piece 
of property.
^^Tansill, The Purchase of the Danish_West Indies (Balti­
more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932), 456-57, 470-73, 50 8. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Tansill, Danish West Indies.)
93See ibid., 289ff.
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IRA NELSON MORRIS
Before the American intervention in World War I, Morris 
felt overwhelmed by his duties as a neutral minister in 
Sweden. He not only was responsible for German and Austro- 
Hungarian prisoners of war, but negotiated diplomatic 
matters which the Central Powers wished to transact with 
Russia.
The geographic position of Sweden made Morris's post
an important location from which to view German and Russian
activities. An especially significant task was keeping the
Wilson administration informed of all trade going through
the Kattegat and Skagerrak. However, in a report.to the
Department of State in,1915, Morris told the Secretary of
State that compelling Sweden to discontinue all exports to
95Germany would incite Germany to retaliate in kind. As
1917 approached, he took heed of all aliens going to America
9 6and the increasing German espionage in Sweden.
American intervention prompted new activity for the 
minister. Aside from some commercial negotiations between 
Sweden and the United States,®'7 he gave full attention to
®^Morris, From an. American.Legation, 33.
®^Ibid., 76. See also Thomas A. Bailey, The Policy of 
the United- States Toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918 [Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 156. (Hereinafter referred to 
as Bailey, Neutrals.)
Q 6Morris, From an American Legation, 122-23.:
9^See Bailey, Neutrals, 151-53.
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aiding in,the defeat of Germany. Since the ambassador to 
Russia, Francis, was often incommunicado, Morris provided a 
vital service by reporting activities in Russia to the 
Department of State, especially during 1917 and 1918.
Morris believed that the events during the summer of 1917 
indicated,the eventual withdrawal of Russia from the war. 
Upon the Bolshevik rise to power, he recommended that the 
Allies cooperate, in some way, with Lenin’s government to 
prevent the utter disintegration of the Russian participa­
tion in the war. To compliment this, he advocated a 
counter-propaganda campaign against : Germany. Of course, he 
was disappointed that'his suggestion was not employed. In 
order to further improve his understanding of the activites 
in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution, he established a 
"Russian Bureau" with men of various political persuasions, 
who would keep him informed of the intricate problems 
there.98
In other legation business, Morris aided in a propa­
ganda campaign against,Germany. He-concluded, "I claim for 
our propaganda work some share in bringing about what was, 
in effect, a veiled offer of peace from Germany early in 
1918."" However, this "veiled offer" had come from a 
Socialist member of the Reichstag, who had no authority or
"Morris, From an American Legation, 73, 156-67. See 
also Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, [1931), 96.
"ibid. , 132-33.
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power to negotiate peace and, under, proper diplomatic pro­
cedures, should not have been received by Morris. In this 
case, the minister clearly overestimated his responsibil­
ities as a diplomat.1^0
CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA
What is known about Vopicka’s. performance as minister 
to Bulgaria, Rumania:and Serbia,was derived primarily from 
his memoirs and correspondence... And although his diplo­
matic duties were varied and often conflicting, his anti- 
Central Power sentiments and his paternalistic attitude 
toward the Balkan countries were always evident. In the 
forward to his memoirs, he wrote:
A blow struck in the Balkans, as of steel 
upon flint; a spark, a flame--and then, the 
holocaust of the world!
But the blow came from without; the hand of 
tyranny was raised against a people whose freedom 
had been bought with their own blood.
The World War began in the.Balkans, yet its 
origin,was in the hearts of,the unscrupulous 
autocrats whose ruthless ambition knew neither 
justice nor limit; who counted the subjections 
of a people merely as the first move in the game 
to win commercial and political supremacy, and 
in the end, to dominate the world. Serbia was 
only a power to be swept aside as the first 
obstacle in the path of world conquest.101
lOOworris's ceremonial performance was difficult to 
determine.
l^Charles Joseph Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans: 
Seven Years of a Diplomatist!s Life in the Storm Centre 
of Europe (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1921) , v. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Vopicka, Balkans.)
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However, Vopicka considered his activities in the 
Balkans during the period of American neutrality in keeping 
with the principles and policies.of the Wilson administra­
tion, For example, an American, who. had been doing business 
in Austria and Hungary, tried to make a lucrative deal with 
the minister. Vopicka was to convince the Rumanian govern­
ment to allow Germany to send trainloads of food, secretly 
hiding ammunition, to Constantinople. The American minis­
ter refused, stating he was from a.neutral country and would 
not-aid belligerents in any way. In another episode, he had 
asked for the resignation of an. American consular agent in 
Bulgaria, who had written a book, which asserted that Bulgaria 
should side against Russia in the developing conflict.
Much of Vopicka's work prior, to. 1917 was typical of many 
ministers from neutral countries. He was responsible for 
various groups of prisoners of war., and was asked to head an 
international committee to investigate the treatment of 
prisoners in S e r b i a . H e  also.took.charge of the interests 
of eight countries, including. Germany. However, his suspi­
cion of the Central Powers made. him .dubious of their activ­
ities in the Balkan countries,. . Vopicka was fearful of 
espionage and propaganda, believing that the German and 
Austro-Hungarian governments employed spies in Bucharest to 
observe the American legation. In one case, he said, a
102Ibid., 35-40, 42-43, 50, 270.
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beautiful woman spy was assigned to.obtain information from 
him. He was able to expose her because she had begun a 
discussion with him without being.properly introduced, which 
was contrary to diplomatic protocol.(!). He later dis-
1 A  7covered she was a prominent Austrian.agent.
While Vopicka’s despatches during the period of Ameri­
can neutrality clearly reflected.his_biases, they also were 
a primary source of information about the Balkan situation. 
His war correspondence was most.abundant from mid-1914 to 
late 1915, because of the crucial nature of Bulgarian and 
Rumanian neutrality. He reported-the. Bulgarian decision in 
October, 1915, to ally with the Central Powers, which he 
considered surprising not only to the Entente, Rumania, and 
Serbia, but also to. the Bulgarian people.10  ̂ In this report
he referred to his previous statement of November 30, 1914,
1 0 swhich had predicted this event. His anti-Germanism 
especially can be seen in his skepticism of Rumania’s polit­
ical intentions before they joined the Allies: "From my
despatches the Department will. see. that I never placed much 
confidence in Roumania because the king is a member of the 
Hohenzollern family and the present administration under 
Mr. [Ionel] Bratianu always acts according to his wishes."106
103Ibid., 82-83.
10^Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 70-71.
105Ibid., 1914, 155.
106Ibid-. , 1915, 71.
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Also, his paternalistic attitude toward the Balkan countries
was evident in his despatches. For instance, in support of
Serbia he exhorted the Department of State to persuade
Britain to withdraw its opposition to the Red Cross shipment
107of flour to that country.
The culmination of his distrust of the Germans occurred 
in January, 1917. General August von Mackensen, the occupa­
tion governor in Bucharest, forced Vopicka and his staff to 
leave. On their way through Berlin, the American minister 
talked with an official in the German.Foreign Office, who 
told him the affair had been a mistake, and that he had not 
been recalled. Vopicka answered, "I am sorry, but you must 
settle the matter with my government. This is nothing less 
than kidnapping and a casus belli. ^
When he finally returned to Rumania and set up the lega­
tion in Jassy, its temporary capital, he continued business 
as usual. When the United States finally entered the war, 
his bias against the Central Powers continued relentlessly.
In fact, he had recommended a declaration of war against 
Austria-Hungary as well as Germany, although his suggestion 
was discounted by the administration.^^ He also continually
1Q7Ibid., 1916, 921. See also 40, 46.
lO^Vopicka, Balkans, 125.
IQ^Ibid.f 128, 246; Foreign Relations Supplement 1918,
I; Mamatey, Central Europe, 12 2.
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expressed his hatred of Bolshevism. He believed it had to 
be eradicated, since, among other things, it forced Russia 
out of the war .
Vopicka’s biases even found expression in his cere­
monial duties. For example:
In Sofia I was received by Czar Ferdinand 
of Bulgaria, being presented by Prime Minister 
Genadieff....On the following day, the newspaper 
"Mir" printed an interview with me in which I 
expressed a favorable impression of the czar, 
stating truthfully my belief that he was a 
good monarch as he had labored twenty-seven 
years for the education of-the Bulgarians.
This evidently pleased the czar, as there­
after he was very friendly, and always gave 
me prompt audience whenever I came to Sofia, 
an honor not granted to all my colleagues, 
some of whom, I understood, being unable to 
see him even once a y e a r . m
Mamatey was extremely critical of Vopicka1s prejudice 
against the Central Powers. For example, he said that the 
American minister gave the Rumanian prime minister the mis­
taken impression that his prejudice against Germany and 
Austria-Hungary were felt by many Americans. Mamatey further 
stated that Vopicka demonstrated open hostility to his 
Austrian counterpart in Bucharest, and created such rancor 
against the Central Powers that they often attempted to recall 
him. However, even though he became a minor legend for his 
"hilarious social gaffes" in the "gossipy and tight little
ll^See Vopicka, Balkans, 143-45.
111Ibid., 22-23.
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world of international diplomats," his activities endeared 
him to the Rumanians and provided some valuable services 
to the Allied cause.
DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS
Although Francis was sent to Russia to improve commer­
cial relations between that country and the United States, 
World War I made the task of the ambassador difficult, and 
broadened his responsibilities. On his arrival, he was 
immediately given the duty of representing German and Austro- 
Hungarian interests. According to Francis, there were 
approximately one and one-quarter million Austrian prisoners, 
one-quarter million German prisoners, ttyo hundred thousand
interned German civilians, and fifty thousand interned
11 71Austrian civilians. In spite of this newly acquired
responsibility, he was still determined to attain a commer­
cial treaty with Russia. In his first meeting with Foreign 
Minister Serge Sazonoff, he was told that no treaty was 
possible until all the Allies developed some definite 
economic policies. Francis was disappointed.
The various interpretations of Francis's commercial 
negotiations are scarcely in harmony. Charles Daniel
H  Mamatey, Central Europe, 121-23. For a more sym­
pathetic view, see Thomson, "Charles Joseph Vopicka,"
D.A.B., XXI, 695.
USprancis, Russia, 4.
•̂ -̂ see Francis's letter to his son, Perry, in ibid. , 8.
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DeYoung asserted that Sazanoff was willing to negotiate a 
commercial treaty in,the spring of 1916, but unknown to the 
Department of State, the Czarist government had inaugurated 
a policy of refusing to enact trade agreements until the 
commercial programs of the Allies were clarified. Francis 
then turned to advancing trade without a treaty, although 
that was hardly his responsibility. Lansing attempted to 
restrain the ambassador's vigor, but Francis persisted. 
However, DeYoung added, the relations of Francis with the 
Czarist government were not close, and he was eternally 
suspicious of its activities. Williams argued that, in 
the ambassador's view, his failure to establish more favor­
able commercial relations with Russia occurred, in large 
part, because of the decision of J.P, Morgan to handle 
Russian loans through his British office. This policy made 
it difficult for American exporters to arrange satisfactory 
American credits for Russia, and increased England's in­
fluence at Petrograd.Kohlenberg added that Francis 
also realized the necessity of placating American Jewry in 
order to conduct commercial negotiations compatible with 
their political interests. Soon Francis was aware that the 
Russian government had no intention of altering its dis­
criminatory policies against Jews, and this was a detriment
115DeYoung, "Francis," 23-24, 27.
116Will iams, American-Russian Relations, 84;
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to his negotiations.I17
Although Francis was wary of the political unrest in 
Russia in 1916 and early 1917, he had new hope for a commer­
cial treaty with the coming to power of the Provisional 
Government. In the absence of instructions from Washing­
ton, he quickly tried to associate himself with the new
government, and was soon able to acquire United States
119recognition of it. Unfamiliar with Russia, Francis
characterized the rise of the Provisional Government in 
terms of American political goals. For example, in May,
1917 he observed:
An immense crowd of enthusiastic Russians 
have just left Embassy where they came to ex­
tend salutation from free Russia to free America 
and at their earnest and repeated request, I 
am now expressing their greetings to their 
brother freemen in the United States.... 120
But Francis also began to discern that the Russians desired
a separate peace with Germany, and he continually exhorted
the new government to continue the war in order to keep
pressure on the German east flank. He stated:
This situation, in my opinion, not only jus­
tified but demanded activities on my part to 
assist the Russian Government to keep the Russian 
armies fighting which under ordinary circumstances 
would have been not only unusual but improper for 
an Ambassador to undertake.
H^Kohienberg, Mid-America, XL, 204-12.
H^Francis, Russia, 22-23; Kohlenberg, Mid-America, 
XL, 213.
1 1 Q See Francis, Russia, 82; Kennan, Russia, I, 17. 
120See Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 1-12.
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He evaluated this step as helping to determine the future 
of the United States * Russia, all international relations,
and society itself!121 a resuit, he regularly sought
12 2American financial support for the new government.
Before the accession to power of the Bolsheviks,
Francis held firmly to the conviction that the Russian people 
should support the Provisional Government, and he decried 
” ... the anarchistic dictums which had been preached from 
every street corner by an extreme Socialist named Lenin and 
his followers," who he believed were in the pay of Germany, 
With the Bolshevik revolution, Francis’s anticipation of 
improved commercial relations between the United States and 
Russia, and the continuation of Russia in the war faded.123 
When the Bolsheviks came to power, the ambassador made no 
recommendation for recognition, nor did he receive instruc­
tions to do. so. At first he did establish what he called a 
"quasi-business" relation with them. However, after the 
signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, he became an enemy of 
Bolshevism, and raised the ire of the German, government as 
well for inciting the Russian people to continue the pros-
121prancis, Russia, 125.
122For example, see Foreign Relations Russia, 1918, I, 
1-12, 90-94, 150.
123pranciS} Russia, 112-13; Foreign Relations Russia, 
1918, I, 40. !
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ecution of the war.424
Francis was undaunted. More than ever he harangued 
the Bolsheviks and the Germans. And although he had been 
initially opposed to it, he finally advocated Allied mili­
tary intervention in Russia to extirpate German influence, 
and ultimately to topple the Bolshevik government.125 ^e 
stated, "I advocated the eradication of Bolshevism in 
Russia because it is a blot on the civilization of the 
Twentieth Century, and for the additional reason that it is 
our interest, to exterminate it in the land of its birth."126
Historians have given substantial attention to Francis's 
activities in Russia during the revolutionary period. 
Kohlenberg commented that-Washington was pleased to do all 
it could to aid any individual or group whose aim was the 
destruction of the Bolshevik regime, and Francis,■in agree­
ment, was unwilling to pursue his plans for a commercial 
treaty or any other intercourse.427 Conversely, Williams
124Francis, Russia, 132, 173-77, 189-212, 231-37. See 
also Foreign Relations Russia, 1918,1, 521. He eventually 
moved his staff to Vologda.
42^Francis, Russia, 288-309; Foreign Relations Russia, 
1918, I, 387, 519; il, 55, 126, 178- 80, 51T-70,' 526-27:
126Francis, Russia, 307. See also 340.
127Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 24. See also Albert N. 
Tarulis, American-Baltic Relations 1918-1922: The Struggle 
Over Recognition ^Washington D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1965), 36-39; Foster Rhea Dulles, The 
Road to Teheran The Story of Russia and America 1781-1943 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), 127-31; ~
DeYoung, "Francis," 43, 48, 53-55, 61-74; Stuart, Diplomatic 
Practice, 232, 264. „
viewed Francis’s actions as "open threats" to reactivate 
the Russian Army, and silence Lenin and Trotsky. He added 
that Francis did not seem to understand that the Russian 
people had little inclination,to continue the war.*28
Historians have generally agreed that Francis's reports 
gave little insight into the problem facing Russia in 1917. 
Kennan stated that the events in Petrograd seriously con­
fused Francis, and his despatches gave Washington only a dim 
and "not wholly intelligible" impression of what was happen­
ing. On the other hand, the Wilson administration did not 
keep its ambassador well-informed e i t h e r . F o s t e r  Rhea 
Dulles concurred, and added that although despatches from 
the American consuls in Petrograd and Moscow gave some idea 
of the growing influence of Bolshevism, the Department of 
State built its policy on the interpretation of Francis, who 
had continually dismissed the threat of Bolshevism to the 
stability of the Provisional Government. Also, the ambassa­
dor failed to realize that while Lenin and Trotsky received 
aid from Germany to get to Russia, they were not paid 
agents.130
128winiams, American-Russian Relations, 92.
l ^ K e n n a n ,  Russia, I, 242-43. See also Christopher 
Lasch, "American Intervention In Siberia: A Reinterpretation, 
Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVII ( J u n e ,  1962), 209-23.
l^Dulles, Road to Teheran, 104. See also DeYoung, 
"Francis," 35-41; John Albert White, The Siberian Inter­
vention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 73.
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An example of Francis's distrust of Bolshevism was his 
acceptance of the validity of the Sisson documents. Kennan 
explained: "In the winter of 1917-18 the Committee on
Public Information, which was the official American propa­
ganda agency of World War I, stationed in Petrograd a special 
representative, Edgar Sisson, formerly an editor of Cosmo­
politan Magazine. In February and March 1918, Sisson pur­
chased and removed from Russia a:.number of documents and 
photographs of documents purporting to prove that the leaders 
of the Bolshevik government were paid agents of the German 
General Staff." Eventually Sisson showed these documents to 
Francis.-1-31 Dulles stated that Francis utilized these as 
conclusive proof of his conviction that Lenin and Trotsky 
were in the pay of Germany. In time the documents would be 
discredited, and Francis's basic assumptions would prove to 
be unwarranted. But his opinion was almost universally 
accepted in those decisive days.1^2
Betty Miller Unterberger presented a clear evaluation 
of Francis's activities concerning intervention in Russia.
She stated that there was a growing unanimity among Ameri­
can representatives in Europe and Asia in favor of interven­
tion. The consuls in Russia urged it, and Reinsch in China
131Kennan, "The Sisson Documents," Journal of Modern 
History, XXVIII (March, 1956), 130.
132Dulles* Road to Teheran, 122-23. See also Brenda 
Kurtz Shelton, "President Wilson and the Russian Revolution," 
University of Buffalo Studies, XXIII (March, 1957), 118.
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believed that the Russians would welcome Allied interven­
tion, if Japan was not allowed to enter unilaterally.
Francis became more vehement, and advocated immediate occupa­
tion of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel. And, like 
Reinsch, he was opposed to the unilateral intervention of 
J ap an. ̂  ̂ ̂
Since the political unrest in Russia was almost con­
tinuous during his time in Russia, Francis's ceremonial 
activities were limited. Before the Provisional Govern­
ment came to power, the Russian court was considered the 
most lavish and ritualistic in Europe. Francis's association 
with the Czar was cordial, but not intimate.According 
to Kennan, Francis lived quietly in his embassy apartment, 
confining his social life largely to the American colony, 
and taking little part in the gatherings in high Petrograd 
society. Kennan further asserted that Francis seemed to 
find no easy approach to his colleagues; he was ignored or 
was the subject of amusement and condescension. His rare 
diplomatic dinners, which were "...marked by a squeaky 
gramophone playing behind a screen in the dining room, and 
Philip [Jordan] interrupting the service at the table from
133getty Miller Unterberger, America's Siberian Expedi­
tion, 1918-1920 A Study of National Policy [Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 19 56), 2 8-29, 47-48, 60-61, 
141. See also her article, "President Wilson and the 
Decision to Send American Troops to Siberia," Pacific 
Historical Review, XXIV (February, 1955) , 63-7TT See also 
DeYoung, "Francis," 74b-75b.
13 4 For example, see Francis, Russia, 12-16.
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time to time to crank it," were not up to the standard of 
Russian society.*35 He attended some social gatherings 
with members of the Provisional Government., including 
Alexander Kerensky, and his relations with them were 
friendly. But he never lost his apprehension of the 
Bolsheviks, and imperial protocol.was certainly not part 
of Russian society then.
HENRY MORGENTHAU
Morgenthau1s reluctance to accept the Turkish assign­
ment was not evident in his performance as ambassador. On 
his arrival to Constantinople, he quickly determined to 
take charge of his embassy:
Soon after my arrival I observed a curious 
phenomenon concerning the position.of an ambassa­
dor. The instinctive ambition of the attaches 
led them to try to keep the Ambassador from taking 
an active hand in the work.of the Chancery. It was 
explained to me with great solemnity, that-.the 
business office of the Embassy-was not like other 
business offices; that its operations were so in­
volved in delicacies of diplomatic usage that none 
but old hands, trained in all their niceties were 
competent to handle the transaction of its intri­
cate affairs.... I made short work of this mysterious 
nonsense... Therefore, I promptly acquainted myself 
with the records of the Embassy for several years 
preceding, and took absolute charge.of its func­
tions, as I was duty bound to do. The mysteries 
faded instantly. Common sense, judgment, and 
energy are the desiderata of all business rela­
tionships, and I found no barrier in these affairs, 
because of their so-called diplomatic nature.136
l^Kennan, Russia, I, 38.
^ % e n r y  Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922) , 178-79.
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However, he also viewed his post in more ideal terms: 
"America's true mission in Turkey,.I felt, was to foster 
the permanent civilizing work of the Christian missions, 
which so gloriously exemplified the American spirit at its 
best."1^  This was quite a remark for a.Jew, but Morgen­
thau disapproved of Zionism in association with Judaism, 
believing it was the "most stupendous fallacy of Jewish 
history." Instead, America was his Zion.138
His diplomatic tasks soon became more immediate and 
concrete with the war. Turkish neutrality was vital. He 
employed loans to Turkey as an expression of American 
friendship and as an inducement, to remain aloof from the 
conflict. In his reports, he strongly urged increased 
Allied demonstrations of friendship for the Turks in order 
to counteract the mounting German influence.139 Finally, 
Turkey demonstrated its partisanship towards the Central 
Powers, and closed the Dardanelles, cutting off the Allies 
from Russia. Morgenthau recalled:
The Grand Vizier came out in answer to my re­
quest. He presented a pitiable sight. He was in 
title at least, the most important official of the 
Turkish Government, the mouthpiece of the Sultan 
himself, yet now he presented a picture of abject
157Ibid., 203.
■ •̂̂ See ibid. , 348, 401.
139Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 19 29)37-41, 
43-46. (Hereinafter referred to as Morgenthau, Morgen­
thau 's Story.) See also Foreign Relations Supplement 
1915, 980, 982-83.
129
helplessness and fear. His face was blanched and 
he was trembling from head-to foot. He was so 
overcome by his emotions that he could hardly speak; 
when I asked him whether the,news was true that the 
Dardanelles had been closed, he.finally stammered 
out that it was. "You know, this means war," I said, 
and I protested as strongly as I could in the name 
of the United States.140
Historians have been especially interested in Morgen­
thau1 s negotiations concerning Turkish neutrality, and the 
strong presentation of his position. Grattan stated that 
it was not surprising that Turkey joined the Central Powers, 
since they had every reason to doubt the sincerity of the 
proposal of the Entente to observe the integrity of Turkey 
if she remained neutral. Although a treaty of alliance 
between Turkey and Germany had been signed on August 2, 1914, 
the Turks continued negotiations with the Entente as simply 
a smoke screen to hide their preparation for war. Morgenthau 
was as much in the dark, Grattan argued, as the Entente 
statesmen during the period between the signing of the treaty 
and the Turkish declaration of w a r . 441 as Laurence Evans
and John A. DeNovo asserted, Morgenthau was anxious to make a 
strong presentation to the Turks to demonstrate the illogic 
of their defying the Entente. His plan was discouraged by 
the Secretary of State, who instructed him that, under no 
circumstances was he to offer suggestions, officially or 
unofficially. Only if the Turks asked, was he to inform
140ibid., 106.
^Grattan, Why We Fought, 249-50.
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them that the United States preferred them to remain neu­
tral. -*-42 However, Grattan, unlike Evans and DeNovo, noted 
that Morgenthau recorded in his memoirs that he had approval 
from the Department of State to act unofficially„143
Morgenthau's desire to keep Turkey netural can be 
attributed, in part, to his suspicion of the Central Powers. 
He was certain that' they had:premeditated the war, waiting 
for an opportune casus b e l l i . A f t e r  his attempts to per­
suade Turkey to remain neutral failed, he turned much of 
his energy to relief work. He contended that there was 
nothing between the foreign nationals under his protection 
and destruction except the American flag. From the begin­
ning, he realized that his task would be a difficult one.
His memoirs abound with examples of his relief efforts. One 
curious example involved the white slave trade:in Constanti­
nople. Morgenthau had told Bedir Bey, Prefect of Police, 
that he would some day write a book on his stay in Turkey, 
and thought Bey's performance of his duties should improve, 
so he would not be cast as a villain. According to the
142Laurence Evans, United States Policy and the 
Partition of Turkey 1914-1924 (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins Press, i965)"7 TS~. [Hereinafter referred to as 
Evans, Partition of Turkey.); John A. DeNovo, American 
Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 90. 
(Hereinafter referred to as DeNovo, Middle East.)
l^Grattan, Why We Fought, 150-51.
144por example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau* s Story, 89.
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ambassador, Bey then made a concerted effort to curtail the 
slave trade. During the Allied bombardment of the Turkish 
capital, Morgenthau remained in the city to "forestall 
massacres and the destruction .of the, city," and was able 
to establish safety zones with the approval of the Department 
of State. At that time, he also had "a most significant 
meeting" with Enver Pasha, Minister of War. The Turkish 
government had been incensed by the Allied bombardment of 
civilian targets, and decided to take hostages from the 
ranks of the foreign nationals. After considerable dis­
cussion, Morgenthau convinced the Turks to take only fifty 
hostages, and soon thereafter obtained their release. 1-45
Morgenthau was not as fortunate with his protests 
against the genocide of the Armenians in Turkey. He was 
greatly disturbed by the annihilation, but felt helpless to 
interfere in Turkish internal matters. Therefore, he began 
a widespread propaganda campaign in Europe and America. He 
even proposed a large-scale evacuation of Armenians to 
America, but the project was considered impractical.146 
various activities produced no substantial results. Conse­
quently, he became frustrated with his failure to stop "the
145Ibid., 54-56, 130, 200, 244-47.
•^^See Foreign Relations Supplement 1915, 988. A 
committee, proposed by Morgenthau, was formed to raise funds 
and provide means to save the Armenians. Some of the 
prominent members were Cleveland Dodge, Charles Crane, John.
R. Mott and Stephen Wise. This group believed the large- 
scale emigration of Armenians to America was impractical.
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destruction of the Armenians," which made Turkey "a place 
of horror" for h i m , 147 The ambassador left Turkey in 1916, 
believing there was nothing more he could do, and he de­
cided to return to his former business and political activ­
ities. He felt he could best serve his country by helping 
to reelect Wilson.148,
Historians have generally recognized Morgenthau’s 
efforts on behalf of foreign nationals, and especially 
Armenians.149 Grattan argued that while Morgenthau could 
hardly be reproached for his publicity campaign to save 
the Armenians, he played into the hands of Allied propa­
gandists who used the massacres to prepare the public for 
any measures of severity,toward Turkey they might institute 
after the war, i.e., the division of spoils as established 
in their secret t r e a t i e s . R o b e r t  L. Daniel supported 
his thesis, stating that although Morgenthau helped organize 
relief committees for the Armenians, he too exploited latent 
animosity toward the Turks and resorted to name-calling. The 
ruthless Turk, Morgenthau said, was "psychologically primi­
tive" and a "bully and a coward."151
14^Morgenthau, Morgenthau’s Story, 385.
148Ibid.
149por example, see DeNovo, Middle East, 79, 101.
l^^Grattan, Why We Fought, 251.
l^lRobert L. Daniel, "The Armenian Question and 
American-Turkish Relations, 1914-1927" Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XLVI (September, 1959)', 2 53- 54. See 
also Morgenthau, Morgenthau’s Story, 236, 275.
133
The ambassador's ceremonial role was more difficult 
to discern than his performance as a negotiator and a 
reporter. He was friendly with many Turkish officials, 
often socializing with them, but maintaining a condescend­
ing air. 152 jn h-[s associations with his diplomatic 
colleagues, he was superficially cordial and always imperious. 
For instance, on his arrival to Turkey, instead of the cus­
tomary visitation required of an ambassador, he remained 
at the American Embassy and waited for the other envoys to 
come.to him. He told Dr. Paul Weitz, an unofficial attache" 
and a "secret German agent," that he never made the first 
advances. The other diplomats should decide whether they 
wished a relationship based on formal diplomatic exchange 
or a frank informal friendship. If they preferred the latter, 
he would be delighted to meet them halfway, but they must 
cover the first half.153 jn addition, he was often on guard 
at social events for hints of important diplomatic secrets.
At a dinner at which he was host, the American ambassador 
noted that the special emissary of the Kaiser was offended 
by his table placement. He said, "I reported this dinner 
incident to my government as indicating Germany's growing 
ascendancy in Turkey...," and presumed all other envoys at 
the affair did the s a m e . 154 j^s flair for the dramatic was
152por example, see Morgenthau, All in a Lifetime, 202.
153ibid., 180-81. Morgenthau said that the German and 
Austro-Hungarian ambassadors were delighted.
*^Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 43-46.
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most evident here,,
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH
The duties at the Peking legation were complex and 
varied in 1913, but Reinsch chose, to interpret most of them 
in terms of economic activities. As he said:
I had long discarded any narrow interpretation 
of diplomacy, but even if I had adhered to the prin­
ciple that the diplomat must busy himself only with 
political matters, I should have had to admit that 
in China political matters included commerce, finance, 
and industry. I did not, of course, intend that the 
Legation should enter into a scramble for concessions, 
but it was my purpose that it shall maintain sym­
pathetic contact with Americans active in the economic- 
life of China, and should see.to it that the desire 
of the Chinese to give them fair treatment should not
be defeated from any o t h e r  s o u r c e .-'-55
Reinsch did become involved in maintaining and securing 
concessions for American businessmen, as in the case of the 
Hwai River conservancy project: ."I thought it essential to 
propose only such relationships as would help develop some 
American interests already established in China. I was 
attracted by this plan, sound, useful, and meritorious, to 
redeem the Hwai River region."156 jn another case, Japan 
disputed some oil rights in northern China which the Standard 
Oil Company had developed. Reinsch quickly informed Stan­
dard Oil' s -headquarters that its interests were endangered,
155paul Samuel Reinsch, An American,Diplomat in China 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922),
64. (Hereinafter referred to as Reinsch, China.)
IS^Ibid., 80-81. See also Foreign Relations 1914, 
107, 111, 113, 114; also 1917. ’
and coaxed the Chinese into re-affirming the American claim. 
But in his plan for economic development in China, he re­
ceived little cooperation from the uninterested financiers 
in the United States. He was frustrated by their lack of 
concern for China and their overt attention to Europe. 
Japanese aid to China also vexed him, since he assumed that 
it would reduce active American business activity in China, 
The Lansing-Ishii notes were the coup de gr&ce, because, 
among other things, the United States officially recognized 
Japan’s economic interests in China.157
Those historians who evaluated Reinsch’s ability to 
negotiate economic issues generally applauded his efforts, 
but indicated his failures. Pugach stated that Reinsch 
believed Wilson wished to assist in the development of 
China, strengthen the independent position of the United 
States in the Orient, and protect its national interest, as 
opposed to "facilitating the marketing of portfolio invest­
ments." The minister of China, Pugach continued, felt he 
was executing the foreign policy of the President, even when 
he exceeded "the letter of his.instructions„" Pugach also 
suggested that Reinsch had a modicum of success, especially 
when he visited the United States in 1918 to stir American, 
business interest in China. By the next year, however, the 
Japanese-American rapprochement made it impossible for him
157Reinsch, China, 82-88, 304-07, 328, 353-58, 382.
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to continue his w o r k . 158 Gage was in basic agreement, but 
emphasized the practical political motives of Reinsch's 
economic policy. The Sino-Japanese negotiations in early 
1915, having shifted the balance of power in the Far East, 
forced Reinsch to conclude that:American capital interests 
in China should be strengthened to stave off Japanese 
economic advances, and eventually political incursions. The 
minister also saw the necessity of weaning Britain away from 
Japan, and influencing its diplomats to follow an American 
lead which would include a new interpretation of special 
interests in the Orient. Internally, Reinsch wanted to manip­
ulate Chinese policy to bring about a closer relationship 
between his country and China by keeping in office an 
amenable group of Chinese statesmen. Unfortunately, Gage 
asserted, Reinsch’s program failed, for a number of reasons, 
including: 1) European countries, even.with the war in
progress, were unwilling to abandon their spheres of in­
fluence and special interests; 2) the Japanese were able to 
discourage American capital investments in China; 3) Reinsch's 
attempts to manipulate Chinese officialdom split it into 
factions relying on outside support to gain power; and 4) the 
Lansing-Ishii notes. After the failure of his program, Gage 
concluded, Reinsch just marked time.159
158pUgacj1> Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 169-71.
See also Pugach, "Reinsch,'* 108-13.
159Gage, "Reinsch," 97-98, 101-02, 135, 189-92, 427-29. 
See also Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest
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The problems of the war and Japanese political and 
military encroachment in China were issues of major signi­
ficance with which Reinsch was compelled to deal. The 
Chinese government asked for his advice when Japan,pre­
sented the ignominious Twenty-One Demands to them. Realiz­
ing the devastating effect of such ultimata, he recommended 
that detailed negotiations on each demand be carried out in 
order to stall for time and arouse the interest of other 
nations. Beyond this, Reinsch felt helpless, and believed 
he could only watch the course of events and give sym­
pathetic hearings to the Chinese of f icials. ̂ 0
As the war intensified, Reinsch flooded Washington with 
despatches urging close association with China to keep her
neutral. He stated in his memoirs:
We built up our solution of unity for China.
In carefully weighed dispatches I sent it to the 
American Government, and cabled the President a 
statement of China's vital relation to future 
peace. I was constrained to condemn Japan's policy, 
quite deliberately, summing up the evidence 
accumulated in the course of five years. I had 
come to the Far East admiring the Japanese, friendly 
to them--my published writings show this abundantly.
I did not lose my earnest goodwill toward the Japa­
nese people but I could not shut my eyes to Japanese 
imperialist politics with its.unconscionably ruthless 
and underhanded actions and its fundamental lack of 
every idea of fair play. The continuance of such 
methods could only bring disaster; their abandonment
An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York: 
MacMillan Co., 1934), 186-91. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Beard, National Interest.); Li, China Policy, 164; Notter, 
Wilson, "275- 76 .
l60Reinsch, China, 125-28, 130-37, 143-44, 149. See 
also Foreign Relations 1914, 182-205; Supplement 1915, 83.
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is a condition of peace and real welf are. . . . 161
But although Reinsch tried to persuade the tenacious Chinese
officials to keep their country neutral, they were bent on
belligerency. Reinsch stated:
In their ignorance of these secret arrangements 
[between France, Britain, Italy, and Japan, as­
suring non-interference with Japan's China aims] 
the Chinese thought that association with the war 
powers would put them on the.footing of an ally.
...For my part, I allowed the Chinese to feel that 
the American government, desiring them to decide 
this question according to their own best judge­
ment, hoped that a way might be found to bring 
the war situation into harmony with justice to 
China.162
/
Reinsch believed that if China became a belligerent she 
should be entitled to assurances.from the powers guarantee­
ing her political and administrative.integrity in terms not 
easily avoided in the future. But China became involved in 
long discussions with the Allies instead, and her financial 
situation constantly weakened. Throughout these negotia­
tions Reinsch desired to give "the best form of American 
assistance." Above all, he had in mind "steering China 
beyond earshot of the financial sirens that were luring her 
upon the Japanese rocks."163
A number of historians recognized Reinsch's awareness 
of Japanese encroachment in China as a fundamental problem
16lReinsch, China, 334-35. See also Foreign Relations 
Supplement 1917, I, 402, 412.
162Reinsch, China, 286-87. See also 241-54,
l65Ibid., 296.
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with or without war. The Twenty-One Demands were the most 
graphic example of Japanese incursion. Pugach asserted that 
the American minister realized that the United States could 
and would do little to stop Japan at that time, since not 
even the British would act. Reinsch thus concentrated on 
achieving three things: 1) to. focus attention on the
duplicity of Japan--to arouse American public opinion and 
awaken the administration to Japan1s intentions; 2) to 
disassociate the United States from acquiescence to the 
demands; and 3) to "hammer away", at those sections which 
proved the greatest menace to American interests. In these 
areas Reinsch had some s u c c e s s . 164 According to Gage, as 
the war developed, the American minister advocated stronger 
political and international measures, to discourage Japanese 
advances in the Far East. When.he resigned* Reinsch recom­
mended direct action against the Japanese to "call her 
bluff," since he realized diplomatic representations were 
no longer efficacious. 165 Bailey.added that Reinsch's 
increasing militancy towards Japan somewhat embarrassed 
the Department of State. He had made certain informal 
commitments to the Chinese on his.own.responsibility in.
1917, which were partially the cause for Chinese protests
164pUgach, "Reinsch," 213-15.
^^^Gage, "Reinsch," 242-43, 556. See also Reinsch, 
China, 241-59; Bailey, Neutrals, 23-24; Thomas Edward 
LaFargue, China and the World War (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Pres s', 1937), £6-115; Curry, Far Eastern Policy, 
112-18, 120-21.
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against Germany, As a result, Lansing reprimanded Reinsch 
and ordered him to make no further unauthorized prom­
ises .^66
Thus, Reinsch had difficulty enacting his program for 
China. And when he attempted to make firm recriminations 
against Japan, his own.government, had to make sure he did 
not overstep his authority,
Reinsch’s awareness of the importance of the Far East 
in the foreign policy of the United States was exemplified 
in his ceremonial performance. An educated, well-informed 
scholar of Asian affairs, he realized the necessity for 
cordial relations with the Chinese.167 Besides, he had a 
strong affection for them. He was able to maintain his 
favorable relationship with the.Chinese government even in 
the most critical periods of the continual internal turmoil. 
It was no wonder that he was asked to become a personal ad­
viser to that government after his resignation from the 
diplomatic corps.
HENRY LANE .WILSON
The interference in the internal affairs of Mexico by 
the contentious ambassador Wilson best illustrated why he 
was so controversial. It was well known that Wilson detested
^^Bailey, Neutrals, 23-24. For a more sympathetic 
view, see Li, China Policy, 106; Fifield, Far East, 69.
167por example, see Reinsch, China, 188.
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the Francisco Madero regime. On its inception, he said:
The revolution of Madero sprang unarmed and 
motley from the national discontent with the 
system and administration, of. the Diaz regime.
This discontent it neither represented nor 
organized. Madero was a.comparatively unknown 
person who appeared at a psychological moment 
and reaped a harvest which, might.have gone to 
stronger and abler men had any such been then 
prominent in the public eye....Nevertheless, 
the character of the revolution.inaugurated by 
him was from its inception formidable neither 
in numbers nor organization....-^8
Throughout Madero's rule, the ambassador decried the Mexican 
President and predicted his ultimate failure.169 Eventually, 
the threat of revolution arose against Madero. Wilson was 
deeply concerned about the safety of American and other 
foreign nationals in Mexico, and he protested to the Mexican 
President-and the rebels. He even advocated that the United 
States use forceful action if protection was not extended to 
American life and property.I?9 In the interest of peace, he 
said, the whole diplomatic corps tried to persuade Madero to 
relinquish his position to the Mexican. Congress. Madero was 
incensed by this demand and sent a note to Washington blam­
ing Wilson for inciting action against him.171
As the revolution persisted, Wilson felt impelled to
168wiison, Diplomatic Episodes, 20 5.
169Ibid., 226; Foreign Relations 1913, (1920), 935.
l^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 234-35, 255-60; 
Foreign Relations 1915^ 704.
*^Wilson, Diplomatic Episodes, 263. Wilson stated 
that Madero later apologized for his accusation.
restore:order to Mexico, and decided to ask generals Victor- 
iano Huerta and Felix Diaz, the-leaders of the rebellion, 
to come to the American Embassy for consultation. His 
object, Wilson asserted, was to have the two generals enter 
into an agreement for the suspension of hostilities and for 
joint submission to the Federal congress . -*-72 Madero's 
overthrow followed, and Huerta was installed as provisional 
President. Within a short time Madero was killed. Huerta 
claimed that assassins had murdered him while he was being 
escorted to prison. Wilson said'he.was shocked, having 
received assurances from the general that Madero would not 
be harmed. However, the ambassador did not blame the new 
government for the deed.-*-73
Wilson spent the remaining days of the Taft adminis­
tration and the first year of the Woodrow Wilson adminis­
tration attempting to obtain American recognition of the 
Huerta government.I74 During the Democratic administration, 
Ambassador Wilson believed his despatches were being ignored 
since he disagreed with the President's policy of de jure 
recognition. The ambassador was also aware that the Presi­
dent believed he had been in collusion with Huerta and Diaz 
during the revolt. In a lengthy telegram, Ambassador Wilson,
17^Ibid. , 279. Wilson claimed to have no prior meet­
ing with Huerta. See 274-75.
173Ibid., 283-88.
■*-7^For example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 725.
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had explained the situation during the.revolution, as he 
viewed it, and exonerated himself , of all blame. This
had little effect, and his frustration was clearly demon­
strated in his memoirs. He stated.*..
The anomalous situation, resulting from the 
attitude of the government in Washington I was 
obliged to endure in silence as there seemed to be 
no cure for it. The reports and recommendations 
which it was my duty to.make.I made and then waited 
patiently, trusting that a certain amount of exper­
ience would teach the administration the course 
which it ought to pursue in the interest of the 
welfare of the Mexican nation and for the good of 
our people living in Mexico . -*-7.6
The ambassador's version of his performance during the 
revolutionary period has been severely criticized and sym­
pathetically defended. Callcott asserted that Wilson had 
indeed taken an active part in the. overthrow of Madero. He 
had given substantial advice to the rebels, and arranged 
the meeting at the embassy to unite them. When Huerta was 
securely in office, Wilson sought his recognition so Mexico 
could return to the "... good old conservative days of Diaz 
when property rights were secured, the classes were supreme 
and only the people were suffering." Callcott concluded 
that Wilson's activities were hopelessly out of step with 
Washington and he knew it. Thus, his recall by President 
Wilson was no surprise.177 Blaisdell, while critical of
l75Ibid., 768-776.
176wflson, Diplomatic Episodes, 300-01. See also 308.
 ̂̂ Callcott, Caribbean Policy, 301ff. See also Grieb, 
The United States and Huerta, 16-17; P. Edward Haley, 
Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and
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the ambassador's interference in internal Mexican affairs, 
argued that his actions were not necessarily "out of step" 
with Washington. Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. 
Knox were willing to give Madero-a chance, but when the 
revolution broke out they were.reluctant to take definite 
steps. Blaisdell asserted that their.caution rose from 
their preeminent concern with the three-sided American 
presidential election of 1912. Thus,Ambassador Wilson, and 
his conservative ally in the Department of State, F.M. 
Huntington Wilson, were able to. harass the Madero regime 
which they both disliked. Wilson, Blaisdell said, gave way 
to his "penchant for meddling," and. accepted the cause of 
the rebels as a way to restore order in Mexico. Blaisdell 
contended that although the ambassador.had no direct part 
in the murder of Madero, "...the world awakened on the morn­
ing of February 23 [1913] to find that the climax to the 
ambassador's statesmanship had been the assassination of 
Madero, [and] Wilson's diminishing, reputation sank to the 
vanishing point." The event prompted an investigation of 
the ambassador's conduct by the new.Democratic administra­
tion, and led to his eventual dismissal.I?8
Wilson with Mexico, 1910-1917 (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 
1970), 16, 32, 56, 62-72. [Hereinafter referred to as 
Haley, Revolution and Intervention.); Stanley R. Ross, 
Francisco I. Madero Apostle of Mexican Democracy.(New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1955) , 238-39 , 293-311. 
(Hereinafter referred to as Ross, Madero.); Calvert,
Mexican Revolution, 87; Notter, Wilson, 214.
178Blaisdell, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
XL, 118-25.
145
Link outlined the ambassador's antagonism to the Wilson 
administration in more detail. Because the Taft adminis­
tration was reaching the conclusion, of its tenure when 
Huerta rose to power, the President and his advisers decided 
to leave the question of recognition to the new administra­
tion. The ambassador's despatches had become increasingly 
dramatic by then, and this made President Wilson dubious of 
the credibility of the ambassador's reports. By March, 1913, 
when the New York World began a. fierce campaign to discredit 
the ambassador, the confidence of the Wilson administration 
in its envoy had faded. The President was prepared to 
recall him, but if he did, a new envoy would have to be 
appointed, and this would constitue a recognition of Huerta's 
regime. In an evasive move, the ambassador was called to 
Washington for "consultation." He was never returned to his 
post.179 Grieb went a step further and argued that Ambassa­
dor Wilson's despatches did not only pique the Wilson admin­
istration, but strengthened its resolve to depose H u e r t a , 1 **0
Masingill contradicted the critical interpretations of 
Wilson, and defended his actions. Masingill insisted that, 
in general, the ambassador did not stray from his instructions, 
since in 1911 Knox had authorized him to use his own discre-
179Link, Wilson, II, 348-56; Link, Progressive Era,
111-12, See alsoCalvert, Mexican Revolution, 135.
i
I80grieb, The United States and Huerta, 70, 85. For 
a less critical account, see Baker, Wilson, IV, 238-39.
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tion in cases of emergency. By 1912, the Taft administra­
tion was increasingly leaving the Mexican question in Wilson's 
hands, although the ambassador did not initiate a policy 
anathema to the American government. Masingill accepted 
the ambassador's own conclusions about the overthrow of 
Madero. And while the death of the ex-President of Mexico 
shocked Ambassador Wilson, it had hardly been possible for 
him to have, prevented it. Besides., the ambassador, with 
the support of the Department of State, accepted the Presi­
dency of Huerta as a fait accompli, and he became more con­
cerned with the new regime than with the fate of the deposed 
officials. The failure to accept Huerta's explanation of 
the death of Madero, Masingill argued, would have been an, 
admission that the new Mexican government had acted in a 
criminal manner. The recall of Wilson, he went on, was 
based on political reasons, A campaign of persecution was 
waged against the ambassador, because his policy of recogni­
tion differed from the President's.. A stream of "amateur 
sleuths" constantly embarrassed Ambassador Wilson and finally, 
in a "humiliating public way," he was dismissed.181
1 8 3 - M a s i n g i l l , "Henry Lane Wilson," 68, 94-107, 130, 
183-84, 209--21Q, 227. For other sympathetic treatments 
of Ambassador Wilson, see Lowry "Mexican Policy," 26,
34-35; James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in 
Mexican Relations (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1932J,
215-17.
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FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON
Historians have overlooked-the performance of Stimson 
as ambassador to Argentina. Of course, the relative unim­
portance of Latin American countries during World War I and 
the priority given the war policy by the Wilson administra­
tion justified this. But, even in his memoirs, Stimson 
discussed few substantive issues. He asserted that it was 
indiscreet to record details of confidential negotiations 
between the United States and Argentina. And, he warned, 
quite facetiously it is hoped, that his memoirs might 
include fictitious elements to mask state s e c r e t s .
On account of his attitude, only a few examples of the 
performance of Stimson are available. He attended a consid­
erable number of conferences in Latin America, including the 
Pan-American Conference of 1915 and the Tacna-Arica arbitra­
tion. In both instances, he blamed the Department of State, 
in part, for their failure. He credited himself, however, 
with salvaging hope for a resolution of the Argentine-Chile 
border dispute in 1917, by convincing the contending parties 
to accept mediation by the United States and Uruguay. He 
later stated that the Department never sent him any reply to 
this s u g g e s t i o n , 1^3 in other activities, he sought a marine, 
telegraph cable between the eastern United States and Argen-
■^^Stimson, My United States, 278-79.
ia5Ibid., 350-56.
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tina, which, was accomplished after settling a conflict with 
the British monopoly.184
In one of his few contacts with the problems created by 
the war, he was instrumental in bringing about a wheat con­
vention between the Allies and Argentina. According to the 
subsequent treaty, Argentina would extend credit to England 
and France to buy wheat. However, Stimson was slightly dis­
turbed that he had taken part in such: an unneutral act.185 
The ambassador's despatches were scarce, mostly con­
cerned with local conditions and commercial relations. How­
ever, his attitude toward the Department of State was blunt 
and critical:
The first thing a diplomatic secretary is 
taught to do is never, in his dispatches, "to put 
the department in the wrong." But the difference 
between an undersecretary in the department and 
the minister at the post is as an assistant secre­
tary of state more lucidly explained to me, that 
"The department thinks the fellow on, the job is a 
d----d fool but the fellow on the job knows the 
department is."186
He added that he was inclined to think the Department was 
right about half the time, which was a liberal concession.
It (and he called the Department "it") was a "singularly 
bad" correspondent, published the most confidential des­
patches in the newspapers, and lacked manners--his most
184Ibid», 401. 
l85Ibid., 415-17. 
186Ibid., 294.
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serious charge of all. He would have liked reasons for 
the Department's instructions, believing he could then act 
more intelligently. He also criticized the Department for 
never acknowledging which of his suggestions were carried 
out, since "it" alone could give instructions„ His solution 
to these problems was to give all important despatches to 
the Associated Press. He insisted that, if nothing else, 
he caught the attention of the Department of State and got 
results,!87 Stimson, in a radical way, suggested a common 
problem that many American, diplomats complained about--poor 
communications with Washington, It was questionable, however, 
if his solution was in the best interests of the United States.
The analyses in this chapter illustrated some, of the 
basic characteristics of the performances of these diplo­
mats. However, such studies are of little value unless they 
are accompanied by synthesis and reflection. In the next 
chapter, an attempt will be made to develop some overall 
evaluations of these envoys.
•®-^Ibid. , 294-99. See also Stuart, Diplomatic Prac­
tice, 77-Tff..
CHAPTER IV
PERFORMANCE: EVALUATIONS
A diplomat not only can be evaluated by comparing his 
performance to some ideal standards, but by analyzing the 
manner in which he executes his duties and the results he 
attains. In the case of the chiefs-of-mission under Wil­
son, the complexity and variety of the tasks they per­
formed must be taken into account. Therefore, in order to 
have the broadest possible perspective of these diplomats, 
self-appraisals as well as scholarly interpretations will 
be presented. These evaluations should then provide the 
basis for an.overview of the performance of each diplomat.
WALTER HINES PAGE
Pervading almost every letter and despatch Page wrote
was his conviction that an Anglo-American detente was
necessary. In 1914, he wrote to Wilson:
...Of course, what some of the American newspapers 
said is true--that I am too free and too untrained 
to be a great Ambassador. But the conventional 
type of Ambassador would not be worth his salt.to 
represent the United States here now, when they 
[Britain] were eager to work with us for the peace 
of the world, if they are convinced of our honour 
and right-mindedness and the genuineness of our 
friendship. -*■
Ipage to Wilson, March 18, 1914, in Hendrick, Page, 
I, 261.
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In a more general sense, he reflected: "Is an Ambassador
a man sent to keep another Government friendly and in good 
humor with your Government so that you can get and give all 
sorts of friendly services and make the world better? Or, 
is his business to snap and snarl and play 'smart* and keep 
'em irritated--damn 'em!--get:and give nothing?"^ Because 
of his pro-British sentiments, Page revealed which type he 
considered himself to be.
Historians have used Page’s Anglophilism as the basis 
of their analyses of the,ambassador's performance. Hen­
drick believed that Page's pro-British sentiments and his 
anti-Germanism aided in explaining his performance as 
a m b a s s a d o r .  ̂ However, Hendrick often defended Page's ac­
tions instead of evaluating them. For example, he said:
And so for five busy and devastating years Page 
did his work. The stupidities of Washington might 
drive him to desperation, ill-health might increase 
his periods of despondency, the misunderstandings 
that he occasionally had with the British Govern­
ment might add to his discouragements, but a natural­
ly optimistic and humorous temperament overcame all 
obstacles, and did its part in bringing about that 
united effort which ended in victory. And that it 
was. a great part, the story of his Ambassadorship 
abundantly proves.... But history will indeed be un­
grateful if it ever forget the gaunt and pensive 
figure, clad in a dressing gown, sitting long into 
the morning before the smoldering fire at 6 Gros- 
venor Square, seeking to find some way to persuade 
a reluctant and hesitating President to lead his 
country in the defense of liberty and determined 
that, so far as he could accomplish it, the nation
^Seymour, House, I, 312. 
^Hendrick, Page, I, 325.
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should play a part in the great assize that was in
keeping with its traditions and its instincts,4
Countering Hendrick's contentions, historians critical of 
Page asserted that the ambassador's pro-British sentiments 
were so extreme that he acted at the expense of his own 
country.5
Gregory examined the character of the ambassador and 
evaluated.his performance with better perspective than 
either Hendrick or the severe critics. Page, he argued, 
proved to be a more enthusiastic exponent of "idealistic 
missionary, nationalism" than Wilson.^ And, like many 
nationalists and expansionists, Page believed American 
greatness was linked to kinship with Britain, as a racial 
as well as a political union.7 Therefore, Page did not 
hesitate to invite Britain to join in his scheme for remak­
ing the world. But he was extremely idealistic, partly 
because the United States had not been involved in.the arma-
4Ibid., II, 319-20, See also I, 360; II, 20, 229. For 
other favorable, yet not as sympathetic views, see Bell, 
Woodrow Wilson and the People, 145-46; Link, Wilson the 
Diplomatist, 26; Walworth, Wilson, II, 4; II, C- Alien, Great 
Britain and the United States^ 6T8, 640-42.
^For example, see Arthur Willert, The Road to Safety 
A Study in Anglo-American Relations (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 19 53), 58; Arnett, Kitchin, 121-22; Grattan, Why 
We Fought, 183; C» H, Cramer, Newton D. Baker A Biography
(Cleveland: The World Publishers Co., 196l), 87^ 89.
6Gregory, Page, 35.
7Gregory insisted that this was not an extreme sort of 
racism, but a virtual Social Darwinism expressed as the 
Anglo-Saxon example for the world in terms of individual 
liberty and democracy. See ibid., 127-28.
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merits race or the balance of power of Europe. Coming from 
a prosperous country, he did not believe Europe could solve 
its own problems without American assistance in the form of 
an Anglo-American alliance. Gregory added that Page, like 
other men cast into new positions of prestige and importance, 
had boundless enthusiasm to do a great deal in a short time 
and to simplify solutions to complicated, problems,8
The outbreak of war in Europe and the declaration of 
American neutrality most conspicuously demonstrated Page's 
Anglophilism, Gregory asserted. For example, in 1915, Page 
"... favored nothing that would force Britain.to alter its 
policy and show respect for American neutral rights--little 
less than, placing American commerce under British control." 
Unfortunately, the ambassador's activites were, often con­
trary to the.policies of his government.^ Consequently, by 
1917, Anglo-American relations were not what Page desired.
The impact of Page upon American-British relations, 
Gregory continued, was not as notable as the ambassador and 
some historians have assumed. If he had any influence in 
Washington, it was only during the first few months of the 
war. By 1915, he was so hopelessly Anglophile that the
8Ibid., 35-36, 44, 48.
^Gregory speculated that if the American government had 
been as clearly in favor of the Allies as its ambassador to 
England, it would be difficult to imagine Germany exercising 
the restraint it showed prior to 1917. See ibid., 130-31.
See also Tansill, America Goes to War, 138.
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administration usually treated his messages with indiffer­
ence or apprehension. And, in London, his influence with 
the Foreign Office was not significant, as demonstrated by 
the "Dacia" affair and the controversy over the Declaration 
of London. Furthermore, Grey, often neglecting Page, listened 
to and received information from House, Lansing, and Cecil 
Spring-Rice, British ambassador to the United States. In fact, 
when House was in London, Page faded into the background,^
Gregory also surmised that not only Page’s Anglophilism, 
but his inexperience reduced his effectiveness as an ambassa­
dor. His freshness and willingness to explore new ideas were 
commendable, but as an amateur diplomat, he was unable to 
understand typical diplomatic frustrations. Also, he did not 
realize that his proximity to the diplomatic activities of 
London and.Europe could be deceiving as well as enlightening. 
While he knew that he was sent to his post to manipulate the 
foreign government, he did not realize that the foreign 
government would try to manipulate him.^
Although Gregory's analysis of Page was the most thorough 
since Hendrick's, and surely the best balanced, a further 
observation about the performance of Page should be made-- 
Page's pro-British sentiments went through a metamorphosis,
■^Gregory, Page, 197-98, 211, 214.
iilbid., 215-17. See also Gregory's article, "The 
Superfluous Ambassador: Walter Hines Page's Return to 
Washington.1916," The Historian, XXVIII (May, 1966), 389, 
403-04. See also Seymour, House, I, 304.
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At the beginning of his service in England, they were, in 
large measure, a means to an end,-since he was looking to­
ward the emergence of the United States as a potent world 
power. He then deemed it necessary to ally with the other 
great Anglo-Saxon nation. However, the longer Page remained 
in England, the more his pro-British sentiments became an 
end in themselves, and he began to defend British policy at 
every turn. Page's outlook at this stage directed his 
energies to the prosecution of the war, which he viewed as 
a struggle, between freedom and tyranny. This, of course, 
reaffirmed his desire for an Anglo-American alliance, but 
also inspired him to enter upon a dramatic crusade against 
"the Teuton lords." Whatever idealistic plans Page had for 
the world, they were put further out of:reach by the broad­
ening of his pro-British sentiments into Anglophilism and 
anti-Germanism.
BRAND WHITLOCK
The war overwhelmed Whitlock. His memoirs and letters 
demonstrated how frustrated he became and how helpless he 
felt to cope with the German occupation of Belgium. He said:
It was a constant source of poignant and un­
availing regret with me that I could not perform 
the prodigies that those poor harried folk so 
touchingly expected; such as the unlimited con­
fidence in the great Republic across the sea.
Sometimes I had the uncomfortable feeling of 
being a kind of impostor, the pitiably little I 
could accomplish being so very small in com­
parison with all that I should have liked to dp,
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to help them in their sorrow and.their p a i n .
Of course, he insinuated that he had done his best. He 
wrote Newton D. Baker in 1917:
My experience in Belgium--perhaps I have 
told you this before--took something out of me 
that can never be replaced, did something to me 
that can never be repaired. I seem to have given 
all my youth, all my energy, all my freshness to
the task, and it has left me limp with the pale
constitution of the valetudinarian. Ah mell^
However, he took solace in his popularity with the Belgian 
people, asserting that he had received unimaginable grati­
tude when he left, which had been somewhat embarrassing.
He even noted that Baron von der Lancken, head of the
Political Section in Brussels, had. told, him at their fare- 
well meeting, "Peut-etre au congres de la paix," as if to 
imply "when we meet again."14
The biographers of Whitlock have generally acknowledged 
the predictment in which the war had placed the minister, 
but they gave.minimal attention to an evaluation of his 
performance in light of it, Tager’s assessment of Whitlock 
was superficial, and virtually ignored his diplomatic duties. 
He described Whitlock as a champion of virtue and justice, 
who probably felt a renewed sense of mission in his associa­
tion with the Belgian relief program because of its humani-
l^whitlock, Belgium, II, 189.
■^Whitlock to Newton D. Baker, December 12, 1917, in 
Nevins, Whitlock The Letters, -250.
^Whitlock, Belgium, II, 455.
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tarian aspects, and who further believed he was doing 
everything in his power to destroy the authoritarian German 
state. Tager added that the conflict against German domina­
tion was apparently a resumption of the. minis ter' s old 
battle against:corrupt forces in domestic politics. And 
although Whitlock had considered himself a pacifist, his 
experience, in.Belgium changed him. In fact, his activities 
as a war minister purportedly increased, his stature in 
America, which he relished. However, by the end of his 
service in Belgium, he had lost all sense of mission. The 
war and political and social developments in America, i.e., 
the passage of Prohibition and the rejection of the 
Versailles treaty, disenchanted him. He became bitter and 
"turned .his back on the world.
ThorbUrn's analysis was similar to that of Tager, but 
it emphasized the character of the minister in more detail. 
He considered Whitlock's major attributes to be his- alert 
intelligence, his eagerness to learn, and his peculiar will­
ingness to accept new ideas. Never an original thinker, the 
minister gleaned his ideas from others, and then expressed 
them in his own way. Thorburn added that, as a diplomat, 
Whitlock freely admitted his lack of knowledge about .inter­
national events, but,he rose "splendidly" to the occasion 
when war broke out. Like Tager, Thorburn noted Whitlock's
-^Tager, Whitlock, 153-64.
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disillusionment. He argued that the minister had been 
beset throughout his public career by an inability to learn 
what bothered him. Hence, Whitlock never really knew what 
his goals in life were,^
Crunden evaluated Whitlock in much the same manner as 
Tager and Thorburn, He stated that the minister arrived.in 
Belgium as a "sensitive libertarian”. and artist. Having 
experienced little horror in his life,, the war shocked him, 
especially after his tour of the front.. As the occupation 
progressed., Crunden asserted, Whitlock’s nerves all but dis­
abled him. He was not physically or emotionally strong, 
quite out of his element in the war. zone, and it was sur­
prising he did his job as well as he.did. As the war 
persisted,.his initially buoyant and optimistic nature became 
increasingly pessimistic. Crunden concluded that although 
Whitlock died "overwhelmed by a sense of failure," he 
actually deserved to be a hero.
Essentially, all three interpretations were identical. 
They avoided, however, the obvious conclusions about Whit­
lock's performance. Given his background and personality, 
the minister was unfit for his position. He had been sent 
to the idyllic Belgian post as a personal favor to some 
Wilson supporters, especially Newton D. Baker, in order to
16Thorburn, "Whitlock," ii, 113,.127, 133, 174-76.
l^Crunden, Whitlock, 302, 343, 387, 399, 427.
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allow him time to write novels--hardly a sound reason for 
an appointment to a diplomatic post. The war not only 
shocked Whitlock, but destroyed the tranquil environment he 
had desired. Therefore, his inexperience was compounded 
by his unusual unpreparedness for the war. Contrary to 
Tager, Thorburn and Crunden, it must be argued that Whitlock 
failed as. a war diplomat. His reports.lacked analysis of 
the events.he observed and most often emphasized the Belgian 
relief work, something he could comprehend through his 
humanitarian instincts. But although.the relief program was 
his major, concern, most of his colleagues did not credit him 
with doing an equitable portion of the work. Thus, Whitlock 
appeared to.be a man of words not. action, frustrated and 
shocked out of his ideals by the realities of war and its 
aftermath.. One can sympathize with his. predicament, but,one 
can hardly ignore his inability to cope with it. He was a 
classic example of a political appointee placed in a situation 
that even an experienced diplomat would have found difficult.
JAMES W. GERARD
In his memoirs, Gerard declared that he left Germany 
with a "clear conscience" and the knowledge that he had 
done everything possible to keep the peace. Concerning his 
relations with the Germans, he said;
I was credited by the Germans with having 
hood-winked and jollied the Foreign Office and 
the Government into refraining for two years from 
using illegally their most effective weapon.
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This, of course, is not so. I always told 
the Foreign Office the plain simple truth and the 
event showed that I correctly predicted the 
attitude of America.
Our American national game, poker, has given 
us abroad an unfair reputation. We are always 
supposed to be bluffing,...
I only regret that those high in authority 
in Germany should have preferred.to listen to 
pro-German correspondents who posed as amateur 
super-Ambassadors rather than to the authorized 
representatives of America.... 18
Gerard's self-appraisal was more of a vindication than 
an assessment of his performance as ambassador to Germany, 
Similarly, many historians who lauded Gerard neglected to 
examine his ability as a diplomat. For example, Seymour 
applauded:Gerard's "dignity" and the skill with which he 
maintained.cordial relations with Germany in the most try­
ing post in the war zone. However, he said little more.l^
Some critics of Gerard did attempt to determine the nature 
of the ambassador's performance, but their discussions often 
degenerated into denunciations. For instance, Link charac­
terized Gerard as a "former dilettante in Tammany politics" 
who was an,"authentic international catastrophe." He added 
that at a. time when circumstances demanded tact, understand­
ing, and wisdom, Gerard could offer only ineptitude, ignorance 
and folly. Thus, both American and German authorities began 
to rely on Joseph C. Grew, a young career diplomat at the
l^Gerard, My Four Years in Germany, 429. See also 430,
19Seymour, House, I, 185. For another favorable, but 
less sympathetic account, see Arnett, Kitchin, 123.
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embassy- Link further stated that "...during a period of 
extreme tension in German-American relations Wilson had as 
his spokesman in Berlin a man for whom he had no respect 
and not a little contempt." The President's opinion of 
Gerard was pungently revealed in comments that he penciled 
on copies.of despatches from the ambassador. On Septem­
ber 10, 1915, Wilson wrote: "Ordinarily an Ambassador ought
to be backed up as of course, but-- this ass? It is hard to 
take it-seriously." On the next day, he added: "Who can
fathom this? I wish they would hand this idiot his pass­
port !" 20
Although.Birnbaum echoes many of. Link's contentions, 
he was a more objective critic, realizing that Washington 
had not given Gerard adequate instructions. However, it 
must be recognized that since Gerard felt duped by the 
Germans and.deluded about German peace offers, he became 
increasingly anti-German, and was a detriment to his gov­
ernment in.a period of tenuous relations with Germany. 
Obviously., more diplomatic experience and a keener aware­
ness of European conditions would have made him a more 
valuable representative, but additional experience might 
not have been able to counter his natural impetuousness.
^Link, Wilson the Diplomatist, 25-26. See also Link, 
Wilson, III, 311; Tuchman, Zimmermann Telegram, 121.
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MYRON T. HERRICK
Herrick made it evident in his autobiography that he 
deemed his amicable relationship with the French the out­
standing achievement of his service as ambassador. He 
said:
I am told that I have really won, the love of 
France. If that be true, I am blessed beyond the 
measure of good fortune, for the things I have 
done which have brought me this sentiment are 
also the very things that have won the confidence 
and approval of the people of my own country, 
whose love for France was never stronger than it 
is to-day....21
However, Herrick not only neglected to evaluate his per­
formance of diplomatic duties, but dismissed his tenure 
under Wilson as an anticlimatic period of his service. He 
stated:
As I look back on it, I realize that I never 
had such a carefree time in my, life as during 
those first seventeen months as Ambassador under 
the Wilson Administration. I had no responsibility 
other than carrying out my instructions; I was 
staying on at the President's request, yet realizing 
it was only temporary; and I knew that any time I 
wanted to leave I could say so and start home....22
Mott's evaluation of Herrick was, hardly more enlight­
ening than the ambassador's own account. He praised him 
as a ''pioneer in diplomacy" who was willing to take chances 
rather than to be stagnated by convention. Furthermore,
Mott re-emphasized the admiration of the French for Herrick,
2lMott, Herrick, 261. 
22Ibid., 117.
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and insisted that although the ambassador had to his credit 
no peace confirmed or war. avoided, he left a legacy to his 
countrymen chiefly in the example of.his;character.23
Some.critics of Herrick condemned.his Francophilism. 
Millis, in a severe attack, asserted that the ambassador 
demonstrated his sympathy in many ''grossly indiscreet ways." 
For example, Herrick's decision to. remain in Paris after the 
French government retreated to Bordeaux.was reckless. Millis 
contended.that the event made a hero.of-Herrick in France and 
the United. States, but impaired American neutrality. In 
another instance, a group of young American men- came to the 
American Embassy in Paris, early in the war, to inquire about 
enlisting, in. the French army. The "foolish old man," Millis 
said, explained the laws of neutrality to the group, but then
encouraged them to enlist. Many of these young men-died in
combat.24
Without question, the ambassador's diplomatic activities 
were limited and his reports infrequent during this period. 
His only significant accomplishment after the commencement 
of hostilities in 1914 was relief work. Aside from this, his 
major concern was maintaining amicable relations with the 
French. This overemphasis, however, crippled Herrick^s 
efficiency as an American representative. The equally potent
23Ibid., vi, 221-22, 258, 375-76.
7 AMillis, Road to War, 74. For a less severe criticism,
see Grattan, Why We Fought, 73-76.
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anti-Germanism that his pro-Freneh sentiments produced made 
him an unreliable source of information for the Wilson ad­
ministration. Of course, his clear support of the French 
cause in the war made him even more popular in France, but 
further detached him from his responsibility as an envoy 
from a neutral-country. In addition, he.did not realize 
that popularity is a superficial way to build good rela­
tions between countries. Thus, having, "won the love of 
France" was a minor diplomatic achievement for Herrick. It 
represented, a. personal accomplishment, not a substantial 
improvement of Franco-American relations.
WILLIAM GRAVES SHARP
It is.difficult to determine exactly how Sharp analyzed 
his performance in France, since he made few pertinent 
comments in his memoirs. However, he continually emphasized 
his attempts, to keep his diplomatic activities in alignment 
with the foreign policy of the Wilson administration. His­
torians hnve added little of significance to Sharp's remarks. 
The sympathetic Beckles Willson lauded, the ambassador with­
out measure, but introduced nothing of.critical value. Sey­
mour, one of the few historians to evaluate Sharp at all, 
claimed that, the ambassador was a reliable source of informa­
tion whom. House admired for his exemplary conduct throughout 
the war. Seymour concluded that House often turned to Sharp
16S
for advice.
The few statements of Sharp and Seymour are hardly 
adequate to. judge the ambassador's ability as a diplomat. 
However, a. few observations can be.made.. Since Sharp, a 
political, appointee with no diplomatic experience, genu­
inely accepted. Wilson's "New Freedom" and "New Diplomacy," 
he allowed.the. administration to guide his actions, and 
possibly his. thoughts. Good examples, were his reports and 
despatches, which were informative, but rarely critical of 
his instructions or American policy. Viewed from the ex­
tremes, Sharp might be considered a. blind follower, on the 
one hand, or an effective instrument of the Wilson adminis­
tration, on the other. However, given,the colorless nature 
of his reports, the limitations of his.negotiations, and 
the lack of.attention from historians,.he was most likely 
only a faithful servant of the Wilson administration.
MAURICE .FRANCIS EGAN
Egan considered the purchase of the Danish West Indies 
his crowning achievement, believing he had a major part in 
the negotiations. In his memoirs he asserted that Wilson 
and Lansing highly praised him, as.did the Danes, who had 
never before given such accolades to an American. However, 
Tansill .stressed, that Egan's participation in the negotia­
tions for the purchase of the islands was important, but
2^Seymour, House, II, 226.
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not as significant as the minister intimated. Nonetheless, 
Tansill was quite sympathetic to the minister, who he 
believed was. an "eminent American man of letters",and an 
able diplomat.26
Tansill's analysis of Egan's performance concerning 
the purchase appears to be quite accurate. However, Egan's 
activities as minister after this transaction were unin­
spiring. He had completed the task for.which he had been 
sent to Denmark, and became more interested in maintaining 
his long-time pleasant relationship with the Danes, He had 
found a comfortable niche in the world, and was content to 
pursue a life uncluttered by superfluous diplomatic activ­
ities .
IRA NELSON MORRIS
Morris believed his immediate goals as minister to 
Sweden were, to improve Swedish-Ameiican political and eco­
nomic relations and, when war broke out, to keep his govern­
ment well-informed of the activities of Germany and Russia, 
He never clearly stated whether he felt he had accomplished 
the former,.but he intimated his reports were important 
aids to his government. Morris said, "What I was trying to 
get at all these years, and what, I hope, I shall always be 
trying to get at, is the truth."2? His observations of
^Tansill, Danish West Indies, 450.
27^orris, From an American Legation, 167,
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prison camps, his role as liaison between the Central Powers 
and Russia, his few economic negotiations with Sweden, and 
his propaganda campaigns against Germany, were all discussed 
in his memoirs, and he considered them, important„ And al­
though the Wilson administration frequently neglected 
Morris's advice in his despatches as substance for policy, 
his reporting,appeared to be his most significant function, 
especially because he displayed a clear understanding of 
the influence of German militarism and the Russian revolu­
tion on Europe during the war. Yet, his. effectiveness as a 
reporter was somewhat limited by his anti-German sentiments 
which often colored his conclusions,
CHARLES JOSEPH VOPICKA
Unquestionably, Vopicka regarded.his performance as 
minister to. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia* as successful 
and righteous. His conspicuous mention, in his memoirs, 
of a number of medals conferred upon him by the Balkan 
countries exemplified this feeling. He. increasingly had 
become convinced that he not only represented American 
interests, but Balkan interests as well. Hence, he could 
justify his potent anti-Central Powers sentiments as a 
legitimate reaction to the crucial situation in East 
Central Europe.
Since the minister was certainly self-deluded, naive, 
and excitable, Mamatey's criticism of him seemed justifiable.
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Vopicka's bias against Germany and. Austria-Hungary was ob­
vious from the beginning of his service--not only as a 
response to the hostilities in Europe, but most likely as, 
a deep sympathy for his former countrymen and a hatred of 
foreign imperialism. Therefore, his actions in the Balkans 
could almost be predicted. His lack of diplomatic exper­
ience and his frequent disregard for the practicalities of 
foreign relations were evident in his interference in Bul­
garian, Rumanian and Serbian affairs, in his prejudiced 
despatches, and in his continual antagonizing and suspicion 
of the envoys of the Central Powers in.the Balkan countries. 
Since Vopicka was one of the few chiefs-of-mission near the 
hostilities in Europe, he especially needed prudence and 
objectivity. Unfortunately, these characteristics were non^ 
existent in him. It must be admitted that the complexity 
of the situation in, the Balkans would have been difficult 
for any diplomat to comprehend. Nonetheless, a more unsuit­
able choice for the ministerial post in the Balkans could 
not have been appointed,
DAVID ROWLAND FRANCIS
Francis found little in his own performance to crit­
icize, sincerely believing he had done what was correct.
He remained an. idealist to the end of his service, 28 
although he admitted his inexperience and lack of know-
28por example, see Francis, Russia, 349.
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ledge about Russia, he never questioned the quality of his 
negotiations or his ability to report.
Most historians understood the shortcomings of Francis, 
but some apologized for them. Kennan argued that it was 
easy for the members of the American community and the dip­
lomatic corps in Russia to ridicule Francis and deprecate 
his ability, but in sending him to the Petrograd post,
Wilson had.done an undeserved injustice to him. While 
Francis, at his age and with his experience and temperament, 
had not been well-equipped for the post, he made do with the 
qualities he possessed, and performed with "courage and 
enthusiasm.
Kohlenberg evaluated Francis's commercial and economic 
activities in Russia, emphasizing the strengths and limita­
tions of the ambassador's performance. He stated that al­
though Francis failed to satisfy his insatiable desire to 
promote closer economic ties between Russia and the United 
States, any lesser man would have yielded long before 
Francis. Kohlenberg concluded that Francis was primarily 
a charming old gentleman, who had proved himself in the 
business world and, as Lansing aptly appraised, the am­
bassador was a man with too keen a scent for trade to be 
an ideal diplomat.^®
^ K e n n a n ,  Russia, I, 40-41.
■^Kohlenberg, Mid-America, XL, 216-17.
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Many historians were severely critical of Francis's 
inexperience, as a diplomat. Walworth contended that- 
Francis naively pictured the revolution in Petrograd as a 
practical realization of American principles of government. 
But more than that, the appointment of Francis demonstrated 
that Wilson was to pay dearly for his. tendency (and House's) 
to give.attention to political expediency in choosing envoys 
for Russia. Unfortunately, Walworth added, American policy 
towards Russia, after the downfall of the Czar, was based 
on Francis's unwarranted faith in the.Provisional Government
7 . Iand his disdain for the Bolsheviks. . Philip C. Jessup was 
even more, explicit■than Walworth. He argued that Francis 
was unable to. perceive the events in; Russia as they unfolded 
during the revolutionary period. To the ambassador, the 
great issue was whether the Russian people would adopt a 
constitutional monarchy or a representative form of govern­
ment, not envisioning that a social revolution would follow 
the political revolution. For example,.he had called Lenin 
an "extreme socialist or anarchist" who was stirring up a 
little minor trouble, and later Francis accepted the rumor 
that Lenin was a G e r m a n  a g e n t . 32 Jessup further stated that 
Francis also did not realize that the Provisional Government
•^Walworth, Wilson, II, 93, 137. See also Daniel M. 
Smith, The Great Departure The United States and World 
War I 1914-1920 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., T965), 
TTTW .------
•^See Foreign Relations Russia 1918, I, 27.
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was wholly dependent for its actual power upon the Soviet 
of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, who exercised what little 
control ̂ anyone had over the army ,,33 Max M. Laserson was 
similarly critical of the ambassador. He asserted that 
Francis's utterly irresponsible evaluation of Lenin was an 
example-of the ambassador's total ignorance of the political 
map of Russia. He did not know the difference between 
"radical-socialists"anarchists," "maximalists," and 
"bolsheviks," and he did not really know who was fighting 
whom during, the.revolutionary period. The ambassador's 
description of events in Russia, was a model of "illiterate 
political reporting." Laserson did concede that, despite 
the ambassador's ineptness, he took certain practical steps 
on his own initiative or on instruction from Washington that 
were sound., such as requesting that a railroad commission be 
sent to Russia and that credit be extended to the Pro­
visional Government.3^
Most historians, whether sympathetic or critical of 
Francis's performance, agreed that the ambassador lacked the 
qualifications and experience to deal with the diplomatic 
problems imposed by the revolution in Russia. Thus, it was
33Philip. C. Jessup, Elihu Root 1905-1937, Vol. II
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 19 38), 354-55, See also
Dulles, The Road to Teheran, 101.
3%ax M.. Laserson, The American Impact on Russia-- 
Diplomatic and Ideological-̂ -1784-1917 (New York: MacMi 11 an 
Co.," 1950), 408-410.' For a more speculative criticism of 
Francis, see DeYoung, "Francis," 96-97.
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no surprise that he was unable to comprehend and report 
clearly the events that occurred from 1916 to the end of 
the war.. .That he also interfered in internal affairs in 
Russia made it clear that the United States could not 
afford to. have such a novice in Russia during a crucial 
period of history.
HENRY MORGENTHAU
When. Morgenthau acknowledged his. inability to impede 
the Armenian genocide, it appeared that*he was admitting 
failure as.a diplomat. This is unlikely. In his memoirs, 
the ambassador constantly referred to his relief work and 
his relationship with the Turkish government, intimating 
he was an. energetic envoy who tried his best,.35 Although 
Morgenthau's assessment of his performance lacked sub­
stance, his.memoirs demonstrated many aspects of his per­
sonality and character which were of vital significance in 
determining his prowess as a diplomat. And these aspects 
have been,generally neglected by historians.
Morgenthau was a fascinating combination of business 
practicality and Wilsonian idealism. He could be imperious, 
haughty, and condescending towards the Turkish ministers; 
blunt and earthy with his diplomatic colleagues; strong- 
willed within his own embassy; and emphatic and persuasive
35fot example, see Morgenthau, Morgenthau's Story, 
82-86, 401-02. '
173
with the Department of State. Concurrently, he was altruis­
tic about.the work of the Christian missionaries in Turkey, 
and empathetic about the plight of destitute foreign nation­
als and Armenians. He also foresaw an "Americanization" of 
the Turkish economy as workable and proper, trying to impress 
the Turkish.ministers with the benefits, of American business 
practices. And he interfered in internal Turkish affairs 
when he believed the Turks were forsaking the Allies for 
the cause, of the Central Powers. Unable to change the 
decision of the Turkish government, he.devoted himself 
exclusively to relief work, which inevitably resulted in his 
disillusionment with his post.
PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH
In the broadest sense, Reinseh regarded American rela­
tions with China as dependent upon "spontaneous cooperation" 
between the two peoples in matters of education, commerce, 
and industry. During his service in China he had tried to 
impress upon America a "new vision" of a modernized China. 
Reinseh believed he was unsuccessful because of the pro­
vincialism of the financiers of the United States, and 
outside influences working in America.to halt business enter­
prise in China. Reinseh also believed.that Wilson had 
misjudged the importance of China, and did not heed his 
warnings about what could happen if Japanese incursions 
continued,, However, at the end of his service, the minister
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was unwilling, to advertise the difference, in their attitudes, 
believing it would produce no practical results. But he 
never disclaimed his ideals for China, and his sole conso­
lation seemed to be the lasting friendships he developed
with many C h i n e s e . ^ 6
Historians.gave considerable attention to the appoint­
ment of Reinseh to China and, in most cases, praised the 
selection. .However, analyses of his performance as a dip­
lomat have.varied. Fifield believed Reinseh was unquestion­
ably.one of.the most capable American diplomats ever sent to 
China. The minister was able, Fifield contended, to under­
stand the.fundamental forces in the Orient, although he was 
a strong partisan of the Chinese people and a steady critic 
of Japan's Far East policies. 7̂
Pugach. was sympathetic towards.Reinseh. More detailed 
than Fifield, he emphasized the minister's economic programs 
for China. He argued that Reinseh was an expansionist, 
whose ideology, resembled the ideas of Dollar Diplomacy,38 
However, Reinseh wanted expansion to. be. gradual, based on 
the practical needs and the actual power of the United States. 
In the Ear East, the minister desired his country to forge
3^See Reinseh, China, x-xi, 298, 384.
■^Fifield, Far East, 14. See also Curry, Far Eastern 
Policy, 39.
•^Pugach, "Reinseh," 59. See also Beard, National 
Interest, 183-95.
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a partnership with China built on.mutual trust and advan­
tage , which, included international cooperation as well.
Pugach further stated that Reinseh had a sense of mission-- 
a feeling of responsibility to the United States, China, 
and the world, and "threw himself" into the implementation 
of his program when he became minister to China*, This 
program had:been practical as well as idealistic. The 
overseas expansion of American enterprise became his major 
emphasis, and the primacy he attached to American investments 
in China helped.to explain the inconsistencies between the 
principles, which he advocated and the actions he pursued.
The apparent failure of American enterprise in China, however, 
forced him. to search for the causes and seek a solution. A 
major concern became Japanese threats.to American,interests, 
which he fought.with increasing resolve. He also began 
criticizing. Washington and Wall Street for not:supporting 
his program, for China. However, he won a few limited and 
fleeting victories, i.e., he helped prevent the most dan­
gerous and. obnoxious objectives of the.Twenty-One Demands 
from being, implemented until approximately 1917, and he made 
possible a. few loans and enterprises for China. By 1918, 
he finally became tired, angry and disappointed, since the 
growing ambitions of Japan, the World War, and the lack of 
American business interest in China,were too overwhelming to 
counteract. Pugach continued that although the minister did 
not fulfill the objectives of his program, he had a "noble
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vision" of a "good society" which began with the unobstructed 
application.of science, technology, and. the principles of 
the Open Door. And it was,ridiculous to assert that Reinseh 
should have accepted the reality of the world situation and 
revised his,programs, since the, question of his success or 
failure, which some historians have belabored, was inconse­
quential in assessing the minister's ideas and policies or 
the events,of his day, Pugach argued.that it was more 
fruitful to examine Reinsch's major ideas, their validity, 
and his faithfulness to them, since the minister was a lead­
ing interpreter and a commentator as well, as a participant 
involved in the major ideas and policies of his day,39
Kent took a harsher view of the failure of Reinsch's 
mission. He aruged that since the. minister always saw the 
best in men, it was a logical consequence that he would 
attempt to secure a better understanding between the United 
States and China. However, he developed an enduring parti­
sanship towards the Chinese and, without regard to conse­
quence, promised more than his instructions warranted. When 
the Chinese did not get results, they.lost faith in the 
ability of the American government to fulfill its pledges. 
Also, Reinsch's attempts to fashion his own foreign policy 
in the field demonstrated his unfamiliarity with an environ­
39Pugach, "Reinseh," 70-71, 121-22, 263, 362, 587-99.
See also Pugach, Pacific Historical Review, XXXVIII, 157-60, 
163-65, 174-75.
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ment which emphasized intrigue and deception, rather than 
friendship and fair play. Kent considered the lack of 
American political and economic interest in the Orient and 
the role of.Japan only secondary reasons.for Reinsch’s 
failure as a diplomat. He concluded, that the minister, 
actually fared, well as a prophet, accurately predicting 
that increased Japanese encroachment in China would con­
tribute ,to. a. maj or . war . But it was: tragic that an intell- 
gence capable, of pointing out the menace of Japan and the 
importance.of China in the international community should 
have failed in the diplomatic arena in practical a f f a i r s . 40
Although. Gage concluded that.world political and eco­
nomic conditions played a part in defeating Reinsch’s pro­
grams for. China, he, like Kent, placed considerable blame, 
on the minister himself. He claimed Reinseh was the princi­
pal protagonist of American political, financial, and 
cultural imperialism, which he pursued, with great enthusiasm. 
The minister brought to his post many distinctive qualities 
and ideas compatible with Wilson's ideology, expressing them 
as a sense, of. mission in China. His genuine sympathy for 
ancient Chinese culture, in all its aspects, encouraged him 
to consider.it America's duty to assist in developing her 
resources and culture. But this led him to become almost a 
jealous guardian, with the right to influence China left to
4®Kent, Wisconsin Magazine of History, XXXV, 114, 118, 
155-57.
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the United. States. However, on his arrival to China, he 
did not realize that the scene in China.was prearranged by 
the balance of power already in existence, and the internal 
Chinese political and social unrest. Gage continued that 
much of the minister’s activities in China involved Ameri­
can business interests, but he and the.American financiers 
approached, commercial affairs from entirely different per­
spectives. Reinseh modified or ignored details that would 
be insisted upon in regular business transactions. Profit- 
making and.strict financial practices were, for him, secon­
dary to American.national interests and policy. He also 
considered, the war as an opportunity for the United States 
to increase its economic and political influence in China.
But Japan, also regarded the war as an opportunity, and 
Reinseh found himself in a clash of. major consequence, in 
which Japan was.more successful than the American minister. 
Like Kent, Gage realized that Reinseh1s.diplomatic activ­
ities illustrated his determination to construct policy and 
define procedures without instructions. While the minister's 
programs demonstrated good historical insight,legal acumen, 
and his ability to envisage ultimates, they were not always 
practical in view of the problems of the moment. And al­
though Reinsch’s idealism and energy were laudable, he fell 
into many contradictions. For instance, he repeatedly 
asserted that business and economic enterprise were sufficient 
for the execution of American policy in China, but'he often
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resorted to political action of extreme.sorts« The minis­
ter further contended that public opinion would be adequate 
to control Japanese activity in.China, while recommending 
to Washington, that military action be taken against Japan.
In addition, he disclaimed the race for:concessions, but 
engaged in such activities for the United States.41
Gage-and the other historians were,able to elucidate 
many pertinent characteristics of the performance of 
Reinseh ,in. China. There are, however, a few additional- 
points that, might, be. considered. The. minister had the 
intellectual.potential to become a good diplomat. Yet, he 
lacked a certain degree of pragmatism and experience. This 
was manifest, in the program he, developed for China. His eco­
nomic plan to develop China's industrial and agricultural 
potential.,, increase American business interests, and reduce 
European spheres of influence, was essentially positive and 
optimistic, since he envisaged a modernized China of the 
future, prominent in international affairs and closely allied 
to the United States. However, this, dream did not take into 
consideration the existing problems of. internal strife in 
China, the. World War, lingering European interests in Asia, 
and the lack of enthusiasm of American financiers for busi­
ness ventures in China. Also, he unrealistically believed
41Gage, "Reinseh," 46, 54, 141-42,.232-33, 284-85,
387, 404, 427-48, 585, 588-92. See also LaFargue, China 
and the World War, 118, 127, 130; Link, Wilson, III','' '2TS-74.
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that unilateral aid to China from the United States was 
essential. On the other hand, his political goal was 
immediate and negative--to dispel the steady encroachment 
of Japan in,China, which not only endangered Chinese terri- 
torial and, administrative integrity, but threatened the 
increase of American influence in Asia. Realizing, as he 
did, the increasing importance of the Orient, his antago­
nizing and. baiting of the Japanese could create.many problems 
for future American relations there. Thus, Reinsch's pro­
gram became.; a. weak compromise between long-term economic 
goals and immediate political interests; which were incon­
sistent -and. impractical in light of the realities of his 
diplomatic environment.
HENRY LANE WILSON
Wilson's despatches and memoirs substantiate that he 
believed he had made a correct appraisal of conditions in 
Mexico, .and had acted accordingly. The. ambassador also 
flatly denied that he had interfered imprudently in Mexican 
affairs or acted in collusion with Huerta and Diaz to over­
throw Madero.42
Many of the historians who have studied Wilson's ser­
vice in Mexico have endeavored to determine why he inter­
fered in Mexico's internal affairs. The conclusions of 
Charles Curtis Cumberland were typical of many critics of
42por example, see Foreign Relations 1913, 768-76,
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the ambassador. Cumberland claimed that Wilson believed 
Mexicans were fitonly for dictatorship, and that direction 
by a great power, namely the United States, was necessary.
In his ardent desire to return to the Diaz system, the 
ambassador failed to comprehend that conditions in Mexico 
had changed with the rise of Huerta. It was ironic, 
Cumberland, averred, that Wilson's.. desire for the restora­
tion of a government subservient to the.American Embassy 
was almost, completely lost, since Madero-'s overthrow, which 
the ambassador had deliberately or accidentally encouraged, 
led to the death and destruction following the Huerta coup 
and the violent anti-Americanism in Mexican policy for many 
years thereafter.43
While critical of Wilson's performance during the revolu­
tion, Calvert admitted that the ambassador's actions were 
not entirely his own fault. The simultaneous death of his 
brother and the election of Woodrow Wilson as President 
placed the ambassador's career in the balance. Calvert spec­
ulated that.Ambassador Wilson believed that only a great dip­
lomatic victory could save his career,.and when fate presented 
the revolt against Madero, he took the chance, but unjustifi­
ably earned an infamous reputation. Moreover, the Department 
of State was largely responsible for his predicament, since
^Charles Curtis Cumberland, Mexican Revolution Genesis 
Under Madero (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1969. 
Origin a1ly pub1i s he d, Austin: University of Texas Press,
1952), 235-43. See also Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 
16, 261; Link, Wilson, II, 353; Walworth, Wilson, T~t 358-59.
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the Mexican policy of the Democratic administration was 
incoherent and.would have been difficult for the most gifted 
diplomat to. convey. However, Calvert added, the ambassador 
became increasingly unfit for his post, because of his unpre­
dictable and arbitrary behavior, attributable to his intem­
perance, poor health, habitual drinking, and moodiness. He 
also became plagued by rumors and got caught up in the intri­
gues of Mexico, increasingly detaching him from the Wilson 
administration.44
Grieb and Blaisdell also evaluated Wilson in terms of 
character. Grieb believed the ambassador’s moods were the 
major hindrance, to his performance, his short temper his 
primary weakness. Grieb added that Wilson’s inflated ego, 
enhanced by his position as dean of the diplomatic corps in.. 
Mexico City, was also a detriment. These characteristics 
came to the fore as he attempted to promote American business 
interests, and.assure adequate protection for Americans and 
their property in M e x i c o . 45 Blaisdell added that Wilson had 
an active intelligence, a willingness to work hard, a desire 
to represent American interests to the fullest, and a knack 
of acquiring information not ordinarily available. However, 
he was too ambitious and contentious, clashing with many, if 
not all, of his superiors. In addition, the ambassador had
44ciavert, Mexican Revolution, 111, 288. For a less 
speculative account, see Ross, Madero, 237-58.
^Grieb, Huerta, 3-4.
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a meddlesome nature and a pessimistic attitude, which also
influenced his actions.46
Masihgill's evaluation of Wilson was a defense rather 
than an indictment. He argued that it was not a singular 
interest in American business which directed the ambassa­
dor's -activity in Mexico; it was his conviction that a 
country where chaos was so prevalent, like Mexico, needed 
the rule of a strong government. However, the ambassador's 
attitude was not an aberration, since he more often spoke 
for his superiors than for himself. And not until early 
1913, when the Taft administration decided to leave the 
Mexican problem to the Wilson administration, was the ambassa­
dor warned, against meddling. Masingill further insisted that 
the ambassador would have been able to contribute his ex­
perience and talents as a diplomat to the Democratic admin­
istration. However, he was never consulted, since his 
recommendation to recognize Huerta was contrary to the 
President's Mexican policy. Also, Masingill argued, the 
ambassador-was not necessarily responsible for the events 
that occurred in Mexico during the revolution, but given 
his impulsive nature, his tendency to arouse controversy 
gave him a notorious reputation.47
46Blaisdell, Southwestern Social Science Quarterly,
XL, 127-35. ' 1 1 '
4 7]yiasingill, "Henry Lane Wilson," 62-64, 208-09, 230- 
31, 239-45. See also Lowry, "Mexican Policy," iii, 34,
48-49.
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The various.assessments of Wilson's character were 
useful in understanding why the ambassador decided to 
interfere, in internal Mexican.affairs. However, he cannot 
simply be criticized for his intentions. The fact that he 
felt compelled to interfere not only demonstrated what he 
thought the Mexican government should.be, but what authority 
he believed an American ambassador in Mexico had at his 
disposal. His. interference, in some measure, jeopardized 
the ability of his country to develop a~working relation­
ship with Mexico. Trying to solve Mexico's problems by 
overstepping his authority alienated him from Washington, 
made a compromise solution difficult, and set a precedent 
for future unwarranted American intervention in Mexican 
affairs. Wilson's interference itself was the cardinal 
error of his service in Mexico, and all other criticisms 
or accolades are secondary.
FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON
Stimson's self-appraisal was mildly sarcastic and, 
while favorable, was not laudatory. His memoirs were not 
extremely revealing, but attested to,his outspoken nature, 
as exemplified in his censure of the Department of State,48 
His attacks seemed to have arisen from his distrust of the 
professional diplomat, who he believed was unfit in emer­
gency situations. He argued that the career man was often
48For example, see Stimson, My United States, 455.
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out of touch with his home country and. acted only by instruc­
tion, employing.little personal initiative or discretion.49 
Accordingly, his criticism was a defense, of amateur diplomacy 
and, consequently, his own position.
There were few treatments of Stimson1s performance as 
ambassador to Argentina, and none which considered his 
complex character. Harold F. Peterson’s sympathetic account 
went little beyond the exterior of the. man. He characterized 
the Harvard.professor as a neophyte diplomat, with extensive 
public service, who had charm and a "puckish humor." Stim­
son' s erect carriage, grey hair, and pointed beard got him 
the nickname "Jesus in a dress suit." Peterson further 
asserted that no American visualized the. weaknesses of the 
Department of State more effectively than Stimson and, at 
the end of his service in Argentina, the ambassador set 
forth some workable recommendations for the improvement.of 
the Department and the diplomatic corps. For example, he 
recommended a closer relationship between commerce and 
diplomacy in Latin America, believing, that the chiefs-of- 
mission should, coordinate all the reports of commercial 
attaches and consuls to assure a reliable flow of informa­
tion upon which to base policy.50
49Ibid., 374-75.
^°Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States 
1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York, 1964)
304, 344.
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Peterson did not seem to realize that, although Stim­
son was -a perceptive critic, he. was also a victim of his 
own criticisms. He blamed the Department of State for 
having little confidence in the ability of its envoys, while 
he demonstrated a similar lack of trust in the Department, 
even denying the authority it represented. He argued that 
the Department was imperious and discourteous, corresponded 
inadequately, and publicized confidential despatches imprud­
ently. However, besides arrogantly holding himself aloof 
from the Department of State and its activities, Stimson 
assumed that.his conclusions and evaluations were preferable 
to those of.his;superiors, and indiscriminately gave impor­
tant despatches, to the Associated. Press, for publication. 
Furthermore, he accused professional diplomats of lacking 
innovation, and. adaptability, as if amateurs, like himself, 
innately possessed such qualities and were able to utilize 
them without any diplomatic experience. Thus, when Stim- 
son's actions as well as his words are.considered, he 
presents quite a paradox as.a diplomat.
While historians differed in their evaluations of the 
chiefs-of-mission under Wilson, the self-appraisals of the 
diplomats were quite similar. And although the diplomats 
did not assert that they had brought every task to a success­
ful conclusion, they firmly avowed that they had tried their 
best.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Although the diplomats under discussion intended to 
serve their country well, and often exhibited humanitarian 
concern for the foreign nationals and actively supported 
relief programs, they generally performed poorly. There 
were three.major shortcomings, intricately woven together, 
which hampered, them: 1) lack of ability, and preparedness
for their posts; 2) problems concerning relations with the 
foreign government; 3) problems concerning relations with 
the home government.
Of the various inadequacies of these diplomats, inex­
perience in foreign affairs was the salient characteristic. 
With the exception of Egan, Herrick, Wilson, and to a minor 
degree, Morris, the conglomeration of businessmen, politic­
ians, college professors, and lawyers, lacked practical 
exposure to the intricacies of diplomatic life prior to 
their appointments. Abundant examples have been presented 
which demonstrated many of the problems.created by placing 
inexperienced men in unfamiliar positions of responsibility, 
Gerard was an excellent example. He had difficulty even 
determining which officials in Germany represented authority. 
He also, for a time, placed excessive faith in German peace 
offers, and could not clearly distinguish between genuine
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offers and diplomatic maneuvers. In addition, his reports 
often neglected substantive issues, and emphasized such 
manifestations as the German "hate campaigns." Similarly, 
Whitlock was not a shrewd observer, more concerned with the 
details of. the work of the Belgian relief program than the 
German activity in Western Europe and especially Belgium.
It is difficult to determine when inexperience ends 
and naivete begins, since, in many, cases, they are closely 
allied. Some of the diplomats were gullible, and accepted 
almost everything they observed at face.value. Francis was 
possibly the most glaring example. He was not only unfamil­
iar with Russia, but he drew many superficial conclusions 
about the revolution and its participants. He equated the 
rise to power of the Provisional Government with American 
political ideals; he neglected the war.-weariness of the 
Russian people, while advocating that they continue the war 
against Germany; and he labeled Lenin as an anarchist, 
damning the Bolsheviks because he thought they were, under 
German influence. Whitlock, Gerard, Vopicka, Morgenthau, 
and Page were similarly unfamiliar with.the political prob­
lems of Europe and the rest of the world. Even Reinseh, 
who was purported to be a competent reporter, often accepted 
the statements of Chinese officials without question.
Some of the chiefs-of-mission of.the Wilson adminis­
tration were also self-deluded. For instance, Page actually 
assumed that his threat to resign influenced the Department
189
of State to accept his proposal for the resolution of the 
controversy over the Declaration of London., In similar 
situations, Egan credited himself with, a preeminent role 
in the purchase of the Danish West Indies, and Whitlock 
believed himself an indispensable part, of the Belgian 
relief program. These illusions, unfortunately lacking 
the benefit of perspective, often resulted in exaggerating 
the role of the envoy.
Possibly the most serious self-delusion is unrestrained 
idealism. It goes without saying that.idealism is not 
inherently destructive for the diplomat, but when it becomes 
an obsession, it can hinder if not obstruct his: day-to-day 
activities. The concept of "world order" which Page and 
Reinseh held bordered upon obsession. Both were dedicated 
to the rise of the United States as a great international 
power. In the mind of Page, the United.States especially 
needed to become an active agent in. European affairs through 
an alliance with Great Britain. With the war, the United 
States assumed a more dramatic role in his mind--to save 
the world from the "Hun," and preserve."democracy„" Reinseh 
believed the United States needed to increase its influence 
in Asia through a close association.with.China, since he felt 
the Orient had the potential for significance in international 
affairs. Also, both Page and Reinseh. attempted to execute 
their goals without due regard for the. practicalities of 
their day or the wishes and desires of their own government,
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the host government, and other nations of the world. Their 
quest became personal. Their partisanship for their host 
country increased, almost at the sacrifice of their duty 
to the United States. They distrusted, individuals and 
governments which opposed their ends, i.e., Germany for 
Page, Japan for Reinseh. These envoys sometimes promised 
more to the host country than they could deliver, often 
exaggerating the power and wealth of the United States, Page
and Reinseh became almost self-righteous and inflexible.
Partisanship and its counterpart,. disdain and distrust, 
are the most obvious problems concerning the diplomat's 
relations with the foreign government. Biases, of course, 
are natural for all human beings, but when they contribute 
to an envoy's errors in judgment, prejudiced reports, and 
unwarranted, conflicts, they are detrimental. Vopicka's 
hatred for the Central Powers was demonstrated in many in­
judicious, ways while he was still a neutral minister. The 
pro-British sentiments of Page often,led him to support 
English policy over American. Herrick's love of France was
excessive. The overtly dramatic despatches of Francis, 
which decried the Bolsheviks, were misleading. And some of 
Whitlock's reports almost bled. The examples are endless.
Interference in the internal affairs of the foreign 
country is possibly the most serious charge that can be 
leveled against the diplomats of the Wilson administration, 
especially because of the numerous instances of such inter-
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ference. Not only was relations of.the envoy with the host 
country jeopardized, but he was telling the foreign govern­
ment--"! know what is best for you." Henry Lane Wilson most 
clearly exemplified a diplomat who.overstepped his authority, 
and complicated the relations between.his government and the
foreign government. However, other diplomats during the Wil­
son administration were equally guilty.of impolitic inter­
ference, including Francis, Vopicka, and Morgenthau.
Poor relations with the home government was not a prob­
lem for most of the envoys who have been discussed. Of
course, difficulties in communications, between the Department 
of State and the chiefs-of-mission were.recurrent, most 
dramatically in the case of Stimson. Page and Henry Lane 
Wilson had the most serious conflicts with the administration; 
Gerard and Reinseh had conflicts to a lesser degree. Most of 
these problems concerned disputes over, policy or were person­
ality clashes. However, the administration reacted differently 
in each caser-Henry Lane Wilson was, dismissed, Page was 
ignored, Gerard was neglected, and. Reinseh was pacified. In 
all these instances, .the envoy was as. uncompromising as the 
administration, and thus must*be equally criticized.
All of the shortcomings discussed restricted the effec­
tiveness of the diplomats during the Wilson administration.
%
Yet, the question that needs to be answered is to what degree 
these inadequacies can be attributed to amateurism, since 
most of the problems could be exhibited by the professional
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as well,, Inexperience in foreign affairs impeded the 
amateur diplomats, and it was aggravated by the coming of 
World War I. The unfamiliarity of the amateurs with the 
day-to-day.routine of diplomatic life, with the foreign 
governments and their leaders, and with.the variety and 
complexity.of diplomatic duties, was compounded by the 
increased responsibilities which the war imposed,, As 
neutral ministers and ambassadors, these men (with the 
exception of Henry Lane Wilson and Stimson) acquired such 
tasks as .assuming the interests of a number of other 
countries, inspecting prison camps, and.developing and 
executing relief programs. The expanded duties of the 
envoy during this period would have been.difficult for the 
most seasoned diplomat. Thus many of the amateurs faltered 
and were often overwhelmed by their duties. Also, they 
frequently, acted intemperately-- interfering in internal 
affairs, exhibiting profound biases, and reporting with a 
dramatic flare. Similarly, it was not difficult to under­
stand why men such as Morgenthau, Page,.Whitlock, and Reinseh 
became frustrated and disillusioned when their ideals were 
dashed.
The chiefs-of-mission under discussion were almost 
universally unprepared by their backgrounds and experiences 
to become diplomats. Unlike the professionals, they began 
their service without the benefit of diplomatic training or 
apprenticeship. Therefore, through hindsight, it must be
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concluded that many of the amateurs should never have been 
appointed. The use of spoils politics by the Wilson admin­
istration might have paid many political debts, but it pro­
duced a number of envoys who were, in large measure, unfit 
to serve.
However, the Wilson administration, was not unique in 
appointing, amateurs as chiefs-of-mission. As has been 
demonstrated, this practice was common during the period 
of the rise of the United States as a world power. It 
would seem that a strong trend toward.professionalizing the 
ambassadorial and ministerial posts should have occurred 
during this period, since the consular service and the 
subordinate positions in the diplomatic corps had been 
placed on the merit system. Yet, it was. ironic indeed 
that a government which demanded training and experience 
of its consular officials and diplomatic, secretaries, 
would simultaneously allow political favorites, heavy 
campaign contributors, and businessmen to lead these sub­
ordinates and represent American interests abroad.
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ment. He was too speculative about Wilson's 
motivations, however.
Childs, J. Rives. American Foreign Service. New York: 
Holt and Co., 1948.
The account was brief and to the point, 
but it should have included a few more examples.
Coletta, Paolo E. Progressive Politician and Moral 
Statesman 1009-1915, Vol. IT of William 
Jennings Bryan. Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1969.
This work contributed some helpful infor­
mation about Bryan's role .in the appointment .of 
chiefs-of-mission, although the interpretations 
were not new.
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Cramer, C.H. Newton D. Baker A Biography, Cleveland: 
The World Publishing Co7, 1961„
There were no useful comments about the 
appointment of Whitlock .in this work, However, 
Cramer made some criticisms of Walter Hines Page.
Crane, Katherine. Mr. Carr of State Forty-Seven Years 
in the" Department of StatFI New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1960.
Carr's long career.in the Department of 
State made him an important subject in the study 
of the professionalization of the Foreign Service. 
However, there were few comments about the appoint­
ments during the administration of Wilson, or 
Bryan's role in the selection process.
Crunden, Robert M. A Hero In Spite of Himself: Brand 
Whitlock in Art, Politics, and War. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.
This was possibly the best-balanced 
account of Whitlock's performance in Belgium. It 
was still somewhat superficial, however, since 
Crunden did not give sufficient attention to the 
reasons for the ineffectiveness of the minister.
Cumberland, Charles Curtis. Mexican Revolution Genesis 
Under Madero. New York: Greenwood Press, 
Publishers, 1969; Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1952.
Cumberland's analysis of Henry Lane Wilson 
was brief, but lucid.
Curry, Roy Watson. Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern 
Policy 1915-19 21. New York: Bookman
Associates, 1957.
The comments about Reinsch were not abun­
dant, but this work is.a standard study of Wilson's 
policy toward China and Japan.
DeNovo, John A. American Interests and Policies in the 
Middle East 1900-1939. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1963,
The broad nature of the work did not 
allow for a comprehensive analysis of Morgenthau. 
The few comments about him emphasized his concern 
for the Armenians, but did not go much farther.
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Dodd, William H. Woodrow Wilson and His Work. Garden 
City, Hew York: Doubleday, Page and Co. , 
1920.
Dodd was almost defensive about Wilson's 
appointments to the major diplomatic posts.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. The ̂ Road ..to Teheran The Story 
of Russia and.America 1781-1943.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1944sDulles recognized-Francis's naivete as 
ambassador to Russia, and its effects on his 
despatches to Washington.
Evans, Laurence. United States Policy and the
Partition of Turkey 1914-192TI Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963.
This study was of little value in ex­
plaining the role of Morgenthau in Turkey.
Fifield, Russell H. Woodrow Wilson and the Far East 
The Diplomacy of the Shantung Question.
New York: Thomas V. Crowell Co., 1952.
This was a useful supplement to Curry, 
for an understanding of Wilson's Asian policy. 
However, Fifield's evaluation of Reinsch was too 
brief and too laudatory.
Gibson, Hugh. The Road to Foreign Policy«, Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 
1944.
Gibson's strongly critical account of the 
diplomatic corps demonstrated some of the serious 
weaknesses of non-professionals as envoys.
Grattan, C. Hartley, Why We Fought. New York: The 
Vanguard Press, 19 29.
Grattan was critical of almost all phases 
of American foreign policy during World War I.
Thus, his book should be used-with care.
Gregory, Ross. Walter Hines Page Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James's. Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1970. 
Gregory's objective and informative study 
was a lucid reevaluation of a complex ambassador.
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Grieb, Kenneth J. The United States and Huerta.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1969.
Grieb attempted to present a balanced 
view of Henry Lane Wilson, but his prejudice 
against the Mexican policy of President Wilson 
was too obvious.
Griswold, A. Whitney. The Far Eastern Policy of.the
United States. New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Co . , 19 38 „ . .
Although dated, this is a necessary over­
view for the study of United States Asian policy.
Haley, P. Edward. Revolution and Intervention: The
Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 
1910-1917 . Cambridge: M.I.T. Press , 11)70 „ 
This new study of the revolutionary 
period in Mexico presented nothing new concerning 
the performance of Henry Lane Wilson. There was 
too much reliance upon United States sources.
Ilchman, Warren Frederick. Professional Diplomacy in 
the United States 1779-1939. A Study in 
Administrative History. Chicago: Univer- 
sity of Chicago Press, 1961.
This was a well-researched study, 
especially useful for its analysis of the effects 
of professionalism upon the consular and diplomatic 
services. However, Ilchman did not give sufficient 
attention to'the use of spoils politics in the 
appointment of ministers and ambassadors.
Jessup, Philip C. Elihu Root. New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Co., 19 38. .
Jessup provided some useful comments 
about Francis.
Johnson, Allen; Malone, Dumas; Starr, Harris E.; eds. 
Dictionary - of.American Biography.
Vol. VI-XXI. New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1931-44.
The biographical data was useful, but 
the interpretations were often poorly supported.
205
Kennan, George F. Soviet-American - Relations 1917-1920, 
Two vo 1 umes’.T.Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1956, 1958.
Kennan's sympathetic evaluation o£
Francis's appointment, his - negotiations, his 
reporting, and his ceremonial performance, was 
useful.
Kerney, James. The Political Education of Woodrow
Wi 1 son. New York: The Century Co., 1926. 
The editor.and publisher of the Trenton 
Evening Times had a close association with the 
Wilson administration. For this reason, he was 
able to provide some valuable information about 
various diplomatic . appointments However, since 
he relied primarily upon his personal experiences 
during the Wilson, administrations to write his 
book, his comments should be scrutinized carefully.
LaFargue, Thomas Edward. China and the World War.
Palo Alto, California: Stanford Univer- 
sity Press, 1937.
There were relatively few comments about 
the role of Reinsch in China.
Laserson, Max M. The American Impact on Russia-
Diplomatic and Ideological--17 84-1917.
New York: MacMillan Co., 1950.
Laserson's evaluation of Francis was 
typical of many critics.
Law, Frederick H. Modern Great Americans. Freeport,
New York: JBooks for Libraries Press,
1969. Originally published in 1926.
This was only useful insofar as it gave 
some biographical information about Van Dyke.
Li, Tien-yi. Woodrow Wilson's China Policy 1913-1917.
New York: University of Kansas City Press - 
Twayne Publishers,-1952.
Li's assessment of Reinsch was superficial, 
due primarily to his sympathy for the involvement 
of the American minister in the complicated Asian 
problems.
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Link, Arthur S. Wilson. Five volumes. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1947, 1956, 
1960, 1964, 1965.
Link's biography of Wilson was indis­
pensable for this study. The discussion of various 
appointments was especially important. However, 
Link's evaluations of the diplomats were somewhat 
uneven--he could-be overly critical or too sym­
pathetic.
 ________ . Wilson the Diplomatist--A Look at His
Major Foreign .Policies^ Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press , T9 57.
This was helpful .for an understanding of 
Wilson's motivations for his foreign policy.
_____________ . Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era
1910-1917. New York: Harper and Brothers 
Publishers, 19 54.
Many of the segments in this work relat­
ing to the diplomatic corps can be found in 
Link's Wilson.
Long, J.C. Bryan The Great Commoner. New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 192 8.
This dated.and.poorly researched work was 
of little value in the.study of Bryan's role in 
the selection of diplomats.
Mamatey, Victor S. The United States and East Central 
Europe 1914-1918 A Study in, Wilsonian 
Diplomacy and Propaganda. Princeton: 
Princeton Univers tty Press, 1957 .
Mamatey included-One of the few accounts 
of Vopicka's role as minister, although it was 
highly critical and condemning.
May, Ernest R. Imperial Democracy The Emergence of 
America as a Great PowerT New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961.
May's interpretation.of the ascendency 
of the United States as a world power after the 
Spanish-American War was worthy of consideration, 
and a good background - for an understanding of 
American diplomacy during the early twentieth 
century.
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_____________ . The World War and American Isolation
1914-1917. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1766. .Originally published in 
19 59.
There was little discussion of the 
American diplomats during the World War I period, 
although this work .provided a ,good background for 
an understanding of American neutrality.
Mayer, Arno J. Political Origins of the New Diplomacy 
191V-1918. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1959.
Mayer placed little emphasis on the per­
formance of the various diplomats.
Millis, Walter. Road to War America 1914-1917.
Cambridge : TKe\Riverside Press, T9 35.
Millis's colorful narrative should be 
viewed with caution.
Morrissey, Alice M. The American.Defense of Neutral 
Rights 1914-1917. Cambridge: Harvard 
University.Press, 1939.
Morrissey's few comments about Gerard.were 
quite general, and she ignored the.performances of 
many of the other chiefs-of-mission in Europe.
National Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vols.
XXXIII, XLIX. New York: James T. White 
and Co., 1947, 1966. .
The articles about Gerard and Schmedeman 
were informative.
Nicolson, Harold. Diplomacy. London: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1963. Originally published 
in 1939.
Nicolson's colorful prose made his "ideal" 
diplomat quite vivid.
_____________The Evolution of Diplomatic Method.
New York: The MacMillan Co., 1954.
The chapters were originally Chichele lec­
tures at Oxford University and were concise, but 
highly informative. This .is an excellent first 
source for the study of any phase of diplomacy.
Notter, Harley. The Origins of the Foreign Policy of 
Woodrow Wilson! Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins' Press',' 1937.
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One of the .first works to attempt to syn­
thesize the foreign policy of Wilson, Notter's 
work included some general comments about many of 
the newly appointed diplomats, but little detail.
Page, Rosewell. Thomas Nelson Page A Memoir of a 
Virginia Gentleman. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1923.
Brother.Rosewell's discussion of the 
appointment of Thomas Nelson Page to Italy was 
possibly the most thorough.
Palmer, Frederick. Newton D. Baker America at War.
New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1931.. 
Palmer included a few pertinent comments 
about the performance.of Walter Hines Page in 
London. The association between Baker and Whit­
lock was not clearly made, however.
Perkins, Bradford, The Great.Rapprochement England 
and the.United.States 1895-1914, New 
York: Antheneum, l9b8.
Perkins gave.little .attention to Page's 
first two years in England.
Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States 
1810- 196(h New York: State University 
of New York,.1964.
The discussion of Stimson was not very
fruitful.
Rappaport, Armin. The British Press and Wilsonian 
Neutrality. Palo .Alto, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1951.
Rappaport was not seriously concerned 
with Page's activities in London.
Ross, Stanley R, Francis I. Madero Apostle of
Mexican Democracy. New Yo rk: Columbia 
University Press,. 1955.
Ross presented a well-balanced and well- 
written account.of Henry Lane Wilson's performance 
in Mexico, especially.his .relations with the 
Madero government.
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Selle, Earl Albert. Donald of China. New York:
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1948.
Selle .asserted.that.William Henry Donald, 
an Australian journalist, who worked in the inner 
political circles of the Manchus, was almost a 
legendary figure. Donald had.acted as a inter­
mediary between.Reinsch and .the Chinese government, 
and many episodes in . this work revealed the com- 
plex internal difficulties in China with which the 
minister had to cope.
Seymour, Charles. American Diplomacy During the
World War. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1934.
This is a standard study of the period, 
like Notter's, but it is quite dated. He gave 
minimal attention to the American chiefs-of- 
mission in Europe.
Smith, Daniel M. The Great.Departure The.United
States and World War .I 191.4-19.20. New 
York: John Wiley and -Sons, Inc., 1965. 
Smith's selective bibliography of secon­
dary works was impressive.
_____________ . Robert Lansing and American Neutrality
1914-17. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1958.
Smith gave a brief account of the rela­
tions between Lansing and Page.
Spaulding, E. Wilder. Ambassadors Ordinary and Extra­
ordinary . Washington D.C.: Public Affairs 
Press, 1961.
Spaulding's evaluations of the major 
diplomats during the Wilson administration were, 
not original. This seemed to be a popularization 
of the diplomatic corps, rather than a genuine 
research study.
Stephenson, George M. John Lind of Minnesota.
Minneapolis! The.University of Minnesota 
Press, 1935.
This study had disappointingly little 
about Henry Lane Wilson.
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Stuart, Graham H. American Diplomatic and Consular 
Practice, New York: D. Appleton- 
Century Co., 1936.
This work was necessary for an under­
standing of the functions and duties of the 
American envoy. However, Stuart's discussion 
of the history of the Foreign Service was 
sketchy, and his evaluations of the diplomats 
under Wilson were superficial.
_____________ . The Department of State A History of
Its Organization,' Procedure, and Per- 
sonne 1J New York: MacMi1lan Co., TST49. 
There were some brief discussions of the 
diplomatic appointments under Wilson.
 ________ . Latin America and the United States.
New York: The Century Co., 1922.
This work was of no value for an assess­
ment of the diplomatic posts in Latin America 
during the administrations of Wilson.
Tager, Jack. The Intellectual as Urban Reformer 
Brand Whitlock and the Progressive 
Movement. Cleveland: The Press of 
Case Western Reserve University,
1968.
The emphasis of this study was not foreign 
relations of the United States or Whitlock's role 
as minister to Belgium, Consequently, Tager's 
comments on these subjects were superficial and 
unauthoritative.
Tansill, Charles Callan. America Goes to War. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1942. Originally 
published in 1938.
There were a number of comments about 
Gerard and some of the other chiefs-of-mission in 
Europe, but Tansill never presented a lucid 
evaluation of the diplomatic corps during World 
War I.
_____________ „ The Purchase of the Danish West Indies.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932.
Tansill not only provided the most com­
prehensive assessment of Egan's role in the 
negotiations for the islands, but indicated-some 
of the inconsistencies in the minister's memoirs. 
His general evaluation of Egan's performance was 
quite limited, however.
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Tarulis, Albert N. American-Baltic Relations 1918- 
192 2: The Struggle Over Recognition! 
Washington B.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1965.
This work was of little value in discus­
sing the role of Francis, Egan and Morris. In fact, 
Tarulis did not use the memoirs of Morris.
Tassier, Suzanne. La Belgique et.L'Entree en Guerre 
des Etats-Unis (1914-1917). Bruxelles:
La Renaissance du Livre, 1951.
Tassier was sympathetic to Whitlock, 
although she mentioned him infrequently.
Thayer, Charles W. Diplomat-. New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 19 59.
Thayer was a useful supplement to Ilch­
man and Stuart. His discussion of the qualities 
needed by an ambassador was especially worthwhile.
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram. New York: 
The Viking Press, 19 58.
Tuchman did not develop the relationship 
between Gerard and the German Foreign Office very 
clearly.
Unterberger, Betty Miller. America’s Siberian 
Expedition, 1918-1920 A Study of 
National Policy. Durham, North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 1956.
This is a standard study of the Siberian 
Expedition. Unterberger lucidly described the 
reactions of Francis and Reinsch to the idea of 
Allied intervention in Russia.
Walworth, Arthur. Woodrow Wilson. Two volumes. New 
York: Logmans, Green and Co., 1958.
This work is overshadowed by Link's 
biography.
Welles, Sumner, Naboth's Vineyard The Dominican 
Republic 1844-1924. 'New York: Pay son 
and Clarke Ltd,, 19 28,
Welles was- critical of Bryan's role in 
the appointment of Sullivan,
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White, John Albert. The_Siberian Intervention.
Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1950.
Unterberger’s work is more thorough than 
his study.
Willert, Arthur. The .Road-to-Safety A Study in 
Anglo-American-Relations. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, ..1953.,
Willert's treatment o£ Page was sketchy.
Williams, William Appleman., American-Russian Relations 
1781-1947. New York: Rinehart and Co., 
1952.
This was .an. interesting contrast to Kennan, 
since Williams was critical of Francis. However, 
his discussion was too brief.
Willson, Beckles. America's Ambassadors to France 
(1777-1927) A Narrative of Branco-. 
American biplbmatic Relations. FTew. York: 
Frederick A. Stokes Co., 19 2 8.
_____________ . America's Ambassadors to England
(1785-1929) A Narrative of Anglo- 
American Diploma tic. Relations . New York: 
Frederick. A. Stokes Co., 1929.
These two works were disappointing. 
Willson's research-was. inadequate, and his inter­
pretations were shallow.
B. Articles
Adler, Selig. "Bryan and Wilsonian Caribbean Penetra­
tion. " Hispanic American Historical 
Review, XX (May, 19T0)', '198-226.
This was useful background for an under­
standing of. Wilsonian, policy in Latin America, 
but little was mentioned about the various dip­
lomatic appointments to Latin America.
Bailey, Thomas A. "The. Sinking of the Lusitania." 
American Historical. Review, XLI 
(October, 193 ip , 5iV73.
This article, clarified many misconceptions 
about the sinking of the Cunard liner.
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Blaisdell, Lowell L. "Henry.Lane Wilson and the 
Overthrow of.-Madero,/' Southwestern 
Social Science Quarterly, XL 
(September, 1962)., 126-35.
Blaisdell presented.a moderate criticism 
of Ambassador Wilson's activities in Mexico, but 
did not introduce much new evidence.
Coletta, Paolo E. "Secretary of State William
Jennings Bryan and .'.Deserving Democrats.'" 
Mi d - Arne r i ca,. XLVI11 (April, 1966), 75-98. 
Coletta gave more pertinent information 
about Bryan's use of ..spoils politics in this 
article than in his biography.
Daniel, Robert L. "The Armenian Question and
American-Turkish Relations, 1914-19 27." 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XLVI (September, 1959) , 252-275.
Daniel did. not give much attention to 
Morgenthau'.s concern, for. the . Armenian genocide, 
but the article was useful background.
_____________ . "The Friendship of Woodrow Wilson and
Cleveland ...Ho.. Dodge.." Mid-America, XLIII 
(July, 1961), 18 2-96-
Dodge's offers of-financial support to 
Page and other diplomatic nominees were made clear.
Gregory, Ross. "A Look at the Case of the Dacia." 
Journal of American History, LV 
(September, 1968), 29 2-96.
This short article ..presented an excellent 
clarification of the case of the "Dacia." It also 
demonstrated that.the effectiveness of Page as a 
diplomat was not necessarily what it seemed.
_____________ . "The Superfluous .Ambassador: Walter
Hines Page '.,s_ Return to Washington 1916." 
The Historian, XXVIII (May, 1966),
389-404.
Gregory demonstrated how Page had fallen 
out of favor with the Wilson administration.
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Harvey, George. "The Diplomats of Democracy." North 
American Review, February, 1914,. 161-74.. 
Harvey's frustration at not being offered 
a diplomatic sinecure was apparent in this article. 
Probably most noteworthy was his characterization 
of the appointments ..to Latin America as a 
"political debauchery." His indictment of Bryan 
was severe.
Kennan, George F. "The Sisson Documents." Journal of 
Modern History, XXVIII (March, 19 56), 
130-54.
This article clarified the nature of the 
documents and why they were exploited as evidence 
that Lenin and possibly Trotsky were in the pay 
of the Germans.. Kennan did not give substantial 
attention to the attitude of Francis.
Kent, Alan E. "Down From the Ivory Tower: Paul 
Samuel Reinsch, Minister to China." 
Wisconsin Magazine ,of History, XXXV 
(Winter, 1951), 114-18.
Kent was severely critical of Reinsch's 
qualifications for the post in Peking, and con­
cluded that he failed.as a diplomat as a result.
His comment that .Reinsch*s educational back­
ground was not compensation for his lack of 
practical experience as a diplomat was quite 
enlightening.
Kohlenberg, Gilbert C. "David Rowland Francis:
American Businessman in Russia." Mid- 
America, XL (October, 1958), 19 5-217. 
Kohlenberg's concentration upon Francis's 
commercial negotiations was warranted, since it 
has been established that the improvement of 
commercial relations with Russia was one of the 
ambassador's primary duties.
$
Lasch, Christopher. "American Intervention in
Siberia: A .Reinterpretation." Political 
Science Quarterly, LXXVII (June~ 1962), 
205-223.
Lasch believed Francis was no less con­
fused about the situation in Russia than anyone 
else.
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Leopold, Richard W. "The Problem of American Inter- 
vention, 1917 A Historical Retrospect." 
World Politics, II (October, 1949 to 
July, 19 50)," 405-25,
This was a helpful bibliographical aid.
Luce, Clare Boothe. "The Ambassadorial Issue: Pro­
fessionals or Amateurs?" Foreign Affairs, 
XXXVI (October , 19 5 7) , .10 5-21V. — ~  "
Most of Luce's examples were from.the 
period after World War.. I., . but her discussion of 
the role of the diplomat^could easily be applied 
to the appointments during any administration.
Padgett, James A. "Diplomats to Haiti and Their.
Diplomacy." The Journal of Negro History, 
XXV (July, 1940), 265-330. ~  "
The biographical. information about 
Wilson's ministers to Haiti was useful.
Pugach, Noel Harvey. "Making the Open Door Work:
Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919." 
Pacific Historical .Review, XXXVIII 
(May, 1969), .157?75.
Reinsch .was discussed in more detail in 
Pugach's doctoral. dissertation.. In this 
article, Pugach emphasi-zed..Reinsch's commercial 
activities in China.
Shelton, Brenda Kurtz. "President Wilson and the 
Russian Revolution." University of 
Buffalo Studies, XXIII (March, 1957), 
111-55.
Shelton was mildly critical of Francis 
and made only passing references to him.
Stevens, Walter B. "David R. Francis, Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to 
Russia." The Missouri Historical 
Review, XIII (April,. 1919), 195-225.
This article was. a laudatory account 
rather than a research study. It included.little 
of value concerning . the ambassador's performance 
in Russia.
Unterberger, Betty Miller. "President Wilson and the 
Decision to Send American Troops to 
Siberia." Pacific Historical Review,
XXIV (February, 19 55), 63-74.
The information in this article was-in- 
cluded in her book, America's Siberian Expedition.
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Van Alstyne, Richard W.. "The Policy of the United 
States Regarding .the-Declaration of 
London, at the Outbreak of the Great 
War," Journal .of Modern History, VII 
(December, .’19 3 5), - 434r47.
Van Alstyne was quite critical of Page's 
role in the negotiations over the Declaration 
and Hendrick’s interpretation of Page's role,
Watson, Richard L. "Woodrow Wilson and His Inter­
preters 1947-1957," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XLIV (September, 1957), 
20 7-36,
This article is dated, but still valuable.
Wolgemuth, Kathleen Long, "Woodrow Wilson's Appoint­
ment Policy and the Negro," Journal of 
Southern History, XXIV (November, 1954), 
457-80.
Wolgemuth's article was useful for.its 
description of the appointment of Curtis to 
Liberia. It also made clear that few negroes 
were appointed to prominent positions in the 
Wilson administration.
I I I .  Secondary Materials--Unpublished
DeYoung, Charles Daniel. "David Rowland Francis-- 
American in Russia," Unpublished M.A.* 
thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1949, 
This was one of the few works dealing, 
with the ambassador to.Russia. However, DeYoung's 
conclusions were too speculative, and he relied 
upon United States sources exclusively.
Gage, Daniel James. "Paul S. Reinsch and Sino-
American Relations . Unpublished-Ph. D. 
dissertation, Stanford-University, 1939. 
Gage's treatment .of Reinsch was balanced, 
although his style was uninspired.
Lowry, Philip Holt. "The Mexican Policy of Woodrow
Wilson." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Yale University, 1949.
Lowry was critical of the President and 
sympathetic towards., the . ambassador. However , his 
evaluation of ...the. latter was neither original nor 
detailed.
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Masingill, Eugene Frank, "The Diplomatic Career of 
Henry Lane Wilson in.Latin America," 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana 
State University, 1957.
Masingill spent too much time defending 
Ambassador Wilson's actions.
Pugach, Noel Harvey. "Progress,~Prosper!ty and the
Open Door: The Ideas and Career of Paul S. 
Reinsch." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University .of-Wisconsin., 1967.
This, former student.of William Appleman 
Williams emphasized Reinsch's writings, which was 
noteworthy. And.his discussion of the minister's 
activities in China.was.substantive. However, 
Pugach's conclusions were .weak--almost defensive 
rather than analytical.
Thorburn, Neil Alfred. "Brand Whitlock: An Intellec­
tual Biography." Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Northwestern University, 
1965.
Thorburn examined the influence upon 
Whitlock's intellectual development. Consequently 
there was not.much information on the minister's 
diplomatic experience, and what was included was 
very general and speculative.
